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Abstract
The Eurozone has faced repeated crises and has experienced profound transformations in the past years. This thematic
issue seeks to address the questions arising from the changing governance structure of the Eurozone. First, how have the
negotiations, pressures of the crises and reforms impacted the relationships between key actors like EU institutions and
Member States? Second, where did national positions come from and what role did domestic politics play in the negotia-
tions? And finally, to what extent has the evolution of Eurozone governance left room for adequate control mechanisms
and democratic debate? The articles in this issue highlight the developing role of Member States, domestic politics and
democratic and legal control mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Eurozone governance was in the beginning of this cen-
tury dominated by an asymmetric institutional structure
mostly relying on a strong monetary pillar and fiscal
constraints stipulated in the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP; Howarth & Verdun, 2020). The contagion effect
of the international financial crisis painfully highlighted
the inadequacy of this governance structure and avail-
able response mechanisms, as Eurozone Member States
struggled to protect their economies and contain the
growth of public debt. In the course of successive crises
since 2007, a wide range of reform ideas were launched
to strengthen the governance structure with more inte-
grated financial, fiscal and economic policy tools (Chang,
2016). In parallel, the European Central Bank (ECB) intro-
duced non-standard measures to cushion the adverse
impact on banks.
Economic policy coordination was enhanced by the
so-called ‘Six-Pack,’ ‘Two-Pack’ and the Fiscal Compact,
which strengthened the SGP and introduced the
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. These reforms,
streamlined under the European Semester, were
intended to facilitate sanctions under the SGP, reinforce
fiscal discipline and make surveillance more elaborate
so that imbalances could be identified and addressed
earlier (Bauer & Becker, 2014).
The introduction of the multi-pillar structure of the
banking union was intended to reinforce the stability of
the European banking system, for example through a
single rule book for banks and several instruments for
Eurozone banks. The main objective was to break the
sovereign-bank doom-loop by putting financial institu-
tions under a common supervisory and resolution frame-
work and to create a common deposit insurance system
(Dehousse, 2016). The Single Supervisory Mechanism
and a Single Resolution Mechanism were adopted in
2013 and 2014, whereas political deadlock prevented
the adoption of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2016). Likewise, agreements on
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detailed implementation of banking union components
such as the Single Resolution Fund, the financial back-
bone of the Single Resolution Mechanism, proved to
be problematic.
The crises also highlighted the lack of an effective
financial support structurewithin the Eurozone.Member
States created various bailout funds in and outside of
the EU legal framework with the European Stability
Mechanism becoming the centrepiece for Eurozone
assistance in 2012 (Ioannou, Leblond, & Niemann, 2015).
Between 2010 and 2015, EU and Eurozone Member
States channelled assistance through the European
StabilityMechanismandothermechanismsoften accom-
panied by International Monetary Fund support and
strict austeritymeasures. The ECB also createdmonetary
stabilisation instruments by enlarging its long-term lend-
ing operations and engaging in bond purchases on the
secondary market, with the latter creating controversy
on both the national and European level.
However, disagreements betweenMember States or
between national governments and European institu-
tions delayed some decisions and led to foot-dragging
and slow implementation of others, as is the case with
the banking union. A few years after the beginning of
the reform efforts, the so-called Five Presidents’ Report
called for new efforts in reforming Eurozone gover-
nance and for completing the Economic and Monetary
Union. Amongst other elements it particularly empha-
sised the need to establish the European Deposit
Insurance Scheme, a backstop for the Single Resolution
Fund and to setup a common fiscal capacity to cush-
ionmacroeconomic shocks (Juncker, 2015). However, dis-
agreement on the detailed design of these and other
issues remained and curtailed the reform process of
Eurozone governance.
The repeated crises faced by the Eurozone and the
profound transformations it has experienced raise impor-
tant questions that this thematic issue seeks to address.
First, how have the negotiations, pressures of the crises
and reforms impacted the relationships between key
actors like EU institutions and Member States? Second,
where did national preferences come from andwhat role
did domestic politics play in the negotiations? And finally,
towhat extent has the evolution of Eurozone governance
been accompanied by the creation of adequate control
mechanisms and democratic debate?
2. An Overview of This Thematic Issue
The first section of this issue examines the evolving roles
of European and national actors in Eurozone governance
and the continuous renegotiation of their influence and
relationship to other actors in the system.
Sacher (2021) analyses why the European Commis-
sion is reluctant to impose sanctions on Member States,
despite the importance of this tool for the Economic
and Monetary Union since its inception. In addition, pro-
visions on sanctions have empowered the Commission
and have become stricter in the aftermath of the finan-
cial and sovereign debt crises. An analysis of three post-
crisis cases using process-tracing methods in combina-
tion with a normative institutionalist analysis shows that
the Commission is reluctant to impose sanctions, as it
does not perceive punitive action as appropriate.
Rehm (2021) analyses the development of finan-
cial assistance in the Eurozone since 2010. His liberal
intergovernmentalist analysis finds that reforms to assis-
tance mechanisms are best explained by a re-occurring
pattern of mixed preferences. On the one hand, the
threat to Eurozone stability encouraged Member States
to expand and deepen the assistance formula. On the
other hand, potential creditors and debtors tried to
shield themselves from incurring direct costs or protect
their economies. The resulting reforms advanced finan-
cial support in size and scope but failed to effectively
address the difficulties at hand.
Kavvadia (2021) focuses on the role of the European
Investment Bank (EIB) in promoting a greener agenda
for EU development. She argues that the EIB’s announce-
ment of its metamorphosis into a ‘Climate Bank’ in the
context of the EU’s Green Deal makes it an important
actor in the EU’s climate agenda. She analyses the EIB’s
climate pivot by examining the bank’s rational interests
within a sociology of markets analytical framework and
uses a principal-agent model to illustrate the chang-
ing relationship between the European Commission and
the EIB.
The second section of this issue focuses on domestic
politics. The goal is to understand the factors that deter-
mine how national governments act at the European
level. The articles in this section contribute to the litera-
ture on the domestic politics of Eurozone reform, which
tends to analyse government preferences through the
prism of a competition between structural economic fac-
tors and political considerations (Tarlea, Bailer, & Degner,
2019; Van der Veer & Haverland, 2019).
Commain (2021) argues that national positions on
the EU’s adoption of harmonized capital requirements
between 2008 and 2010 can be explained by structural
factors and the ‘varieties of financial capitalism’ approach
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2013; Story & Walter, 1997).
Regulating banks, he argues, requires policy-makers to
balance restrictions of the risk-taking behaviour of banks
and the economy’s reliance on bank lending for growth.
Therefore, while governments generally support the pro-
posed increase of bank capital requirements, they seek
targeted preferential treatments aimed at preserving the
domestic supply of retail credit.
Van Loon (2021) applies a societal approach to govern-
mental preference formation inspired by Schirm (2018,
2020) to examine the Economic and Monetary Union’s
impact of issue salience and actor plurality, subsequently
triggering material and ideational considerations on gov-
ernment preferences towards the Financial Transaction
Tax introduction. By analysing the German, French and
Irish cases of domestic preference formation, she argues
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that the lack of consensus on the European level was
shaped by governments’ responsiveness towards both
societal dynamics and material interests within the
domestic societies of these member states.
Similarly, Högenauer (2021) studies the extent to
which the banking union was scrutinized by the French
andGerman parliaments and towhat degree this reflects
ideas and material interests. An analysis of parliamen-
tary salience and polarization shows that—in line with
public salience—the German Bundestagwas indeed a far
more active scrutinizer. However, the positioning of par-
liamentarians in the two countries is largely explained by
structural economic factors and the interests of domes-
tic banks.
Donnelly (2021) studies the degree of domestic sup-
port in German political parties for the country’s change
of stance on the issue of European grants to Member
States, and its impact on intergovernmental negotia-
tions on the Eurozone budget between 2018 and 2020.
He argues that Christian Democratic politicians and vot-
ers are likely to limit Germany’s support for a larger EU
budget or European grants in the future, despite Social
Democratic efforts to keep the door open.
Finally, the thematic issue endswith two articles look-
ing at the checks-and-balances in Eurozone governance
and the democratic nature of reforms.
Fontan and Howarth (2021) analyse the national-
level reaction to the problematic combination of the
ECB’s strong independence and ever broader interpre-
tation of its own mandate. Applying elements of a
principal-agent approach, they argue that the ruling of
the German Federal Constitutional Court of May 2020
demonstrates the relative importance of national—as
opposed to European-level—actors exercising ex-post
control over ECB policies.
Sebastião (2021) examines the democratic nature of
Eurozone governance reforms from an interdisciplinary
perspective and closes the thematic issue on a normative
note. She uses process-tracingmethodology to argue that,
while the Eurozone and Covid-19 crises evidenced differ-
ent kind of policy outcomes, the EU democratic deficit
remains. Economic crises convert economic power into
‘representative’ political power, thus perpetrating the
political over-hegemony of previous surplus economies.
Ideological debate is constrained and national interests
prevail over politicisation. Political representative power
and democracy are losing out in the process.
The contributions of this thematic issue highlight the
persistent divisions among Member States, the negative
impact on democracy of the crises and the latent distrust
within creditor states. They also provide insights into the
factors that shape Member State positions and the new
roles of several EU institutions in Eurozone governance.
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Abstract
Fiscal policy surveillance, including the possibility to impose financial sanctions, has been an important feature of Economic
and Monetary Union since its inception. With the reform of fiscal rules in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign
debt crisis, coercive provisions have been made stricter and the Commission has formally gained power vis‐à‐vis the
Council. Nevertheless, sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact for budgetary non‐compliance have so far not been
imposed. This article asks why the Commission has until now refrained from proposing such sanctions. Using minimalist
process‐tracing methods, three post‐crisis cases in which the imposition of fines was possible, are analysed. Applying an
adaptation of normative institutionalism, it is argued that the mechanism entitled “normative‐strategic minimum enforce‐
ment” provides an explanation of why no sanctions are imposed in the cases studied: Given that the Commission does
not perceive punitive action as appropriate, it strategically refrains from applying the enforcement provisions to their
full extent.
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1. Introduction
Rules on fiscal policy surveillance and financial sanctions
have been an integral part of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) since its inception. These provisions have,
however, always been a source of dispute. After a soft‐
ening of the EU’s budgetary surveillance framework in
2005, additional reforms were deemed necessary in the
aftermath of the financial crisis and the subsequent
sovereign debt crisis. Amongst others, this latest reform
intended to limit the role of the Council concerning the
imposition of sanctions (EU Regulation of 16 November
2011, 2011). The reform has indeed formally increased
the Commission’s power vis‐à‐vis the Council (Bauer &
Becker, 2014; Dehousse, 2016; Seikel, 2016; Van Aken
& Artige, 2013), without, however, discarding from the
rulebook the flexibility provisions introduced in 2005.
While the application of the surveillance rules was
never a purely technical exercise, the degree to which
political considerations should interfere with technical
surveillance is the source of recurrent debate. Similarly,
the respective roles of the Council and Commission, as
well as their relationship, are far from consensual and
static. While at the beginning of EMU, the Commission
was supposed to act as the technical supervisory author‐
ity, it has become clear under President Juncker that
the Commission is willing to enforce the budgetary
rules politically. This development continued under
Commission President von der Leyen, under whom the
fiscal requirements of the Stability andGrowth Pact (SGP)
were even temporarily suspended in the wake of the
COVID‐19 crisis. Despite the post‐crisis reinforcement of
coercive provisions, the Commission has indeed applied
the SGP flexibly (Mabbett & Schelkle, 2014; Schmidt,
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2016), and has not proposed sanctions based on the
SGP for non‐compliance with fiscal recommendations,
although this would have been possible in several cases.
This article, therefore, asks how we can best explain
why the Commission has so far refrained from proposing
financial sanctions.
This article will draw upon an adaptation of norma‐
tive institutionalism. It argues that while actor behaviour
follows a logic of appropriateness, actors act strategically
to pursue their objectives. Applying minimalist process‐
tracing methods, Commission behaviour is explained by
a mechanism that is entitled “normative‐strategic min‐
imum enforcement.” It argues that because punitive
action is not perceived as appropriate in the cases at
hand, the Commission strategically refrains from apply‐
ing existing enforcement provisions to their full extent.
This article will draw upon three post‐crisis cases
in which the imposition of sanctions for fiscal non‐
compliance was possible. These are the cases of Belgium
in 2013, France in 2015 and the double‐case of Spain and
Portugal in 2016.
The article is organised as follows. In the next sec‐
tion, the development of EU fiscal surveillance rules is
presented. Following this, the theoretical assumptions of
normative institutionalism and their implications for the
case studies are explained. After turning to the article’s
methodology, the cases are analysed as explained above.
The article ends with a summary of the findings and con‐
cluding remarks.
2. Rules and Rule Change in EU Fiscal Policy
Surveillance
Fiscal policy surveillance has been a fundamental part
of EMU since its introduction with the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992. It aims to prevent and correct budgetary
deficits and debt levels that respectively exceed 3%
and 60% of a country’s GDP. With the Excessive Deficit
Procedure (EDP), the possibility to impose financial sanc‐
tions for non‐compliance with the fiscal requirements
was present from the beginning of EMU. The degree
to which coercive provisions should be automatic, the
level of political discretion and the Council’s control over
the EU’s executive, were, however, constant sources of
political disagreement (see Heipertz & Verdun, 2010).
The SGP, adopted in 1997, consists of a preventive and a
corrective arm, with the latter operationalising the appli‐
cation of the EDP (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010; see also
Council Regulation of 7 July 1997, 1997). The SGP was
first reformed in 2005. This reform consisted in making
the SGP more flexible in that it, for example, relaxed the
definition of what counts as ‘exceptional economic cir‐
cumstances’ in the assessment of themember states’ fis‐
cal situation (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010, p. 168). Also, it
introduced the possibility to adopt a revised Art. 126(7)
recommendation with a new deadline for the correc‐
tion of an excessive deficit if a country has taken effec‐
tive action, but ‘unexpected adverse economic events
with major unfavourable consequences for government
finances’ had occurred (Council Regulation of 27 June
2005, 2005, p. 7).
In reaction to the sovereign debt crisis, fiscal
rules were again reformed. The Six‐Pack—the first set
of measures reforming the SGP in the wake of the
crisis–entered into force in December 2011. Sanctions
for non‐compliance with fiscal obligations could now be
introduced earlier and are more automatic. If for exam‐
ple, the Council, upon a Commission recommendation,
and per Art. 126(8) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU, 2016), finds that a mem‐
ber state has not taken effective action to correct its
excessive deficit, the Commission is now required to rec‐
ommend to the Council the imposition of a fine of up
to 0.2% of the member state’s GDP (EU Regulation of
16 November 2011, 2011, Art. 6(1)). The Commission
can, however, recommend to the Council to reduce
or cancel the fine, on grounds of ‘exceptional eco‐
nomic circumstances or following a reasoned request
by the Member State concerned’ (EU Regulation of
16 November 2011, 2011, Art. 6(4)). In addition, with
the introduction of Reverse Qualified Majority Voting
(RQMV), Commission recommendations under the cor‐
rective arm of the SGP are considered as adopted by
the Council, unless there is a qualified majority that
rejects them (Bauer & Becker, 2014; EU Regulation of
16 November 2011; Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,
2012, Art. 7).
For the Commission and its role in fiscal surveil‐
lance and enforcement, this means that it has seen its
competences and powers enhanced (Bauer & Becker,
2014; Dehousse, 2016). RQMV and the possibility to
trigger sanctions earlier in the procedure are likely to
add ‘significant political weight to the recommendations
of the Commission’ (Bauer & Becker, 2014, p. 220).
The Commission, at least on paper, has certainly gained
power vis‐à‐vis the Council, as it is now more diffi‐
cult for the member state representatives to reverse
the Commission’s recommendations. This simultane‐
ously gives the Commission a large degree of discretion
concerning the interpretation of fiscal rules (Dehousse,
2016; Seikel, 2016; Van Aken & Artige, 2013).
Indeed, despite the reinforcement of coercive pro‐
visions in the framework of the SGP, policy‐makers
have not taken back the above‐mentioned flexibility
provisions that were introduced with the 2005 reform.
What is more, the Six‐Pack has introduced even more
exemption provisions that form the so‐called “gen‐
eral escape clause” (see European Commission, 2020).
Therefore, considerable flexibility still exists concerning
the assessment of the fiscal performance of member
states (see also Mabbett & Schelkle, 2014). In its applica‐
tion of the reformed economic governance framework,
the Commission has indeed shown flexibility (Bekker,
2016) and leniency (Mabbett & Schelkle, 2014). Using
its discretion, the Commission has even reshaped the
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coordination process (Vanheuverzwijn, 2017) and has
re‐interpreted the governing rules, applying them more
and more flexibly (Schmidt, 2016, 2020). While the
Commission under President Barroso did not acknowl‐
edge its flexible application of the rules and hid behind
an austerity‐oriented discourse, the Juncker Commission
made its more political and flexible stance public
(Schmidt, 2016, 2020). Nevertheless, the Commission
appears to signal its role as a determined supranational
surveillance body by increasing the number of country‐
specific recommendations tomember stateswith amore
polarised public opinion regarding the EU (van der Veer
& Haverland, 2018). While aiming at presenting itself
as empathetic towards member state authorities, the
Commission seems to avoid showing too much leniency,
suggesting that it tries to find the right balance in its
application of economic and fiscal surveillance rules (see
Vanheuverzwijn, 2017). Still, since the sovereign debt cri‐
sis and through policy‐learning, the views of Commission
officials have moved away from austerity orientation
towards a flexible and politicised view on fiscal gover‐
nance (Miró, 2020). In a similar vein, the Commission, in
its approach towards theArt. 7 procedure concerning the
non‐respect of the rule of law, prefers to find a solution in
cooperation with the government in breach of the rules,
rather than resorting to force (Closa, 2019).
3. Theory
In this article, it will be argued that although actors
strategically pursue their objectives, these objectives are
shaped by the actors’ perception of appropriate action.
An adaptation of normative institutionalism can help us
theorise and operationalise this claim. Normative institu‐
tionalism is rooted in sociology and emphasises the role
of institutional norms that proclaim appropriate action.
In that, it can be distinguished from sociological insti‐
tutionalism, which focuses more on cognitive aspects,
such as the perception and interpretation of situations
and problems, and less on the actors’ political behaviour
(Peters, 2019).
Normative institutionalism assumes that action is
driven by rules, which prescribe appropriate behaviour
(March & Olsen, 2011). Rules contain ‘codes of meaning,’
which ‘facilitate interpretation of ambiguous worlds,’
and ‘embody collective and individual roles, identities,
rights, obligations, interests, values, world‐views, and
memory’ (March & Olsen, 2011, p. 484). Consequently,
actors act according to what they perceive is appropriate
given their role and position (see March & Olsen, 1989).
Rules, however, are sometimes ambiguous. A change in
the situation in which actors find themselves may there‐
fore lead them to match the rules to the new situation.
This realignment consists of a ‘constructive interpreta‐
tion’ of the rules. By ‘fitting a rule to a situation,’ appro‐
priateness is established (March & Olsen, 2011, p. 483).
Although normative institutionalism does not
exclude cost‐benefit calculations (see March & Olsen,
2011), the central role that the logic of appropriateness
plays in the approach lends a structuralist tendency to
it, which leaves little room for agency (see Peters, 2019).
Therefore, and building upon the sociological critique
of the distinction between the logic of appropriateness
and the logic of consequentialism, it is assumedhere that
the two logics stand in an interdependent relationship:
while actors act strategically in pursuing their objectives,
these objectives are shaped by their institutional and
social environment (see Jenson & Mérand, 2010).
Based on these theoretical assumptions and the find‐
ings of the literature review presented above, the follow‐
ing expectations regarding Commission behaviour can
be derived. Given the Commission’s discretion and the
ambiguity of the SGP, the fiscal surveillance rules need
to be interpreted by Commission actors in light of the
situation at hand and in line with their perception of
their role and obligations. Thereby, appropriate action is
established. The main ambiguity of the rules stems from
their openness in that both a strict and flexible reading
and application are possible, and that the rules, there‐
fore, allow for ideologically, economically and politically
opposing policy choices to take form. The rules might
further enter into conflict with wider policy objectives
the Commission is pursuing, which reinforces the neces‐
sity to align rule application and perceived obligations.
The literature suggests that the Commission perceives
a flexible application of the rules—taking into account
the political, social and economic impact of its actions—
as appropriate (see Miró, 2020; Schmidt, 2020), without
however neglecting that being too lenient does not cor‐
respond to its role as surveillance body (see van der Veer
& Haverland, 2018; Vanheuverzwijn, 2017). In any case,
finding solutions cooperatively is expected to be pre‐
ferred to resorting to punitive action (see Closa, 2019),
especially because sanctions might be seen as inappro‐
priate given that under the SGP they would impose fur‐
ther costs on a country that is already in an economically
difficult situation (see Hodson & Maher, 2004). In pursu‐
ing the objectives, it deems appropriate, the Commission
is expected to act strategically.
4. Methodology
4.1. Process‐Tracing
The above‐mentioned expectations regarding Commis‐
sion behaviour will be tested in three case studies, apply‐
ing minimalist theory‐testing process‐tracing methods.
Process‐tracing allows us to trace a causal mechanism
that links a trigger or event X and an outcomeY (Fontaine,
2020; see also Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Bennett &
Checkel, 2015). Serving as a first test of the existence
of a causal link, in minimalist process‐tracing, the causal
mechanism is not unpacked in its entirety (Beach &
Pedersen, 2019). Nevertheless, mechanisms can still con‐
sist of different parts that are conceptualised as ‘entities
that engage in activities’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 3)
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and linked ‘in a relationship of conditional dependence’
(Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 36). After spelling out what
fingerprints we expect the activities to have left, we have
to examine whether our empirical observations confirm
these expectations. If this is the case, the observations
can be regarded as mechanistic evidence that supports
our claims concerning the existence and functioning of
our theorised mechanism (see Beach & Pedersen, 2019;
Smeets & Beach, 2020). The Supplementary File 1 pro‐
vides an overview of the case‐specific observations.
Process‐tracing allows for making within‐case causal
inferences. However, we can also analyse several typical
cases–that is cases in which the cause and the outcome
are present–and examine whether the theorised causal
mechanism functions in the same way across our popu‐
lation of cases. At least at the level of abstraction of the
theorisedmechanism, this then shows that the cases are
mechanistically homogenous (Beach & Pedersen, 2019).
A mechanism provides only one possible link
between a trigger and an outcome, as X and Y can be
linked by several different mechanisms. Only if one
claims that a mechanism excludes other mechanisms,
it is, therefore, necessary to ‘formulate alternative expla‐
nations’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 43; see also Beach
& Smeets, 2020).
In this article, it will be argued that the mecha‐
nism entitled “normative‐strategic minimum enforce‐
ment” links trigger—an EDP at a stage where the intro‐
duction of sanctions is possible—and outcome—the
non‐imposition of financial sanctions. It argues that
because punitive action is not perceived as appropri‐
ate, the Commission strategically refrains from applying
the enforcement provisions to their full extent. Building
upon expectations derived from the literature review
and the theoretical approach of this article, the mecha‐
nism consists of two parts.
Part 1 of the mechanism consists of the European
Commission assessing member states’ fiscal perfor‐
mance within the boundaries of the flexibility of the
rules. The Commission respects the limits of the flex‐
ibility of the SGP concerning the assessment of fiscal
performance, fulfilling its role as surveillance body and
Guardian of the Treaties. At the same time, the use of
flexibility provisions seems warranted if the data on fis‐
cal performance indicates a borderline case, as, in such a
situation, punitive action is not perceived as appropriate.
The fingerprints that would confirm the functioning
of this part are official documents, news coverage or
interview data that show that the Commission saw the
numbers as clear and accordingly respected the limits of
the flexibility it possesses, or that it saw the numbers
as unclear, which justified the use of relevant flexibil‐
ity provisions.
Part 2 of the mechanism consists of the European
Commission trying to avoid punitive action, resorting to a
flexible reading of the rules. Financial sanctions are seen
as inappropriate by the dominant Commission actors
because they are not in line with their perception of the
Commission’s role in fiscal policy surveillance. Therefore,
the Commission applies the rules in a way that does not
lead to the imposition of sanctions and accordingly acts
strategically in pursuing its objectives.
The fingerprints that would confirm the functioning
of this part are documents, news coverage or interview
data that indicate that the Commission believed that the
imposition of sanctions would not have been appropri‐
ate and that it read and applied the rules flexibly.
4.2. Case Selection
Although financial sanctions based on the SGP for non‐
compliance with fiscal recommendations have never
been imposed, there have been instances in which tak‐
ing such a procedural step was possible. For this study,
three cases have been selected that occurred after the
first post‐crisis reform of sanction provisions with the
Six‐Pack. These cases only concern euro area members,
as SGPprovisions regarding financial sanctions only apply
to this group of member states.
The cases selected are presented in Table 1. All cases
have in common that the member states concerned
were under an EDP and did not receive a financial
sanction. The cases diverge, however, in the procedural
steps undertaken. The case of France serves as a highly
politicised example of cases in which establishing non‐
effective action and thereby triggering sanctioning pro‐
visions was theoretically possible but not carried out.
The cases of Belgium, Spain and Portugal are the only
euro area post‐crisis cases in which non‐effective action
was established. Despite this finding, the Commission did
not issue a recommendation concerning sanctions in the
case of Belgium. While the Commission issued a formal
Table 1. Overview of case studies.
Case Existence of Establishment of Formal Recommendation/
excessive deficit non‐effective recommendation imposition of
(Art. 126(6) of action (Art. 126(8) concerning sanctions sanctions
the TFEU) of the TFEU) (EU Regulation
No. 1173/2011, Art. 6)
France 2015 Yes No — —
Belgium 2013 Yes Yes No —
Spain and Portugal 2016 Yes Yes Yes No
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recommendation in the case of Spain and Portugal, it pro‐
posed to cancel the fines. As the steps under the respec‐
tive EDPs of Spain and Portugal were largely dealt with
jointly by the Commission, the two cases are treated here
mostly as a single analytical entity.
For this article, 22 semi‐structured expert interviews
have been conducted with European Commission offi‐
cials both at service (DG ECFIN) and Cabinet‐level and
with National Government officials in Finance Ministries
and at Permanent Representations to the EU. The data
gathered will be used to uncover and confirm actions,
positions and perceptions of key actors. For triangula‐
tion, this article will additionally draw on official docu‐
ments and news coverage. Each interviewwas attributed
a code (see Supplementary File).
5. Analysis
Three post‐crisis cases will be analysed, in which the
imposition of sanctions for fiscal non‐compliance was
a valid option for decision‐makers–Belgium in 2013,
France in 2015 and Spain and Portugal in 2016. In line
with process‐tracing methods, each case study aims at
exploring whether the mechanism entitled “normative‐
strategic minimum enforcement” was present and func‐
tioned as theorised.
5.1. Belgium 2013
As the first euro area country under the reformed rules,
and still under the Barroso II Commission, Belgium was
found not to have taken effective action to correct its
excessive deficit. In light of this decision, the Belgian gov‐
ernment was facing the potential imposition of a fine
under the rules of the Six‐Pack. However, the Commission
did not issue any recommendation concerning sanctions.
The triggerwas that in 2009, in the wake of the finan‐
cial crisis, an EDP was opened for Belgium. At that point,
a deadline was set for the Belgian government to correct
its excessive deficit by 2012.
Part 1 of the “normative‐strategic minimum enforce‐
ment” mechanism suggests that the Commission
assesses fiscal performance within the boundaries of
flexibility: In 2013, the Commission assessed whether
Belgium had taken effective action concerning the
Art. 126(7) Council recommendation it had received in
2009. It found that it had failed to do so. It seems that
the data clearly indicated that Belgium had not achieved
its fiscal objectives.
Evidence shows that the decision to establish non‐
effective action was seen as rather technical. The
Commission’s assessment clearly showed that Belgium
had not undertaken the required action (COM 1).
According to the Commission’s assessment, even with‐
out the recapitalisation of the Dexia banking group that
amounted to 0.8%of its GDP, Belgiumwould havemissed
its deficit correction deadline (European Commission,
2013b). Even the Belgian administration perceived the
decision as a rather technical step that was in line with
the country’s fiscal performance (MS 2).
Part 2 of this mechanism suggests that the Com‐
mission tries to avoid punitive action: After the Council
confirms the Commission’s assessment of non‐effective
action, the latter is required to issue a recommendation
to the Council concerning the imposition of sanctions.
This recommendation can either contain a fine, or the
cancellation thereof. However, despite the Council con‐
firming that Belgium had not taken effective action, the
Commission did not issue any formal recommendation.
The Commission apparently resorted to a flexible read‐
ing of the rules to avoid punitive action in this case.
Evidence shows that in the decision not to pro‐
pose sanctions, legal considerations and arguments have
played a major role. The Belgian EDP had been launched
in 2009 and a Council recommendation was issued. It is
in response to this recommendation that in 2013 the
Commission deemed that Belgium had not taken effec‐
tive action. The Six‐Pack, based on which the establish‐
ment of non‐effective action should lead to a proposal
concerning sanctions, however, only entered into force
in December 2011. The Commission’s legal service ques‐
tioned the legal firmness of proposing a sanction in
this case (COM 1, COM 2). Indeed, a transition period—
although not necessarily mandatory—for the applica‐
tion of fines is foreseen in the recitals of the relevant
Regulation (EU Regulation of 16 November 2011, 2011,
Recital 21). In this vein, Olli Rehn, Vice‐President and
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs at the
time explained:
As the six‐pack legislation of reinforced economic gov‐
ernance entered into force only in mid‐December
2011, imposing a fine for the years 2010 or 2011
could go against the principle of non‐retroactivity
which is essential in European law. In my view,
therefore, it would be neither fair nor legally sound
to apply it retroactively to those years. (European
Commission, 2013a)
According to a Commission official, the possibility of
Belgium not paying the fine, of discussing the decision
being warranted, or of a court proceeding could have
undermined the credibility of the rules (COM2). Pursuing
the normative goal of good cooperation and the legality
and credibility of the rules in force, the Commission–in its
strategic thinking–therefore took into account that the
imposition of sanctions might have undermined achiev‐
ing its objectives.
Evidence suggests that how the European
Commission handled the French EDP in 2013 had also
played a role in the decision. Given that the Commission
aims at a consistent approach towards all member
states, Commission officials deemed it possible that the
lenient approach with regard to France, which at the
time was about to receive a two‐year deadline exten‐
sion (Fontanella‐Khan, 2013), might have contributed to
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the Commission not proposing a sanction for Belgium
(COM 3, COM 6).
Although Belgium did not fully deliver upon the
Council’s fiscal recommendations, it did not enter into
an open conflict with the surveillance framework, and
therefore the Commission did not see a reason to pun‐
ish Belgium (COM 1). In a similar vein, Olli Rehn stated
in a college meeting that the ‘undertakings on fiscal con‐
solidation given by the present Belgian government’ and
the ‘absence of a fully operational government’ in 2010
and 2011were reasons not to impose a financial sanction
(European Commission, 2013c, pp. 21–22).
In summary, when assessing the fiscal performance
of the Belgian government, the Commission found that
the numbers clearly indicated non‐compliance with the
recommendations. Therefore, it applied the rules in line
with its role as Guardian of the Treaties. However, when it
came to proposing sanctions against the Belgian govern‐
ment, the Commission opted for a prudent approach, not
applying the newly introduced provision, as it was in con‐
flict with several other norms. The legality of rule appli‐
cation, its consistency, and the cooperative behaviour
of the Belgian government were valued by Commission
actors and were in line with their perception of what the
Commission should aim for. They accordingly concluded
that sanctions that would undermine these norms were
not appropriate. In interpreting the rules and setting
aside a newprovision to achieve the objectives it deemed
appropriate, the Commission acted strategically.
5.2. France 2015
In 2015, asked by reporters why the Commission did not
sanction France for non‐compliance with the fiscal rules,
Jean‐Claude Juncker, then President of the Commission,
simply answered ‘because it is France’ (Guarascio, 2016).
Although this answer could potentially be explained by
Mr Juncker’s distinctive sense of humour, it seemed
to confirm widely‐held suspicions about the application
of the SGP. But was France treated differently simply
because of its size andweightwithin the EU?Or are there
other factors that explain the non‐imposition of sanc‐
tions in this case?
The trigger was that an EDP was opened for France
in 2009. In 2013, the deadline to correct the excessive
deficit was extended for two years—until 2015.
Part 1 of the mechanism was set in motion, and
in early 2015 the Commission assessed the French gov‐
ernment’s compliance with the Art. 126(7) Council rec‐
ommendation it had received in 2013. In its analysis of
France’s progress under the EDP, the Commission ser‐
vices did not come up with a clear assessment. While
the so‐called ‘bottom‐up assessment’ indicated that
France had complied with the Council recommendation,
the ‘top‐down assessment’ showed a ‘shortfall of 0.2%
of GDP compared to the recommendation’ (European
Commission, 2015b, p. 13). In line with this unclear pic‐
ture, the Commission’s overall assessment of the French
budgetary efforts stated that ‘… the information avail‐
able does not allow to conclude that the recommended
effort has not been delivered in 2013–2014’ (European
Commission, 2015b, p. 13). It seems that given the
unclear data, the Commission has assessed the French
fiscal performance using the flexibility of the rules.
The French case was the first major decision of the
Juncker Commission in the area of the SGP. Evidence
shows that in line with its announcement to be a “polit‐
ical” Commission, it had already made clear in January
2015 that it would use the flexibility that the SGP pro‐
vides (see European Commission, 2015a). As acknowl‐
edged by a Commission official interviewee, the assess‐
ment of the French fiscal situation was borderline,
also because the indicators the Commission is work‐
ing with at this stage are complex and sometimes diffi‐
cult to observe (COM 2). In line with the political and
flexible approach in the area of the SGP under the
Juncker Commission, ‘the bar of evidence required to
step up a procedure is relatively high,’ with the French
case being an example of this (COM 2). According to
another Commission official, given this unclear picture,
the Commission gave France the benefit of the doubt
(COM 1). It did so by effectively–notwithstanding the
double‐negative phrasing–concluding that France had
taken effective action, despite the weak numerical basis
for this.
Part 2 of the mechanism proposes that the Commis‐
sion tries to avoid punitive action: In its assessment, the
Commission did not detect non‐effective action, which if
found and adopted by the Council would have required
a proposal regarding sanctions. Instead, it recommended
extending the deadline for the deficit correction for two
years. It seems that the Commission has resorted to a
flexible reading of the rules to prevent punitive action.
Evidence shows that a pattern emerged during
this case regarding the internal conflict lines and bal‐
ance of power in the area. This pattern consisted
of Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs, being the advocate of a more flex‐
ible approach and Vice‐President Valdis Dombrovskis,
responsible for the Euro and Social Dialogue, advocating
a more rigid application of the rules. President Juncker
emerged as taking on the role of arbiter (COM 3; see
also Schmidt, 2020). Commissioner Moscovici argued
that ‘the Commission must be politically and techni‐
cally credible and must therefore use expertise and
the legal rules as the basis for making the right
political decisions.’ He was further of the opinion
‘that the European Semester was an opportunity for
the Commission to send messages to the member
states to correct their… budget deficits’ and that ‘the
Commission’s general approach must strike the right
balance between encouragement and a demand for
results’ (European Commission, 2015d, pp. 26–27).
In light of the Commission’s aim of encouraging reforms,
Commissioner Moscovici saw the imposition of sanc‐
tions as a failure for both the Commission and the
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member state concerned (see Chassany & Barker, 2015).
Vice‐President Dombrovskis, however, believed that ‘any
relaxing of these rules… would risk undermining the
procedure itself and the equity of this procedure, as
well as the Commission’s power to apply it’ (European
Commission, 2015d, p. 26).
Other than Vice‐President Dombrovskis, ‘a half‐
dozen other Commissioners,’ including Vice‐President
Katainen and Commissioner Vestager, were in favour
of concluding that no effective action had been taken
(Spiegel, 2015). In the absence of a compromise
between Commissioner Moscovici and Vice‐President
Dombrovskis, President Juncker backed Moscovici, and
concessions were made to Dombrovskis regarding the
extension of the deadline, granting two‐more years
instead of three (Spiegel, 2015), although there were
voices in the Council that were already critical of a two‐
year extension of the deadline (MS 1, MS 2).
Effectively concluding that France had taken effec‐
tive action, together with the finding that the eco‐
nomic situation was weaker than expected when
the recommendation had been issued, allowed the
Commission—according to Art. 3(5) of Regulation (EC)
No 1467/97—to extend the correction deadline (see
European Commission, 2015c). Accordingly, sanctioning
a member state based on rather weak and inconclusive
figures and taking the risk of receiving complaints after‐
wards was not in line with the Commission’s approach
on fiscal policy surveillance (COM 2) and its perception
of appropriate action.
In summary, the fiscal data were borderline and sub‐
ject to interpretation by the Commission, using the flex‐
ibility that the SGP provides. Against the background of
unclear data, a flexible reading of the ruleswas applied to
prevent punitive action that was deemed inappropriate
in the situation at hand. Rather than resorting to punish‐
ment, the self‐image of the dominant Commission actors
proclaimed acting towards improving the fiscal and eco‐
nomic situation in the member state concerned.
5.3. Spain and Portugal 2016
Spain and Portugal came the closest to the imposition
of sanctions. Both countries were found not to have
taken effective action to correct their excessive deficits.
While the Commission–as required by the rules of the
Six‐Pack–issued a formal recommendation to the Council
concerning the imposition of financial sanctions, it rec‐
ommended cancelling the fines.
The trigger was that Spain and Portugal had both
been under the corrective arm of the SGP since 2009.
In 2013, the deadline for the deficit correction for Spain
was set for 2016 and the one for Portugal for 2015.
Part 1 of the mechanism was set in motion and, in
2016, the Commission assessed the action of both mem‐
ber states concerning their respective Council recom‐
mendations. It found that both countries had not taken
effective action to correct their excessive deficits. The fis‐
cal data, therefore, seem to have clearly indicated the
countries’ non‐compliance with the recommendations.
Evidence shows that Commission actors saw the
establishment of non‐effective action for both Spain and
Portugal as a rather technical and straightforward deci‐
sion as the numbers were clear (COM 1, COM 2, COM 4,
COM 5, COM 7). So unlike in the case of France, in this
case, the establishment of non‐effective action directly
resulted from the analysis of the fiscal performance.
Part 2 of the mechanism suggests that the Com‐
mission tries to avoid punitive action: The Commission
issued formal recommendations concerning sanctions
following the Council’s confirmation of non‐effective
action. However, the recommendations contained the
cancellation of the fines. The Commission, therefore,
seems to have resorted to a flexible application of the
rules to prevent punitive action.
Evidence shows that, confronted with the legal
requirement to envisage punitive action against Spain
andPortugal, therewas a divisionwithin the Commission.
On the one hand, Commission actors in line with
the tougher approach represented by Vice‐President
Dombrovskis thought that the imposition of sanctions,
although of a symbolic amount (COM 5), would have
served the credibility of the fiscal surveillance framework
(COM 4, COM 5; see also Coman, 2018; Schmidt, 2020).
On the other hand, a strict application of the rules was
opposed by those Commission actors that were more
in line with the approach followed by Commissioner
Moscovici (see Coman, 2018; Schmidt, 2020). In particu‐
lar, the thought was that financial fines would have been
an additional fiscal burden, which could potentially have
had counterproductive effects (COM 2).
In a similar vein, punitive action was not perceived as
appropriate given the effort both countries had made in
the previous years (COM 2, COM 3). In light of this situ‐
ation, a fine would have been difficult to justify for the
Commission, as stated by a Commission official:
The political and the public perception of the
Commission proposing a fine… on countries that
were emerging from that sort of economic backdrop
and with that social backdrop still present… would
simply have been impossible for people to under‐
stand. And so Commissioner Moscovici was very
much of the view that sanctions were neither desir‐
able nor appropriate in that particular case. (COM 3)
A closely related aspect was of particular importance in
the Commission’s assessment of the appropriateness of
punitive action–the member states’ willingness to coop‐
erate. Both countries were seen as being cooperative
and were not questioning the surveillance framework or
intentionally disregarding their fiscal obligations (COM 1,
COM 2, COM 4, COM 7). As one Commission official put
it: ‘Spain and Portugal… did not deserve...to be punished
because their fiscal performance, all in all, despite not
being in line, was not in open conflict with the EU frame‐
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work’ (COM 1). With regard to other EU institutions, such
as the Council, given ‘a broad European consensus in
favour of cancelling the fines,’ Commissioner Moscovici
further ‘felt it wise not to take the risk of provoking unnec‐
essary divisions’ (European Commission, 2016, p. 28).
Ultimately, the Commission took a political decision in
not proposing sanctions (COM 1). It did so by taking into
account the reasoned requests submitted by the two gov‐
ernments, which allows the Commission to recommend
to the Council the reduction or cancellation of a fine
(EU Regulation of 16 November 2011, 2011, Art. 6(4)).
In summary, the assessment of the two member
states’ fiscal performance clearly showed that they had
missed their objectives. Accordingly, the limits of the flex‐
ibility provisions were respected and no leniency was
shown. However, when it came to the requirement to
propose sanctions, the Commission took into account
the economic, social and political situation, including the
countries’ recent effort and their willingness to cooperate,
and potential opposition from other institutions includ‐
ing the Council. Given the dominant actors’ self‐image as
representing a political body that aims at supporting eco‐
nomic improvement, sustaining a cooperative oversight
system and being responsive to the respective situation,
they concluded that sanctionswerenot appropriate in the
situation at hand. Consequently, the Commission applied
the rules flexibly to prevent the imposition of sanctions.
6. Conclusion
Despite the reinforcement of coercive provisions with
the post‐crisis reform of fiscal policy surveillance and the
strengthened role of the European Commission, it has
so far refrained from proposing financial sanctions for
non‐compliance with fiscal recommendations. This arti‐
cle aims to understand the Commission’s behaviour in
this regard. Applying an adaptation of normative insti‐
tutionalism, it is argued that the Commission strategi‐
cally refrains from using coercive provisions to their full
extent because sanctions are not perceived as appro‐
priate in the cases at hand. Testing this assumption, a
minimalist process‐tracing analysis shows that the mech‐
anism of “normative‐strategic minimum enforcement”
was present and functioned as theorised in the three
post‐crisis cases of near‐imposition of fines.
When assessing member states’ fiscal performance,
the Commission acts within the boundaries of its flexi‐
bility. If the data clearly indicates non‐compliance, the
Commission states that no effective action has been
taken. In line with its role as Guardian of the Treaties, it
avoids showing too much leniency. If, however, the data
on fiscal performance is less clear, it uses the flexibility
of the SGP and avoids steps that might lead to punitive
action. Even if based on its assessment of non‐effective
action, the Commission is immediately required to envis‐
age sanctions, it applies the rules in a way that ultimately
does not lead to the imposition of fines. Financial sanc‐
tions are seen as an inappropriate measure by the dom‐
inant Commission actors for several reasons. They are
economically counterproductive, they might create con‐
flict with member states that could damage the cred‐
ibility of the overall surveillance framework and they
would be difficult to justify vis‐à‐vis the European pub‐
lic. They accordingly go against the actors’ self‐image
of the Commission as an institution that should work
towards a cooperative and growth‐enhancing system of
economic and fiscal policy coordination and surveillance.
In a context of ambiguous rules, a strict reading of the
rules is therefore set aside to the benefit of a flexible
reading. This means that the Commission acts strate‐
gically in pursuing the objectives it deems appropriate.
On a theoretical level, this shows that strategy and norm‐
guided action can co‐exist. While the theorised and con‐
firmed norm‐based mechanism provides one explana‐
tion of Commission behaviour, it is well conceivable
that other theories andmechanisms equally explain why
the Commission refrains from triggering sanctions. More
research needs to be done to understand the explana‐
tory value of other factors.
Regarding themechanism’s external validity, it is con‐
ceivable that a similar mechanism provides an explana‐
tion of the outcome in the case of Italy in 2018–2019.
As in the cases studied in this article, the imposition of
sanctions for Italy was discussed but finally avoided by
the European Commission (see Schmidt, 2020). However,
in the course of discussions, the Italian government
moved its position from the overt rejection of the EU’s fis‐
cal surveillance framework to amore cooperative stance.
Given the conflictual behaviour of the Italian govern‐
ment, extending the explanatory value of the causal
mechanism might make a slight adaptation necessary to
sufficiently take into account the specificities of the case.
This could be the task of subsequent research.
To conclude, despite the reinforcement of coercive
provisions under the SGP, there is no automaticity in their
application. Cooperative behaviour and reform efforts—
even if small—are sufficient for the Commission in order
not to resort to punitive action. The idea of a cooper‐
ative relationship between the Commission and mem‐
ber states shapes the practice and the politics of the
SGP and appears to trump considerations concerning
the potential benefits that may result from imposing
financial sanctions. Despite some hawkish voices within
the Commission, most Commission actors seem less and
less inclined to trigger financial sanctions under the
SGP, thereby—at least indirectly—contesting the ben‐
efit and legitimacy of resorting to punitive measures.
The European Fiscal Board, the Commission’s indepen‐
dent advisory body on the implementation of fiscal rules,
goes so far as to call for abandoning financial sanctions
given their difficult enforceability in the current political
context. Instead, it calls for amove towards amore incen‐
tivising framework (see European Fiscal Board, 2020).
Surveillance under the SGP has been largely put on hold
in the wake of the COVID‐19 crisis and it is not yet
clear when or if the EU will go back to applying the
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fiscal surveillance framework in its current form (see
Fleming & Brunsden, 2020). If the rules are not reformed
and the current sanctioning provisions are maintained,
they will most likely stay there, never to be applied (see
European Fiscal Board, 2020), unless, perhaps, in the
case of a member state’s fundamental, overt and contin‐
uous rejection of the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework.
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the Euro crisis, extraordinary
financial support in the Eurozone has been institution-
alised through new tools and bodies with significant fire-
power to assist Member States in difficulties. After a first
leap into this new area of Eurozone support with tempo-
rary assistance tools, Member States continued to adjust
the structure repeatedly through new rules and practices
and advanced deeper into the area of financial assistance
introducing a permanent Eurozone support mechanism
and instruments for bank recapitalisation, often subject
to intense negotiations between core EU countries.
Scholars have become interested in the negotiation
process finding explanatorymerit in the strategic interac-
tion between two ideational camps representing export
and demand-led states (Hall, 2014), in hard intergovern-
mental bargaining and brinkmanship between creditors
and debtors (Schimmelfennig, 2015), in the shift away
from market policy to the state’s core interest (Genschel
& Jachtenfuchs, 2018), or in the previous institutional
setting framing the choices at hand at the peak of the cri-
sis (Verdun, 2015). Puetter (2012) acknowledged that the
decision to govern new eras of EU activity was as much
driven by national interests as by the willingness to find
common solutions for common problems. These stud-
ies often account for complementary explanations but
emphasise different explanatory variables in the inter-
governmental process. Whereas strategic constructivists
find that the cause of action at EU-level in the gov-
ernments’ rationale is based on the ideational founda-
tion of their respective political economies (e.g., Hall,
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2014; Schäfer, 2016), more rational approaches empha-
sise the aggregate welfare cost-benefit consideration by
countries on the European level (e.g., Moravcsik, 2018;
Schimmelfennig, 2015, 2018).
Scholars find that the post-crisis governance struc-
ture has put the adjustment costs predominantly on the
economies of the countries receiving assistance with a
strong emphasis on austerity being the fruit of ordolib-
eral German politics (e.g., Blyth, 2013; Matthijs, 2016).
Scholars have emphasised the emergence of new for-
mats and intergovernmental solutions in the aftermath
of the crisis (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015), how-
ever, less attention has been given to the actual design of
financial assistance and its adjustment in the last decade.
This article complements these studies by emphasizing
the concrete adjustments occurring to the financial assis-
tance formula and the role Member States played in its
continuous development.
The research question set for this article is: How can
we best understand the last decade of Eurozone finan-
cial assistance reforms? As extraordinary financial assis-
tance has the potential to carry significant costs for par-
ticipating countries, the stakes in this policy are high,
justifying an approach centred around Member States’
interests and cost-benefit considerations in the design
of support. This approach distinguishes between the
potential roles of Member States in the different forms
of financial assistance mostly oriented along a creditor-
debtor divide. Whereas Germany and other potential
creditors repeatedly favoured an assistance formulawith
limited liabilities, cost reduction, high disincentives, and
the exclusion of bank support, France and other poten-
tial debtors favoured mutualisation of debt, low disin-
centives, and inclusion of bank support in the assis-
tance. Often the result of negotiations between these
two coalitions favoured the creditors’ design, shifting
the adjustment burden on potential receivers of assis-
tance. However, as debtors repeatedly had difficulties
adjusting, a continuous adaptation of the formula was
necessary in order to achieve the common interest of
Eurozone stability. This led to a tug of war between the
two camps over the adjustment burden and costs of
reform for each step of the way. It is argued that this
mixed preferences situation of common Eurozone inter-
ests and diverging interests along the creditor–debtor
divide explains best how the Eurozone reformed finan-
cial assistance.
In the following section, the theoretical frame-
work is presented. Section 3 describes the initial stage
of Eurozone financial assistance established in 2010.
Sections 4, 5, and 6 present the empirical analy-
sis on several issues related to financial assistance.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
This article borrows from liberal intergovernmentalism
by assessing the outcome of integration in the area
of financial assistance based on state preferences and
intergovernmental bargaining. Liberal intergovernmen-
talismbuilds on the assumptions that states are bounded
rational actors (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2019), act-
ing according to their respective preferences with the
general objective of achieving the most preferred out-
come in the least costly way (Knight, 2018). Moravcsik
(1998) provides a three-stage framework for assessing
the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations. First,
states form their preferences domestically. This pro-
cess is dependent on the issue at hand and the respec-
tive constituency on the national level (Moravcsik &
Schimmelfennig, 2019). The more specialised a policy
and the smaller the number of stakeholders, the more
representative is the state’s position of a specific interest
group. Conversely, in a more general policy concerning a
diffused entirety of taxpayers, e.g., in macroeconomics,
the state represents the interests of its economy as a
whole. In the second stage, the states negotiate a com-
mon agreement. Liberal intergovernmentalism argues
that this process is dependent on the relative bargain-
ing power of states deriving from asymmetric interde-
pendence (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2019), which
favours positions of stateswith low incentives to compro-
mise due to their expected lower gains from a common
solution (Moravcsik, 1993; Schimmelfennig, 2018). Lastly,
states find agreement in specific institutional choices.
This locks the agreement reached in a more or less fixed
manner and tends to favour the preferences of those
countries with the greatest leverage.
Additional to national preferences, this article con-
ceptualises common ‘Eurozone’ or ‘EU’ preferences
shared by all Eurozone members. This common EU or
Eurozone preference is the stability of the Eurozone
and the proper functioning of the common market,
which this article considers as fixed. The common inter-
ests derive from the interdependence of European
economies. The danger to the integrity of the Eurozone
through sovereign defaults or even the breakup of the
Eurozone would have devastating effects on European
economies and hence on the future stability of their
respective fiscal and economic positions. This creates
a situation of mixed preferences in which Member
States agree to resolve the difficulties at hand, but
disagree about the distribution of adjustment costs
(Scharpf, 1997; Zürn, 1992). In game theory, this situa-
tion is referred to as a “coordination game with distri-
butional conflict” (Wolf, 2002, p. 39). Scholars assessed
the moment of the Euro crisis as a situation of mixed
preferences, in which Member States shared the com-
mon preference of safeguarding the Euro, while in paral-
lel following diverging preference on the concrete form
of adjustment, which determined how the burden is split
among the states (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2019;
Schimmelfennig, 2015). In 2010, the German governing
coalition’s behaviour showcased the common interest as
it called this common or shared preference of Eurozone
stability alternativlos (unavoidable).
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Hence, while keeping the underlying interdepen-
dence from common preference on safeguarding the
Eurozone and the commonmarket inmind, this workwill
focus on the diverging preferences in the reform process.
Similar to previous studies on intergovernmental negoti-
ations, the diverging preferences are assessed based on
national cost-benefit considerations. These are depen-
dent on the expected adjustment costs linked to the
materialist burden associated with financial assistance
following a creditor–debtor divide (e.g., Copelovitch,
Frieden, & Walter, 2016; Schimmelfennig, 2018). In the
context of financial assistance, this cost-benefit analysis
is related to specific elements of assistance including the
scale, the timing, the source, the form, the control of
assistance and the disincentives attached to it. Finally,
this article emphasises the preferences of representative
core-states in the bargaining processes.
Financial assistance can be generally regarded as a
favourable loan or permanent transfer of capital to a
recipient. These loans or transfers bear different costs
for states depending on the assistance format and
the expected financial involvement. Member States are
expected to have entered into assistance negotiations
according to their shared preferences that some form of
financial assistance structure was needed or improved
and have shaped the development of the Eurozone assis-
tance structure according to the individual cost-benefit
consideration of their expected involvement.
In the following, this article will assess several
reforms to the financial assistance structure since the
Euro crisis using preferences, intergovernmental bargain,
and the institutional outcome.
3. The European Financial Assistance Formula
As the international financial crisis swept over to the
EU in 2008–2009, non-Eurozone countries received assis-
tance via the EU’s Balance of Payments assistance facility.
An instrument that borrowed via the EU on the market
and on-lend to states. For Eurozone countries, no assis-
tance tool existed from within the EU. To avoid uncer-
tain and potentially very high adjustment costs caused
by a systemic spill-over of a Greek default (Colasanti,
2016) and its potential negative signalling effect to the
market about the debt sustainability of other Eurozone
countries (Schimmelfennig, 2018), the Eurozone explic-
itly marked their common preference of Eurozone stabil-
ity and established several assistance tools (Council of
the EU, 2010; European Commission, 2010). First, the
Greek Loan Facility (GLF) was created as a fast ad-hoc
bilateral response to the Greek crisis with €80 billion
of support. In parallel Eurozone countries established
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a tempo-
rary 3-year special purpose vehicle that could provide
loans to Eurozone members. The agreement on the EFSF
allowed for the lending of up to €440 billion and was
complemented by a Council regulation on the European
financial stabilisation mechanism (EFSM) that allowed
the EU to use its leftover financial margin as assistance
as long as the crisis prevailed (see Table 1).
This first firewall was a mix of a fast-paced response
to Greece’s imminent difficulties and a broader approach
to a potential future system of assistance. All assistance
was provided via loans, a fiscally neutral way in the
medium-term. Out of foresight on the costs of bilateral
assistance for other Eurozone countries, the EFSF was
Table 1. Assistance instruments adopted in 2010.
EFSM EFSF GLF Assistance formula
Guarantee Guarantees on the Individual guarantees Bilateral loans with Limited liability
structure EU budget by Eurozone Member individual share
States
Eligibility for Conditionality Conditionality Conditionality Disincentives
assistance
Decision-making Decision by Council Decision by Decision taken Member States’ control
Eurogroup nationally
Lender EU (intermediary), Eurozone Member States, Mix: No direct fiscal impact
expected €60 billion (intermediary), €80 billion for EFSM and EFSF and
€440 billion direct fiscal impact for GLF;
fiscally neutral in
medium-term;
Time limitation Implicit temporary 3 years Only once Temporary
(as long as exceptional
occurrence justifies
instrument)
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supposed to provide loans as an intermediary in the
same way the EU did through its Balance of Payments
assistance facility (European Stability Mechanism [ESM],
2019). This structure would prevent creditors from wors-
ening their fiscal position during a time of general eco-
nomic upheaval. Whereas the EU could in general fall
back on its own resources as collateral for lending
through the EFSM, the Eurozone countries had to pro-
vide guarantees for EFSF loans. This was achieved via a
contribution key and oversubscription (guarantees), stat-
ing the share and potential financial involvement of each
country in EFSF activity. The intended assistance formula
aimed at limited liabilities for creditors and for the low-
est possible cost, as the EU and the EFSF would lend as
an intermediary, sparing the countries the direct fiscal
impact of bilateral assistance.
Whereas the common interest of saving Greece and
establishing a rescue fund derived from contagion risks,
the EFSF followed a creditor-centred design. In particu-
lar, German and British national preferences on a non-EU
instrument for Eurozone support were the reason why
the Commission’s alternative of assistance exclusively
provided via the EU was ruled out (Gocaj & Meunier,
2013). Decision-making for assistance was in the hands
of the Member States and in the case of the EFSF
and GLF entirely based on national laws to ensure
legal certainty and control. For the EFSM, the Council
decided by qualified majority voting; for the GLF and
EFSF, Eurozone countries decided unanimously with sev-
eral Member States requiring approval from their par-
liaments. Assistance carried policy conditionality, which
was set as ‘strict’ including extensive austerity demands,
which intended to restore market confidence. These
instruments increased risk-exposure of potential creditor
states, but also favoured creditors’ preference of includ-
ing substantial obstacles to accessing assistance and to
rerouting debt in order to avoid direct costs.
4. The Fault in Our Assistance: EFSF Reform
This initial creditor-centred design unintentionally some-
what weakened the common interest of establishing a
support structure for Eurozone stability. Shortly after the
establishment of the EFSF, several issues arose as the
intended signalling effect to markets failed and market
tension continued to rise in the Eurozone in 2011.
First, in this context, the European Central Bank (ECB)
started its Securities Market Programme through which
it purchased over €200 billion worth of periphery coun-
tries’ government bonds on the secondary market (ECB,
2013). These interventions were contested within the
ECB’s Governing Council and by several Eurozone gov-
ernments (Howarth, 2012), as well as by German and
Dutchmembers of parliament (Fontan&Howarth, 2021).
The main dispute was about the ECB’s balance sheet
stretch, with bonds from countries under increased mar-
ket pressure. The intervention by the ECB effectively low-
ered the funding rate for these countries without them
having to undergo reforms to strengthen their economic
situation, which was seen by some as the root cause of
their fragile market position. This undermined to some
extent the previously set strict conditionality that usually
accompanied extraordinary assistance.
Second, the problematic relationship between banks
and sovereigns became palpable as debtor countries
required substantial funds from assistance instruments
because having rescued their banks they had signif-
icantly weakened their fiscal positions (Blyth, 2013;
Tooze, 2018). A large part of the loans to Ireland and
Greece were used to recapitalise banks, creating the sit-
uation in which the debtor countries had to substantially
increase their debt. This assistance came as conditional
loans, carrying strict provisions on economic reform,
as it was considered a national ex-post fiscal problem
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2015). However, contagion risks made
financial sector assistance a Eurozone issue.
Third, the EFSF-design had two flaws, which were
linked to its legal and its guarantee structure. The over-
subscriptions of the EFSFwere not enough to achieve the
sought-after high credit rating for the total amount of
€440 billion (it only achieved €250 billion). Meanwhile,
Eurostat decided that guarantees for assistance under
the EFSF had to be reported as government debt by the
creditors (Eurostat, 2011). The GLF and the rerouting
of EFSF debt had direct fiscal implications for creditor
states in the short and medium-term as their debt level
rose (Bundesrechnungshof, 2019). This went against the
intended assistance formula, which was supposed to
avoid direct national expenditure for assistance.
Fourth, the Eurozone used favourable, yet relatively
high, interest rates for assistance to Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal, in order to encourage swift reform implemen-
tation and hence a rapid return to the market (Colasanti,
2016; Pisani-Ferry, 2014). However, the intention to
incentivise structural reforms did not have the intended
effect. Creditors and European institutions did not suf-
ficiently consider the effect of assistance via loans and
their interest rates on debt sustainability. With this back-
ground, the Eurogroup decided to reform the EFSF and
“adopt furthermeasures [to] improve the euro area’s sys-
temic capacity to resist contagion risk” (Council of the
EU, 2011a).
The creditor countries, particularly Germany, pre-
ferred reforms to protect their rather stable fiscal posi-
tion and shield their taxpayers from assuming potential
costs from mutualised instruments. They preferred to
avoid being exposed to periphery states’ liabilities and
not to incur costs from rescuing periphery banks. Most
notably, they defended the use of policy conditionality
for any form of assistance in order to avoid moral hazard.
Furthermore, they favoured a legal structure with effec-
tive intermediary borrowing and lending to avoid further
increases of public debt through EFSF activities. Debtor
states, on the other hand, favoured an increase of the
EFSF firepower, a mutualisation of debt and lower inter-
est rates for support as their fiscal position worsened.
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Italy’s finance minister Tremonti called mutualisation of
debt the “master solution” to resolve the crisis (Hollinger,
Bryant, & Peel, 2011). France favoured ECB involvement
and pushed for EFSF leveraging via the ECB and a mutu-
alised system for bank recapitalisation (Carnegy, 2011).
In early 2011, the Eurozone agreed to use EFSF funds
for primary market purchases in order to allow strug-
gling states to maintain market access. Primary market
interventions were EFSF state loans with conditionality
applied through a different channel. This was intended
to reduce the amount of lending necessary as recipi-
ents would partially be able to fund themselves on the
market (Spiegel, 2012). This solution allowed Member
States to maintain control over the scale of the liabil-
ities they assumed via interventions in the debt mar-
kets. However, as the ECB acted in parallel on the sec-
ondary market, creditors saw risks rerouted onto their
central banks’ balance sheets. In Germany, the Securities
Market Programme was seen as the introduction of
common Eurozone debt via the backdoor of the ECB’s
balance sheet, which was guaranteed according to the
Eurozone’s capital key (Bundestag, 2011a).
To regain control of assistance and ensure proper
conditionality, the German coalition government con-
sidered a secondary market instrument for the EFSF,
not only as an additional supporting tool but also as
a replacement for uncontrolled ECB action (Bundestag,
2011b). Germany expected that Eurozone governments
would take over intervention on the secondary market
with conditionality, thus disarming the ECB and ensuring
government control over liabilities (Bundestag, 2011c).
A grandmajority of Germanmembers of parliament even
passed a motion stating that there was no further need
for the ECB’s Securities Market Programme (Bundestag,
2011d). The message was understood in the ECB and the
Securities Market Programme’s successor, the Outright
Monetary Transactions programme, explicitly pointed to
a parallel EFSF/ESMprogrammewith conditionality as eli-
gibility criteria for action (ECB, 2012). Primary and sec-
ondary market interventions were introduced to regain
control of targeted interventions on Eurozone debt mar-
kets and allowed the recipients, in theory, to maintain
market access.
Debtor countriesweremore concernedwith avoiding
adjustment costs of recapitalising their banks as none of
the assistance instruments were targeted directly at the
banking sector but functioned as loans to governments.
France favoured a solution of recapitalisation via the EFSF
(Pidd, 2011), whereas Germany preferred national solu-
tions (“Paris et Berlin,” 2011). Both countries eventually
agreed on a potential use of the EFSF as a last resort
for bank recapitalisation, as the market situation deteri-
orated and sovereign yields spreads increased consider-
ably, putting periphery countries’ debt sustainability at
risk (Bundesbank, 2011). The risk associated with a cas-
cade of defaults of periphery countries was immense and
foregrounded the common Eurozone interest of stability
preceding the negotiation on recapitalisation.
Together with the increase in the effective lending
capacity of the EFSF from €250 billion to 440 billion
(achieved by raising the guarantees), Member States
agreed on a common tool for bank recapitulation.
Creditors’ insistence on the established assistance for-
mula forced potential debtors to accept an indirect recap-
italisation instrument. This instrument worked as a state
loan, however, its conditionality was only targeted at the
financial sector reducing the stigma of a full programme
(ESM, 2017). Creditors refused to take over direct liabili-
ties for difficulties occurring in other countries’ banking
sectors. This increased the funds available but did not
ease the burden for potential debtors. Thus, the new
instrument did not effectively resolve the issue of wors-
ened fiscal positions due to bank bailouts.
The market turmoil in 2011 and the initial empha-
sis on disincentives by creditors in the form of strict
conditionality and favourable, yet impractical, lending
rates for GLF loans, brought Greece again to the brink
of default. Thus, Member States decided to lower the
interest rate for Greece and to lengthen the maturity of
its debt (Council of the EU, 2011b). The abolishment of
impractical rates for close-to-default countries was later
presented as an ‘impressive display of euro area solidar-
ity’ by the ESM’s managing director (ESM, 2020a). This
adjustment tempered the insistence on disincentives via
lending rates as the common Eurozone preference and
the potential risks and losses associated with a Greek
default were a much larger threat than the costs asso-
ciated with longer maturities and lower lending rates.
However, agreement to these relieve measures and a
substantial EFSF loan to Greece came again with ‘appro-
priate incentives to implement the programme’ (Council
of the EU, 2011c). This could not avoid a restructur-
ing of Greek debt held by the private sector in 2012
(Colasanti, 2016).
The future issue of counting debt as national expen-
diturewas resolved by defining the legal structure for the
in parallel negotiated design of the ESM, the successor of
the EFSF, as permanent international financial organisa-
tion allowing intermediary borrowing and lending (ESM,
2019; Eurostat, 2013). The capital structure of the ESM
was based on a similar logic as the EFSF, however, the
ESM included a significant share of paid-in capital, which
functioned as collateral togetherwith additional national
guarantees. When in late 2012 the ESM became opera-
tional, it absorbed all functions and instruments from the
EFSF and reset the effective lending capacity to €500 bil-
lion. The step towards the ESM was a rectification of the
faulty design of the EFSF’s legal structure and increased
the direct costs attributed to assistance via paid-in capi-
tal andmade the formula permanent to showcase a cred-
ible commitment. However, it significantly lowered the
states’ guarantees and achieved the major objective of
effective intermediary borrowing and lending easing the
potential creditors’ immediate burden.
The choice of reforms for the EFSF shows how
the resolution of the crisis was a situation of mixed
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preferences. Eurozone countries agreed on a way for-
ward to resolve the crisis and to achieve the common
interest of Eurozone stability by increasing the lending
capacity, lowering the costs for debtors and by introduc-
ing new instruments. While both, creditors and debtors,
tried to deflect adjustment costs in the detailed imple-
mentation of the assistance formula. Concessions made
by Germany and other creditors to include instruments
on market interventions and bank recapitalisation are
in detail dominated by a creditor-centred design of
the assistance formula. All instruments relied on the
same structure of conditional loans to states with lim-
ited liabilities, fiscal neutrality in the medium-term, and
intended intermediary borrowing and lending to avoid
direct costs.
5. Tug of War over ESM Reform and Banking Sector
Support
As the crisis progressed, scholars and experts pointed
towards the different pre-conditions that led Member
States to seek assistance. One of these aspects was the
sovereign doom loop. Arguably, this problem was made
worse via the ECB’s long-term refinancing operations in
2011 and 2012 as banks in Southern Europe accessed
ECB financing using government bonds as collateral
to buy new government bonds (Howarth & Quaglia,
2016). Another aspect was the previous use of assistance
by individual states and their banking sectors. Ireland
argued that it bared disproportionate costs of rescuing
banks and that the Eurozone should share the cost of
the Irish bailout as it reduced contagion risks for the
Eurozone (Smyth, 2011). As in 2012, Spain required sub-
stantial assistance to rescue its banks, it preferred to
receive recapitalisation for its banks, rather than a gov-
ernment loan, as it insisted that its problems were bank-
made (Minder, Kulish, & Geitner, 2012). However, cred-
itors relied on the assistance formula of loans to states.
It became apparent that in order to effectively break the
doom-loop and achieve Eurozone stability, bank recov-
ery and resolution was to be shifted away from the state
(van der Kwaak & van Wijnbergen, 2017).
This was acknowledged at a Euro summit in 2012.
Governments saw the advantage of direct recapitalisa-
tion and agreed on providing the ESM with the pos-
sibility of recapitalising banks directly in a first step
towards Banking Union. However, while France, Italy,
and Spain supported direct recapitalisation, Germany
and other creditor countries remained concerned about
legacy issues in periphery banks and feared that the costs
of losses, due to failure of nations to reform, would be
spread among the Eurozone countries. Germany also
feared a disadvantage for its alternative banking sec-
tor of corporate and savings banks (Commain, 2021;
Howarth & Quaglia, 2016). Debtor countries favoured
this instrument as it would lower their burden for
potential bailouts. Creditors insisted that the establish-
ment was coupled to progress in setting up the Single
Supervisory Mechanism to monitor banks and a liabil-
ity cascade to avoid disincentives for states to clean up
their banking sectors (Council of the EU, 2013a). These
demands were intended to prevent already struggling
bankswith legacy issues from tapping into the ESM funds
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2016).
Other ex-ante requirements were attached to assis-
tance including the threat to fiscal sustainability for the
country in which the banks were based, systemic rele-
vance of the bank in question, private creditor bail-in,
host Member State participation in bank recapitalisa-
tion, and the inclusion of institution-specific and poten-
tially general economic conditionality (Council of the EU,
2013b). In 2014, the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument
was added to the ESM toolkit (capped at €60 billion).
However, the above-mentioned requirements, mostly
due to creditors’ preference to avoid the moral haz-
ard and costs of bank bailouts, made its use less likely
as debtor states still had to bear most of the adjust-
ment costs ex-ante (Merler, 2014). The step from com-
mon assistance to sovereign states to assistance to banks
came with higher risks for creditors as loans to banks
were riskier than state loans (ESM, 2014). Thus, credi-
tors insisted that in this case, the formula should include
additional disincentiveswhich had the effect that the link
between sovereign states and banks was only superfi-
cially cut.
A similar dynamic of mixed preferences is visible in
the case of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF; for more
details see Howarth & Quaglia, 2014, 2016). France’s
preference was for a single European fund that inter-
vened to resolve or recover ailing financial institutions.
Potential debtors favoured a common solution, which
would ease the burden on banks and sovereign states,
as costs would be mutualised through a European fund.
Germany’s preference was to safeguard its small banks,
retain decision-making in the governments’ hands and
have a network of purely national resolution funds
(Barker, Spiegel, & Wagstyl, 2013). Again, Germany
feared that its corporate and savings banks would be
forced to pay for failed banks in the periphery as a com-
mon systemwould not provide the needed incentives for
debtors to restructure their banking sectors (Howarth &
Quaglia, 2014). The compromise reached with Germany
only included 128 larger banks and forced otherMember
States to accept an intergovernmental agreement for the
SRF (Spiegel, 2013).
The compromise included a transitional period of
10 years (later reduced to eight), during which the SRF
would be composed of national compartments. In this
phase, the SRF was intended to be gradually filled with
ex-ante contributions from financial institutions paying
into national resolution funds until reaching a level of
1% of covered deposits (∼€60 billion; Council of the EU,
2020a). Intervention until the end of the transitional
phase would be limited to the collective contributions
of the respective national compartment and the overall
mutualised means available to the SRF at that moment
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(see Table 2). With time, the national intervention quota
reduces, and the mutualised means increase (for more
details see Council of the EU, 2020a).
In this period the costs of assistance would pre-
dominantly be shouldered by the national banking sec-
tor requiring support. Whereas borrowing and transfers
between the national compartments could be under-
taken to have sufficient funds available, the banking sec-
tor receiving support would have to reimburse these
loans or transfers, shielding other states from incur-
ring losses in their compartments. Even though the
Commission was given new competences, the Council
maintained the possibility to object to a mutualisation
(Council of the EU, 2020a).
The compromise on the transitional period followed,
in particular, the German interest in using national reso-
lution funds, including a shareholder bail-in and a reduc-
tion in the number of institutions covered by the SRF.
However, the agreement also favoured the periphery
states’ interest in putting their larger banks under the
umbrella of the Single Resolution Mechanism. The solu-
tion is a middle ground of a purely national and purely
European solution, with safeguards allowing Germany
to shield its banking sector and keep control within the
Council. The SRF followed the logic of the assistance for-
mula with limited liabilities for states, disincentives cou-
pled to its setup and national involvement, as well as
lending via an intermediary.
To make the SRF operational before the transitional
phase ends in 2023, the Eurozone debated a potential
backstop for the SRF. The Council put forward the possi-
bility of using the ESM in the transitional phase in order
to use the SRF’s full capacity before all ex-ante contribu-
tions were collected (Council of the EU, 2013c). However,
the same preferences leading to a semi-European solu-
tion for the SRF also fostered a similar solution for its
backstop. Member States compromised on a system of
bilateral Loan Facility Agreements, allowing for national
bridge financing for their respective shares according to
the intended size of their national compartments. Only
after all means under the liability cascade of the intergov-
ernmental agreement were exhausted, could national
credit lines be drawn which had to be reimbursed in the
medium-term. This meant that governments had to pro-
vide partial bailouts in the transitional period through
a loan to their own SRF compartment, which would
Table 2. ESM instruments and SRF.
Direct
Recapitalisation
ESM (general) Instrument (ESM) SRF Backstop (ESM) Assistance formula
Guarantee Individual Same as ESM By Backstop; before Same as ESM Limited liability
structure guarantees by 2023 through national
Eurozone credit-lines for
Member States compartments
Eligibility for Conditionality Conditionality; National quotas used Reducing risk Disincentives
assistance ex-ante eligibility; before mutualised exposure;
Single Supervisory means; (Conditions to
Mechanism be agreed by
Eurogroup)
Decision- Decision by Same as ESM Decision by SRB By Eurogroup Member States’





Lender ESM, €500 billion ESM, €60 billion Banking sector ESM, limited No direct fiscal
contributions, to €68 billion impact; fiscally
∼€60 billion neutral in
(∼42 billion collected medium-term
10/07/2020*)
Time Permanent Until SRF is Permanent, Permanent Permanent
limitation finalised with ESM transitional period
backstop (2023) of 8 years
* = Source: Single Resolution Board (n.d.).
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lend-on these funds. After the transitional period, the
SRF compartments are supposed tomerge and share the
responsibility for the entire 128 banks. Creditors only
agreed to the use of the ESM as backstop after the tran-
sitional phase elapsed or sufficient progress of reducing
banks’ exposure to risks had been made (Visco, 2019).
Eurozone countries agreed on this in the revised ESM
treaty in 2019 (yet to be ratified), which allowed the ESM
to provide loans to the SRF up to its target level, with a
nominal cap at €68 billion (ESM, 2020b).
The SRF is the first non-state funded assistance instru-
ment with the potential to break the doom loop, how-
ever, the assistance formula upheld in the transitional
period kept the burden on the country with banking sec-
tor difficulties. The intention to freeMember States from
adverse effects of bailouts will only be achieved partially
and gradually in this period. The solution of the tran-
sitional phase was driven by creditors’—and predomi-
nantly Germany’s—preferences, which included limited
national liabilities, pre-requirements in banking super-
vision and bail-ins for SRF interventions. The common
need to freeMember States from thedoom-loop in order
to stabilise the Eurozone allowed for a deeper integra-
tion of support mechanisms favouring the debtors’ posi-
tions. The rules applied in the transitional period under-
lined the strong adherence to disincentives and avoid-
ance of directs costs by creditors, as most solutions only
allowed for partial mutualisation and demanded that
debtor states significantly participate in interventions.
6. Tug of War Continued: Dealing with Covid-19
After having provided immense national stimuli to
their economies in order to counter the economic
effect of Covid-19 (Anderson et al., 2020), several
countries, including Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Slovenia,
Luxembourg, and Belgium called for action in the form of
a common EU debt instrument, allowing for assistance
in form of grants (Dombey, Chazan, & Brunsden, 2020).
The economic argument for the common European inter-
est put forward was that the pandemic was symmetrical
and that all states, regardless of their policies, were fac-
ing difficulties. However, most creditor states preferred
the ESM as a potential resolution tool, which still had
more than €400 billion of its capacity on standby.
The two camps agreed in April 2020 at the Eurogroup
inclusive format on a ‘comprehensive economic pol-
icy response,’ a mix of EU budget allocations, national
guarantees for European Investment Bank activity, and
adjustment to ESM use. The ESM was allowed to pro-
vide credit lines of up to 2% of Eurozone GDP (€240 bil-
lion) which had to be spent on direct or indirect health-
related expenditure (Council of the EU, 2020b). A new
loan mechanism, SURE, was introduced at the EU level,
which allowed the EU to borrow and on-lend €100 bil-
lion to Member States. The only condition was that the
national government expenditure on short-time work
and similar schemes increased since February 2020.
As of January 2021, the Council approved assistance
to 18 governments via SURE with the largest share going
to Italy (€27,4 billion) and Spain (€21,3 billion). The reg-
ulation worked with voluntary national guarantees of
€25 billion to ensure the full capacitywith beneficial lend-
ing rates,whichwas considered an ‘important expression
of solidarity’ (European Commission, 2020a). Creditors
adhered to the assistance formula via intermediary loans
to avoid incurring direct costs and to limit their risk expo-
sure in time through temporary instruments. The big con-
cession on their part was the easing of conditionality for
assistance, which was intended to encourage debtors to
make use of the loans.
In May 2020, as the Commission projected a record
economic decline in the EU, the periphery countries, but
also France, refused to rely on support via Eurozone
financial assistance instruments and French president
Macron referred to the ESM instruments as throwing
‘fake money’ at the problem (Khan & Brunsden, 2020).
The issue was that loans alone did not help already
highly indebted countries as their fiscal sustainability
was under threat and the ESM’s senior creditor status
could have negative effects on market lending rates.
After the Commission’s forecast, a Franco-German initia-
tive proposed a €500 billion grant-based recovery fund
for the EU, raised on the markets and funded by an
increase in the EU’s own resources and a fair taxation
of the digital economy (Présidence de la République,
2020). This U-turn from the German government was
defended as necessary solidarity, given that loans would
not help countries with already high debt and that eco-
nomic cohesion would have been severely disrupted
(Bundeskanzlerin, 2020). German members of parlia-
ment argued that it was in Germany’s interest to
strengthen its EU neighbours due to its strong export-led
market (Bundestag, 2020).
On the other hand, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, and Austria (referred to as ‘the frugal four’)
proposed only using loans for support (Rijksoverheid,
2020). In late May, the Commission combined both in
a proposed recovery fund worth €750 billion (European
Commission, 2020b). The dynamic was not creditor and
debtor per se but between frugal states and a Franco-
German-led coalition. The outcome of a record 4-day
negotiation was a middle ground between both camps
with a Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) worth
€360 billion in loans and €312,5 billion in grants (Council
of the EU, 2020c).
The Covid-19 overall response (see Table 3) is a step
away from the previous application of assistance through
conditional loans with disincentives. Even though grants
were introduced and disincentives predominantly abol-
ished, the regulation of the RRF referred to sound
economic governance as part of the ex-post eligibility
criteria. Thus, creditors upheld some form of conditional-
ity. They also ensured theminimisation of direct national
costs and limited liability for mutual support. The largest
share of around €1 trillion worth of intended assistance
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Table 3. Covid-19 assistance tools.
EU RRF Credit-line (ESM) SURE Assistance formula
Eligibility for Recovery and Resilience Plans (including Increased Healthcare, cure Soft conditionality
assistance sound economic governance) short-time and prevention
work schemes
Guarantee Guaranteed by extraordinary EU Individual Guaranteed by Limited liability
structure expenditure guarantees by EU budget
the Eurozone
Member States
Decision- Council Predetermined Decision on Decision on Member States’
making implementing allocation of assistance assistance taken control
decision, limited to grants taken by within the Council
6,8% of respective Eurogroup
national GNI
Lender EU, €360 billion EU grants, ESM, Limited EU, Limited to Mix: direct fiscal
€312,5 billion to €240 billion €75 billion, impact for Member
voluntary national States (grants),
guarantees for partially no fiscal




Time Until 2027 Until 2027 End of 2022 December 2022 Temporary
limitation
followed the previous assistance formula including tem-
porary instruments in the formof intermediary loans hav-
ing no direct fiscal impact and some conditions attached.
7. Conclusion
By applying the theoretical premise of liberal intergov-
ernmentalism, this article provides one possible explana-
tory track on how the Eurozone has reformed in the area
of financial assistance since 2010. The re-occurring pat-
tern of common Eurozone interests and cost-benefit con-
siderations of creditors and debtors led to a repeated
tug of war over the detailed reforms of assistance, while
both sides still tried to resolve the common difficulties at
hand. These situations of mixed preferences are one way
of understanding the interstate bargaining process over
policies with potentially high costs for Member States.
Creditors’ preferences were decisive for reforms in
terms of disincentives, limited liability for common debt,
and the adherence to intermediary borrowing and lend-
ing to minimise direct costs. They repeatedly favoured
national safeguards and the use of loans. Control and
some disincentives were held on to, which reduced the
effectiveness of the assistance formula and only partially
allowed for a slow de-nationalisation of assistance in the
case of bank-related support. Through the enabling fac-
tor of common EU and Eurozone interests, debtors were
able to push for softening of moral hazard elements and
an expansion of the assistance into areas of banking sec-
tor support. The common interest was also decisive for
Germany and other creditors to support grants.
This explains why financial assistance, even though
increasing in size and in areas of applicability since 2010,
was often accompanied by a reduced involvement for
creditors, a temporary form of instruments, and rein-
forced disincentives for debtors. Apart from disagree-
ment on detailed application of EU and Eurozone assis-
tance, one should however not ignore the increased
volume of assistance available since the beginning of
the Euro crisis, which today stands at a total capacity of
around €1,3 trillion and is at least partially permanent.
While some instruments are certainly more appealing
for debtors than others, assistance continued to be pro-
vided to a larger extent in the form of loans. The com-
bination of loans and grants, as well as the general risks
carried by all Member States associated with assistance,
indicates the commitment to the European project and
underlines the institutionalised shared European and
Eurozone interests.
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1. Introduction
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has emerged as
one of the international community’s great success sto‐
ries of the post‐World War II era. Since its foundation
in 1957, the primary financial arm of the EU became
the world’s largest multilateral bank—as lender and
borrower—surpassing better‐known institutions, such as
the World Bank. With its operations undergoing pro‐
gressive international expansion in over 160 countries,
the bank has developed into a global actor. Set up to
address a market failure in long‐term capital flows to
post‐conflict Europe, the EIB has a dual nature that
is unique among multilateral banks—it is both an EU
body and a bank (Bussière, Dumoulin, & Willaert, 2008).
Accordingly, it combines its institutional character with
financial heft and technical knowledge. As a result of
the EIB’s dual nature, its activity has shifted on several
occasions, adapting to both policy and market develop‐
ments and reflecting the geo‐economic landscape aswell
as the ever‐emerging challenges, which call for global
collective action and financing. Originally geared toward
the EU’s harmonised and integrated development, the
EIB turned into a market‐making support mechanism
(Clifton, Diaz‐Fuentes, & Revuelta, 2014) and subse‐
quently a multifocal economic booster.
As a European body, the EIB has been increasingly
solicited by the EU to assist in facing these ever‐changing
challenges. There have been repeated calls from the
EU to extend the EIB’s objectives and its geographical
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and sectoral reach as well as to ‘strengthen’ its sup‐
port in times of economic downturn. In this vein, it has
been called upon to promote economic recovery against
the backdrop of the financial crisis through the frame‐
work of the Juncker Plan in 2014 and to support the
post‐pandemic fight and economic restart in 2020 (EIB,
2020a). Climate change is one of the defining issues of
our time which requires coordinated policy and action,
in which the EIB can play a key role, as it is empow‐
ered to do both. Financing is important for unlocking the
necessary investment for mitigating climate challenges
(Alonso & Cuesta, 2021). In November 2019, the EIB
announced its ‘metamorphosis’ into a ‘Climate Bank’:
Associated with the EU’s Green Deal, presented a month
later, the EIB claimed to be the first international public
climate bank and a front runner in the EU’s priority cli‐
mate agenda. In its EU institutional capacity, the EIB is
mandated through the treaties to support EU policy ini‐
tiatives and hence to follow rather than anticipate the
Commission. Nonetheless, upon publicizing its claimed
‘makeover’ into a climate bank, the EIB also simultane‐
ously revealed the launch of a new climate strategy and
energy lending policy ending fossil fuel financing after
2021. The EIB is relatively well‐positioned to play a proac‐
tive role in policymaking. Building on the green finan‐
cial and operational initiatives, which the bank started
to develop earlier than the Commission (as in the case
of the issuance of the green bonds in 2007, which came
well ahead of the Commission’s streamlined climate pol‐
icy involvement in 2015) the question is whether, and if
so for what reasons, the EIB adopted a new policymak‐
ing role. Consequently, it is worth researching whether
the EIB developed from a technocratic policy‐taker into
a policymaker, and if so, how this can be best understood.
Is the EIB’s ‘pivot’ to climate a paradigm change?
This article builds on existing scholarly work exam‐
ining the EIB’s evolving policymaking role (Clifton et al.,
2014; Liebe & Howarth, 2019; Mertens & Thiemann,
2017, 2019; Robinson, 2009). However, it examines a
new topic—the bank’s claimed transformation into a cli‐
mate bank—which is so recent that the academic com‐
munity has not yet had time to develop an interest in
it. The article is among the first, if not the first, to study
the EIB’s conversion into a climate bank, which thus con‐
stitutes its scientific contribution. The remainder of the
article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
underlying theoretical framework and applied approach.
Section 3 provides a historic evolution of the bank’s insti‐
tutional trajectory in two sub‐sections, from its policy‐
taking days to modern‐day policymaking transforma‐
tions. Section 4 studies contextual insights related to the
background and motivations behind the EIB’s switch to
a climate bank and analyses whether the turn consti‐
tutes a preferred or forced change. Section 5 evaluates
whether the ‘pivot’ represents a paradigm shift and a
‘quantum leap.’ Finally, the conclusion provides a syn‐
thetic overview of the key findings.
2. Theoretical Framework and Methodology
As EIB’s nature goes well ‘beyond that of a financial
institution’ (van der Zwet, Bachtler, Miller, Vernon, &
Dozhdeva, 2016) being an EU body and a bank, this con‐
version influences EU governance as well as the market.
The article thus uses the sociology of markets as a con‐
ceptual framework, which explains the social relations
that exist between suppliers, producers, consumers, and
the state. It is a framework used for theorising pub‐
lic banks as dynamic institutions (Romero, 2020), which
allows the study of the EIB as an actor in relation to its
major stakeholders, such as other EU governance coun‐
terparts and market players. In particular, this article
analyses the background and motivation of EIB’s turn to
a climate bank—claimed to represent a ‘quantum leap’
(EIB, 2019b, p. 1). Accepting EIB’s challenge of a claimed
‘quantum leap,’ the article draws from quantummechan‐
ics. Specifically, it follows the view of Erwin Schrödinger
that it is meaningless to analyse individual objects in
real‐time. He proposed instead that only the scrutiny of
‘ensembles’ of many particles and their record over time,
can allow for understanding phenomena in their quan‐
tum trajectory. The article follows EIB’s quantum trajec‐
tory and attempts to answer the following research ques‐
tions: Is EIB’s ‘quantum leap’ just a further term in its
search for an identity in its perpetual pendular swing
between the two poles of its nature, acting upon EU
request and in alignment with new European policy, or
for other reasons? What could these reasons possibly
be? Is EU’s policy‐driven bank a policy‐taking or a poli‐
cymaking actor when changing into a ‘climate bank’?
The article concentrates on the EIB’s institutional
nature. In examining the research questions within its
chosen conceptual framework, the article examines the
EIB from a ‘collective dynamics’ perspective, drawing on
the sociology of markets, while examining the bank’s pol‐
icymaking and policymaking roles over‐time for under‐
standing its change into a climate bank. This frame‐
work helps to shed light on both faces of the bank’s
dual nature while viewing the EIB in interaction with its
stakeholders to study what is ‘at stake.’ The stakehold‐
ers prioritised for analysis in this research are primar‐
ily the EU member states (EIB shareholders), and sec‐
ondarily, the Commission, one of the three central EU
policymaking institutions. The role of other stakehold‐
ers, such as NGO’s, other multilateral banks, borrowers
and investors, is also taken into consideration, albeit to
a lesser extent. Given that markets are loci of exchange
involving cooperation and antagonism among rational
actors striving to fulfil a specific purpose (Hodson &
Peterson, 2017), the EIB’s ‘shift’ to a climate bank is analy‐
sed in relation to the varying interests of its stakehold‐
ers in order to identify the reasons—the EIB’s own or
external—that prompted such a ‘pivot.’
To analyse individual actors, which within the soci‐
ology of markets framework are considered as rational,
and to understand the EIB’s role in the EU governance
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constellation, the article uses rational choice institution‐
alism, notably a principal‐agent model approach, well
suited and used in literature to study European gover‐
nance actors and regional development banks, such as
the EIB (Clifton, Diaz‐Fuentes, & Howarth, 2021; Fontan
& Howarth, 2021). The methodology used is based on
academic literature that has approached the EIB from
similar angles—principal‐agent model (Liebe & Howarth,
2019), and sociology of markets (Mertens, & Thiemann,
2019)—as well as different perspectives and more gen‐
eral perspectives, and a review of official documents,
consisting mainly of public speeches, press releases,
and annual reports, including elements relevant to the
research questions. Viewing the EIB as the agent and
the EU member states and the Commission as principals
and policymakers who use the agency to maximise their
objectives, the principal‐agent model is useful for inves‐
tigating the causal influences of their interactions on
EU governance and policymaking (Pollack, 1997). Given
that the principal‐agent models assume that the inter‐
ests of principals and agents diverge due to informa‐
tional asymmetry, to the advantage of the agent, the
results of such an analysis can unveil the background
of EU decision‐making and governance transformations.
It is precisely this asymmetry that ‘empowers’ and moti‐
vates the agent to act in his own best interests. Thus, the
principal is in a position to prescribe the pay‐off rules
in the relationship by limiting the ability of the agent to
exercise policy discretion (Hooghe, 1999). The principal‐
agent model allows one to gauge whether and when the
EIB was called by the principals or if instead, it exploited
the political context and available policy windows and
acted as a policy entrepreneur when it ‘became’ a cli‐
mate bank. In this way, the article delves into whether
and how the rational interests of the bank have led to
the EIB’s ‘pivot.’ Subsequently, it evaluates whether the
EIB’s turn constitutes a discontinuous change or, in other
words, a ‘quantum leap,’ as suggested by the EIB.
3. The EIB’s Quantum Trajectory: From Policy‐Taking
to Policymaking
The starting point of this research is a longitudinal study
of EIB as an agent, attempting to identify whether it
has been acting as the policy‐taker of the principal’s line
and whether there are eventual deviations or changes
of course.
3.1. Policy‐Taking
Founded in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome as the EU’s
bank, the EIB is the EU’s long‐term lending arm. The EIB
has a historical presence in Europe. Its statute has
been annexed as a protocol in seven successive EU
Treaties. The EIB’s qualitative and quantitative develop‐
ment mirrors the evolution of the Union, adapting to
calls to accommodate successive enlargements and pri‐
ority reorientations. These are reflected in the bank’s
ever‐evolving activity objectives, geographical spread,
the volume of operations as well as its structure and pro‐
cesses. Accordingly, the EIB has portrayed itself as a prin‐
cipal vehicle for implementing EU economic policies.
The EIB business model is based on three pillars of
value‐added: (i) consistency with EU policies, support
for the EU priority objectives and EU policy dialogue
with partner countries; (ii) project technical, economic,
environmental and social appraisal and conditionality;
and (iii) EIB financial and non‐financial contribution to
the project. The EIB transfers the financial advantage
of its funds to the beneficiaries and leverages addi‐
tional finance from the public and private sector (EIB,
2011, p. 3).
For more than thirty years, the EIB has viewed itself
as a technocratic implementation agency “having no
organic ties with other Community institutions” (EIB,
1987, p. 3), “autonomous” (EIB, 1991, p. 1; Robinson,
2009, p. 652) and independent (Peterson, 2004). EIB’s
“independence” (EIB, 1987, p. 16) as proclaimed explic‐
itly by President Bröder, let the EIB’s bank‐side curve
out and dominate over its institutional‐side. The bank’s
independence has also continued to prevail under the
presidency of Sir Brian Unwin, stressing in parallel the
bank’s institutional role until the early 2000s: “The EIB
it is in a sense the Unions ‘house bank’ operating as an
autonomous non‐profit maximising financing institution,
owned by the 15 UnionMember States” (EIB, 1996, p. 1).
Subsequently, the EIB started to downplay its indepen‐
dence, highlighting a ‘policy‐driven’ aspect, consistent
with the bank’s intention of closer integration in the EU
institutional constellation, while continuing to stress its
dual capacity. As stated by President Maystadt:
The EIB is no ordinary bank: It was created specifi‐
cally to provide financial support to the EU’s objec‐
tives. I describe this special character with the term
‘policy‐driven bank,’ namely a bank which in synergy
with the other EU institutions and without burden‐
ing the public purse, contributes to the realisation of
projects giving concrete expression to the economic,
social and ultimately, political priorities of the Union.
(EIB, 2001, p. 4)
Since 2011, under the current president, Hoyer, the term
‘policy’ has been dropped, albeit increasingly and sys‐
tematically ‘showcasing’ the EIB’s institutional role by
branding the EIB as ‘the EU bank’ (EIB, 2012, p. 4).
Nevertheless, progressive differentiation started there‐
after. While demonstrating self‐confidence by projecting
its size—for the first ever time in a president’smessage in
an annual report—as “the world’s largest supranational
borrower” (EIB, 2011, p. 5), it appears that the EIB is in
search of an identity. In different months in 2019, its self‐
characterisations ranged from a ‘crowding‐in bank’ (EIB,
2019a, p. 12) to a ‘climate bank’ (EIB, 2019b). This leads
to a question: Is the EIB’s ‘quantum leap’ simply a further
term in its search for an identity? A further adaptation to
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a policy field of intense interest to the EU, as on several
occasions in the past? Or does the ‘pivot’ to a climate
bank point to an EIB turn toward policymaking?
Beyond the EIB’s agency role, its policy‐taking has
also been specifically, consistently, and increasingly
emerging in its top officials’ discourse over time. Under
the Le Portz presidency in the 1970s, the bank described
itself as “translating into practice the priorities, as formu‐
lated by the EIB’s Governors, who are themember states’
Ministers of Finance or Economy” (EIB, 1984, p. 10).
Policy‐taking continued to emerge explicitly or implicitly
in later years, and President Bröder observed that the
EIB “has constantly adapted its activity in keeping with
successive enlargements of the European Commission
and developments in Community policies, thereby serv‐
ingMember States’ needs as effectively as possible” (EIB,
1988, p. 3). Similarly, President Unwin described the
bank’s remit as “furthering the Union’s priority economic
objectives” (EIB, 1994, p. 5), and President Maystadt
explained that “the Bank has defined itself as a pub‐
lic policy bank, and seeks to interpret this to the maxi‐
mum as congruence with EU policy as developed prin‐
cipally by the Commission” (EIB, 2005, p. 1). President
Maystadt explicitly stated that the EIB “does not have as
part of its remit the power to define policies” (Bussière
et al., 2008, p. 6). Following the same line, the cur‐
rent president, Hoyer, has claimed that the EIB is “pro‐
viding finance and expertise for sound and sustainable
investment projects which contribute to furthering EU
policy objectives. The EIB also implements the finan‐
cial aspects of the EU’s external and development poli‐
cies” (European Parliament, 2013, p. 2). Not only has the
EIB portrayed itself as a policy‐taker; it has been also
viewed as such by its stakeholderswhen asked to support
the implementation of evolving EU policies. Through the
Council, the EU member states have regularly called
on the EIB to support changing policies in a constantly
mutating context by altering its objectives, volume and
geographical reach in order to assist European policy
objectives. Starting with the provision of development
finance in the 1960s, examples over the years include
the addition of other objectives, such as energy in the
1970s, the environment in the 1980s, priority lending
to the Trans‐European Networks in the 1990s, increased
support for innovation in the 2000s, assisting economic
recovery after the global economic crisis in the 2010s,
and the Covid‐19 pandemic in 2020. The Commission
has also been calling on the EIB to “step up its efforts
in designing new instruments” to support investments
in green innovation (European Commission, 2005, p. 4).
For the European Parliament, “The EIB is in fact a finan‐
cial instrument serving Community policies” (European
Parliament, 2000, p. 3). Peer multilateral banks have also
been viewing the EIB as a policy‐taker, given that “it
makes long‐term finance available for sound investment
in order to contribute towards EU policy goals” (Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2016, p. 1). In the same
fashion, NGOs expect that “the EIB is supposed to fol‐
low EU legislation in its activities both in and outside EU”
(Feiler & Stoczkiewicz, 1999, p. 5).
3.2. From Policy‐Taking to Policymaking
In line with typical agency dilemma situations, while
EIB’s official rhetoric has focused on its policy‐taking
role, its practices have been increasingly drifting towards
policymaking. The EIB has been tacitly but systemat‐
ically prioritising its rational interests, departing from
its technical know‐how stronghold, with climate change
being the latest example. Cognizant of this shift, the
academic community has called for research on the
bank’s policymaking role (Clifton et al., 2014; Liebe
& Howarth, 2019; Mertens & Thiemann, 2017, 2019;
Robinson, 2009). Theseworks have demonstrated a grad‐
ual and careful EIB shift from a policy‐taking to a policy‐
making role, demonstrating normal entrepreneurship or
policy entrepreneurship activism, depending onwhether
the pendulum was on the side of the bank or the insti‐
tution, respectively. As a result, the EIB’s aspirations to
make a more proactive contribution to EU policy objec‐
tives have been revealed, albeit remaining ‘under the
radar.’ Additionally, these works explored some of the
subtle ways the EIB has been shirking and exploiting the
political context and policy windows to increase its pol‐
icy influence.
However, the situation changed when the EIB openly
claimed, for the first time, a policymaking role under
the current president. Confirming the bank’s politici‐
sation (Mertens & Thiemann, 2019), President Hoyer
argued that he was the one who had pushed the
Juncker plan along with Commission President Juncker.
In a speech for Luxembourg’s ‘movers and shakers’ in
October 2015, he mentioned that he and President
Juncker worked together to create the Juncker Plan, and
he went on to explain the importance of the EIB in this
policy development:
When I met with Jean‐Claude Juncker in the summer
of 2014, he was preparing his program for becom‐
ing the new President of the Commission….This is the
point where Jean‐Claude Juncker and myself agreed
to enable EIB to take risks on a much larger scale.
If you want, this was the birth of the Investment Plan
for Europe, or better known as the Juncker‐Plan. (EIB,
2015b, p. 14).
President Hoyer also confirmed EIB’s politicisation as a
“political instrument…[as it] serves a political purpose”
(Toplensky & Barker, 2019).
4. The EIB’s Climate ‘Pivot’ Context
Tying back to the main thrust of this research, when
President Hoyer explained the EIB’s ‘makeover’ into
a climate bank at the bank’s annual conference in
January 2020, he followed the same line: “We listened
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to the European Council and to the President of the
Commission, Ursula von der Leyen” (EIB, 2020a, p. 8).
Seen from a principal and agency perspective, this
statement—seemingly submissive—can be viewed as
the starting point of a paradigm shift in the EIB’s position‐
ing in the EU governance setting. This statement is unlike
his earlier rhetoric and the EIB’s customary policy‐taking
discourse, showcasing the bank’s efforts to “deliver on
commitments to Member States” (EIB, 2015a, p. 1) or
“to deliver on the promise of the Investment Plan for
Europe calls” concerning the Commission (EIB, 2015b,
p. 4). The 2020 statement could even be interpreted
as an attempt to refer to the EIB as inter pares with
the Council and the Commission. Although one should
observe how the EIB rhetoric will evolve, there is further
evidence of this. First and foremost, the timing of EIB’s
‘pivot’ shows some intention to break away and chal‐
lenge the EU governance set‐up. The EIB released the
news of its ‘transformation’ on November 14, 2019 (EIB,
2019b), well before von der Leyen’s Commission pre‐
sented the European Green Deal on December 11, 2019
(European Commission, 2019). This constitutes a change
in the paradigm in which the EIB announcements usu‐
ally postdate the Council and the Commission for cour‐
tesy reasons, as expected in a principal‐agent relation.
Second, the EIB’s congruent new climate strategy and
energy lending policy ending fossil fuel financing after
2021 and its simultaneous pledge of one trillion Euros
by 2030 for climate change, publicised upon its ‘pivot,’
demonstrate a policymaking role. The latter, seen in con‐
junction with the EIB’s pioneering climate‐related capi‐
tal market activity—well before the Commission stream‐
lined its climate finance policy in 2015—shows that the
bank has been feeling relatively well‐positioned to play
a more pro‐active role in this area. Third, the context
of the EIB proclamation falls during a period of tough
negotiations in EU circles concerning the EIB’s position
within an eminent reshaping of the economic gover‐
nance set‐up related to: (i) the creation of a European
development bank, with three possible scenarios under
discussion, including an EIB subsidiary, an European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) subsidiary
and an independent institution as the third option; and
(ii) the InvestEU, as a successor to the growth‐promoting
Juncker plan for the period 2021–2027. In these negotia‐
tions, the EIB appears to be losing its historic primacy of
being entrusted with the exclusivemandate of managing
EU funding or guarantees as the EU bank. In this context,
the EIB is placed almost on par with other multilateral
and national banks, although maintaining a preferential
position, managing 75% of these resources. Depriving
the EIB of its monopoly over the EU budget seems to be
a new paradigm, also followed by the Commission under
the European Green Deal:
The Commission will also work with the EIB Group,
national promotional banks and institutions, as well
as with other international financial institutions. The
EIB set itself the target of doubling its climate target
from 25% to 50% by 2025, thus becoming Europe’s
climate bank. (European Commission, 2019, p. 16)
In addition to the paradigm shift in the EIB’s principal
and agent role‐setting, the above analysis suggests that
the EIB’s ‘transformation’ into a climate bank was delib‐
erated during strained institutional and market condi‐
tions. To better understand the prevailing background,
particularly the EIB–stakeholder interaction, this article
draws on a sociology of markets perspective. First, the
profiles of the stakeholders are discussed along with
the reasons for including them in this analysis. The EIB
and its EU governance stakeholders have similar pref‐
erences regarding climate action, given an apparent
change in public and institutional sentiment about the
significance of the issue. The EU member states are the
EIB’s top‐ranking stakeholders, as they are the bank’s con‐
stitutionally exclusive shareholders. Serving their inter‐
ests and needs is EIB’s raison d’être and the sine qua
non‐condition for its existence. In turn, its sharehold‐
ers have demonstrated extraordinary and continuous
support, as evidenced by successive capital increases.
The EIB enjoys the strongest shareholding support of all
multilateral banks, mainly because its shareholders are,
on the one hand, exclusively high‐income industrialised
countries, and on the other hand, because they are the
EIB’s prime beneficiaries, with a historic average of 90%
of the bank’s aggregate annual lending. Obviously, share‐
holders’ support also recognises the bank’s agency ser‐
vices in delivering upon their calls, adapting its activity
to their ever‐changing topical demands. Nevertheless, in
parallel to their recent support—demonstrated by the
replenishing of the EIB’s capital post‐Brexit—EU mem‐
ber states have also expressed a desire to reform the EIB
and obtain a higher level of control through the EU gov‐
ernance setup, including supervision of the EIB by the
European Central Bank (Brunsden & Khan, 2018; Khan,
2018; Mertens & Thiemann, 2018). In a lead‐role among
member states, France has been promoting:
The idea of creating a bank to concentrate on climate
change…[and] Ursula von der Leyen… signalled that
shifting the mandate of the European Investment
Bank is among the options under consideration
[while announcing to the European Parliament on
10 July 2019 the ‘transformation’ of the EIB] into a
European climate bank, a green bank, we will be role
models worldwide. (Krukowska, 2019)
Member states’ goading and the European Commission’s
support of the need to turn Europe into a climate
cause front‐runner prior to the EIB’s ‘pivot’ proclama‐
tion in November 2019 raises further questions about
the timing of and reasons for the bank’s announcement.
The EIB’s rush to anticipate the Commission’s Green Deal
makes the exploration of these questions more pressing.
The Commission, as the ‘guardian of the Treaties’ and de
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facto part of the EU policymaking scene, has a seat on
the EIB Board of Directors and is becoming an increas‐
ingly important stakeholder of the EIB, due to strength‐
ened joint action. In the run‐up to the new Commission
leadership, the Commission saw climate change as a
way to mark its tenure, as it: (i) reflects public sen‐
timent; (ii) would be able to consolidate the EU’s cli‐
mate worldview; and (iii) has growth potential because it
touches all sectors of social and economic activity (Rifkin,
2011). Investments in climate‐related areas are inter‐
twinedwith quality of life as well as research, innovation,
and industry 4.0. For financing investment schemes, the
Commission is happy to rely on the EIB’s agency skills.
In need of specialised finance skills, the Commission
views the EIB as a reliable and highly qualified technical
partner with which “it has strengthened collaboration…
and created stronger links between structural funds and
the new financial instruments with the aim of leverag‐
ing… investment” (European Commission, 2019, p. 19).
In this sense, the Commission is the EIB’s sister organ‐
isation, offering the EIB a unique comparative advan‐
tage among its multilateral peers (Kavvadia, 2021). Their
long‐established cooperation covers policy and imple‐
mentation arrangements, including funding and guaran‐
tees. In the EU governance setting, the two institutions
have been conceived in a principal‐agent relationship
since the 1960s, when the EIB was mandated to provide
financing outside the Union. Their relations have been
characterised by the typical agency dilemma inherent
in a “cultural gap” (European Parliament, 2016, p. 103)
and “discontent” (Mertens & Thiemann, 2019, p. 21).
Nevertheless, the two have increasingly been leaning on
each other to address operational issues under various
mandates. The EIB has been comforting the Commission
by providing technically sound mandate management,
while the Commission has bolstered the EIB with fund‐
ing and risk coverage. The latter has been actively sought
by the EIB in situations of high risk and during times
of turmoil, such as the introduction of the euro, the
global financial and economic crises, and the Covid‐19
pandemic. With this increasing cooperation, however,
the Commission feels a stronger need for exercising
greater control over the ‘resisting’ EIB (Counter Balance,
2020b). With the Green Deal, cooperation with the EIB
in the relatively new area of the green finance agenda is
important for the Commission, which did not engage in
mainstream implementation of climate action policy in
capital‐markets until around 2015, whereas the EIB struc‐
tured its environmental involvement earlier, through the
pioneering issuance of green bonds in 2007. This coop‐
eration among the two EU actors did not go unnoticed
by another EIB stakeholder, the European Parliament.
The Parliament’s current ‘greener’ composition is fully
in line with the new EU policy agenda, acknowledging
the benefits of Commission–EIB cooperation in green
finance while also demanding increased control over the
EIB (Counter Balance, 2020b). In its 2016 study of the
EIB’s role in EU’s cohesion policy, the Parliament acknowl‐
edged that the Commission had to rely increasingly on
the EIB’s expertise and anticipated this pattern to further
strengthen in the future based on the experiences from
the financial crisis (European Parliament, 2016).
Beyond the EU governance set‐up, the EIB context is
also determined, shaped, and influenced by the bank’s
peers, which in the sociology of markets framework are
viewed as key organisational stakeholders. Within the
multilateral banks market, the EIB has already surpassed
all of its peers, including the World Bank, in terms of
capital and volume of activity. Despite the recent addi‐
tion of new institutions in themultilateral banking scene,
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and
the New Development Bank, the EIB’s leading position
seems currently unchallenged (Kavvadia, 2021). Given
the global importance of the climate, 11 of the multilat‐
eral banks, including the EIB, have agreed to deepen their
collaboration to promote sustainable infrastructure (EIB,
2017a) as a further example of cooperation initiatives.
While certainly not excluding competition among peers,
projecting cooperation is important for the relevance of
public banks, especially in light of the increased scrutiny
concerning their relevance, mainly from think‐tanks and
NGOs. As a result of this scrutiny in recent years, the slow
climate action of multilateral banks has been voiced as
anNGOprime concern. Uniquely equipped to implement
policy and funding in a wide cross‐border area, these
banks are best suited for dealing with new and diverse
global challenges, such as climate change. In 2016, there
were already calls for turning the World Bank into a
climate bank and “renaming the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development… as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Sustainable Development”
(Montek, Lawrence, & Andrés, 2016). The World Bank,
having a world‐wide membership and being closest to
the UN global climate policymaking, would be an ideal
candidate to take over the climate funding leadership,
for “making financial flows consistent with a pathway
towards greenhouse gas emissions and climate‐resilient
development” (United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 2015). Given that, in the sociology
of markets framework, actors operate through agency,
“framing and entrepreneurship” (Fligstein, 2011, p. 7),
the EIB has slipped into the role of a lead multilateral cli‐
mate financier aware of the position of its peers. The EIB
has obviously used a policy window to its advantage,
building on its strength of having shareholders commit‐
ted both to the climate cause and the EIB. The bank
could therefore act swiftly and establish itself as the first
international climate bank. Although better positioned,
it is difficult for the World Bank to achieve such a major
‘transformation’ due to its wide shareholding basis and
concomitant slower processes. The EBRD also has ambi‐
tious climate policy and funding aspirations (van de Ven,
2017). It has been “a global leader at financing green
investments, most notably through the private sector”
(EBRD, 2020, p. 1), and in 2020 green energy represents
50% of its annual funding. Nevertheless, the EBRD did
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not make a decisive move on climate finance, possibly
because it was more focused on ‘bearing down’ on the
EIB in terms of geographical reach, product mix and
most importantly political support within the EU, asmen‐
tioned earlier. The EIB was the first to put on the cli‐
mate bank hat, thus getting a head start and further
strengthening its positioning among its peers. NGOs are
the natural activist stakeholder in the EIB’s ‘makeover.’
Starting from strained relations and a complete disap‐
proval of “EIB’s actual disregard for environmental con‐
siderations…[and the fact that]… the EIB is supposed to
follow EU legislation in its activities… but does not seem
to do so” (Feiler & Stoczkiewicz, 1999, p. 5), NGOs obvi‐
ously hailed EIB’s ‘pivot,’ considering it largely as a vic‐
tory. After this rough start in the 1990s and the ‘bumpy’
relations with the NGOs, the EIB focused on increasing
its knowledge and expertise in green finance. Indeed, it
is thanks to prodding by NGOs that the EIB presented a
new environmental policy containing numerous positive
statements and requirements in 1996, becoming more
climate aware and proactive in the last 10 years. Its green
financial initiatives and environmentally upgraded oper‐
ational criteria and processes have prepared the ground
for assuming a prime role in the green market and
finance policymaking. However, NGOs cannot be seen as
the prime motivator of EIB’s ‘pivot,’ rather, they acted as
a supportive stakeholder. The last category of EIB stake‐
holders of interest in this research includes the bank’s
investors and borrowers. The former have already shown
positive responses to the EIB’s climate aspirations by sup‐
porting the bank’s green bonds, representing on average
6.5% of the EIB’s yearly issuance programme, while the
latter account for 25% of the EIB’s yearly lending activity
on average. While these volumes constitute a good start‐
ing point—both on the asset aswell as the liability side of
the bank—they do not appear sufficient for an EIB turn‐
about into a purely climate bank. Consequently, the EIB
does not appear ‘mature’ in its complete ‘makeover’ to a
climate bank from a quantitative perspective. Increasing
its lending to the interim target of 50% by 2025 from its
record of 31% in 2018 appears challenging. This seems
even more true in the post‐pandemic context, as several
investments will be halted and new investment priori‐
ties will be set, mainly in support of existing assets and
entrepreneurial undertakings. Nevertheless, on the lia‐
bility side, with more than €16 billion issued in the green
format across 11 currencies, the EIB remains one of the
largest issuers of green bonds (EIB, 2017b, p. 3).
The above analysis reveals that EIB’s ‘pivot’ to a cli‐
mate bank is not based on business grounds, given that
its climate borrowing and lending activity (6.5% and 25%,
respectively) do not justify such a radical step. The EIB’s
‘metamorphosis’ into a climate bank targets climate‐
related lending of 50% of its aggregate annual lending
within five years. Unlike its institutional side, which is
aligned to EU policy objectives, the EIB’s bank side is
demand driven. In 2018, its environment lending was
€17 billion, that is, 31% of the total annual lending of
€55,6 billion. Extrapolating from these figures—ceteris
paribus and based on the EIB’s projection of maintaining
the same lending volume (EIB, 2020b)—the EIB would
have to achieve an additional €10 billion of climate lend‐
ing beginning in 2025. Of course, the EBRD has already
achieved green finance of 46% of its aggregate annual
funding. Although the EBRD is much smaller than the
EIB, in absolute terms this amounts to €4,6 billion (i.e.,
1/3 of the EIB’s 2018 climate volume, prior to its ‘pivot’).
The question of whether there are enough investment
projects qualifying under climate funding is beyond the
scope of this research and remains open, especially as
climate‐related projects are characterised by a higher
innovation intensity and risk profile. With regard to its
borrowing activity, the EIB has not committed to a target.
5. EIB’s Quantum Leap?
Returning to the analysis above, although not pub‐
licly evident, the EIB decided on its ‘pivot’ based on
an increasing trend toward ‘politicisation’ on grounds
related to its stakeholders rather than business reason‐
ing. The EIB has been acting as a policy entrepreneur,
applying rational long‐term thinking and a risk/benefit
analysis. Driven by its principal interest of political and
market relevance, the bank exploited a policy window
and announced its ‘transition’ to a climate bank in a
swift and timely manner. More specifically, for reasons
of political relevance, the EIB has sought to primarily sat‐
isfy the EU member states, as they are its top‐priority
stakeholders. In doing so through its ‘pivot,’ the EIB also
rendered service to the Commission, which was seek‐
ing ways to satisfy the EU member states while shap‐
ing its ambitious Green Deal plan. Having said that,
the EIB was not acting as a policy‐taker, not merely
because it consciously raised its public profile as a pol‐
icymaker by pre‐empting the Commission announce‐
ments. Faced with pressure from its stakeholders, the
EIB acted aggressively as a policy entrepreneur, aim‐
ing to change the game, shifting from being challenged
to taking the lead and becoming the game‐maker. In
recent years, the EIB has been challenged by some of
the EU member states, which have called for radical
reforms (Mertens & Thiemann, 2019). Additionally, the
bank has been under pressure from the Commission as
well. In search of increased control, the Commission has
been curtailing the bank’s traditionally privileged posi‐
tion as the exclusive mandate manager of EU funds and
guarantees by offering ‘cake’ slices to new ‘beneficia‐
ries,’ such as the National Promotional Banks and the
EBRD. Furthermore, the European Parliament has also
been asking for increased control over the EIB since the
early 2000s, when the EIB approached the Commission
for stronger cooperation, as mentioned above. Naturally,
the NGOs have been calling for EIB’s decarbonisation.
Meanwhile, peers have also joined the ‘pressure circle.’
The EBRD has been ‘conquering’ market territory and
becoming stronger compared to the EIB, extending its
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activities in new regions and countries, beyond its orig‐
inal remit, even within the EU—the EIB’s ‘stronghold’—
in countries such as Greece and Cyprus. By sharpen‐
ing its image and political influence, it has strengthened
and extended its cooperationwith the Commission. Even
within the EU economic governance setting, the EBRD
has often been placed on par with the EIB, despite
its non‐EU institutional global membership, including
American, Asian, and Oceanian countries. In this situ‐
ation, where stakeholders seek increased control over
an organisation that has grown to become the world’s
largest multilateral bank, the EIB’s quantum leap seems
to be motivated by its rational interests of escaping EU
political pressure andmaintaining its relevance. The EIB’s
interests are topped by the bank’s endeavours to main‐
tain its relevance and safeguard its positioning, mainly
in the EU governance context and, to a lesser extent,
in the multilateral banking context. The EIB’s observed
propensity to assume a policymaking role contributes
to its vital interest in controlling the developments and
guiding them toward preferred solutions through early
participation in the agenda‐setting. Climate action has
been chosen as the battering ram for breaking into the
EU institutional policymakers’ club for the following rea‐
sons: (i) it has wide political support; (ii) it is topical, but
with a long‐term future horizon; and (iii) the EIB is well
placed to play a lead role given its long held and recog‐
nised expertise in climate finance.
The leap was swift and well timed to exploit a win‐
dow of opportunity during a developing situation within
the EU governance context. This first‐entrant act solidi‐
fied EIB’s institutional and market position, building on
its previously recognised climate mastery. While essen‐
tial for supporting the implementation of EIB’s ‘pivot,’ its
business metrics do not yet justify its climate ‘makeover’
and cannot be seen as the factors motivating the conver‐
sion. Acting as a policy entrepreneur, the EIB used a pol‐
icy window in a period of ‘malaise’ in the run‐up tomajor
changes in the European economic governance, some of
which directly concern its activity in the EU as part of
the InvestEU and others its role outside the EU in a new
institutional European development banking set‐up (cur‐
rently under consideration). The EIB’s climate turn is a
paradigm shift toward policymaking and agency activism
to satisfy the bank’s rational interests of political andmar‐
ket relevance.
6. Conclusions
In a combined act in November 2019, the EIB ‘meta‐
morphosed’ into a climate bank, while also announcing
the launch of a new climate strategy and energy lending
policy ending fossil fuel financing after 2021 and includ‐
ing targets and milestones. By pre‐empting the EU offi‐
cial announcements concerning the Green Deal, which
the EIB’s ‘pivot’ is to support, and by using in parallel
a rhetoric that deviates from the bank’s customary dis‐
course, the announcement constitutes a paradigm shift
in the EIB’s institutional behaviour. In this case, instead
of its historical ‘policy‐taking’ attitude, the EIB deliber‐
ately wished to take centre stage and enter the spot‐
light, a course usually taken by the policymaking actors
within the EU governance. Furthermore, the act has not
been justified by the bank’s prior climate metrics, which
at the time of the announcement were below those of
some of the EIB’s peers, and represented only a quar‐
ter of its aggregate annual lending, compared to half
of the annual activity showcased by some of the peers.
In this sense, the EIB’s ‘pivot’ announcement diverges
from the bank’s path‐dependent evolution and custom‐
ary rhetoric, and as such, constitutes a ‘quantum leap,’
as stated by the EIB.
The article, therefore, argues that capitalising on its
reputation, the EIB’s resounding climate ‘conversion’ can
be understood through its trend toward increased politi‐
cisation. The climate ‘conversion’ constitutes further evi‐
dence of the EIB’s aspirations to make a more proactive
contribution to EU policy objectives, as already revealed
by several scholars. Demonstrating agency activism as a
policy entrepreneur, the EIB used a policy window pre‐
sented during a period of ‘malaise’ and fermentation
in the run‐up to major changes in the European eco‐
nomic governance set‐up, to raise its profile for improved
political and market positioning. Having grown to be the
world’s largest multilateral bank, a greener EIB agenda—
consolidating and building on the bank’s climate finance,
renowned mainly due to its pioneering climate‐related
capital market activity—can have important implications
for the economy, climate, and governance in the EU
and beyond. However, whether the EIB’s announcement
will go beyond the ‘quantum leap’ in the bank’s pub‐
lic appearance, to constitute a real metamorphosis, can
only be benchmarked against the bank’s future metrics.
They will prove either a bold new departure from previ‐
ous activity or simply an adaptation to a new European
priority policy field, as has occurred on several occasions
in the past.
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1. Introduction
On 27 March 2020, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the international standard-setter for banks’
capital requirements, announced the deferral of imple-
mentation deadlines of the Basel III framework—
adopted in response to the global financial crisis of
2008—to ensure “that banks and supervisors are able
to commit their full resources to respond to the impact
of Covid-19” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2020). As for the EU transposition of the final elements of
the international standards, it seems that the European
Commission (EC) has put on ice the legislative proposal
amending the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and
Capital Requirements Regulation that it was supposed to
issue in June 2020.
This reaction to the emerging economic fallout
of Covid-19 suggests policymakers, first, consider that
banks should play an important role in fostering eco-
nomic recovery, and second, fear that the planned tight-
ening of capital requirements may be incompatible, in
the short term, with said bank support of the real
economy. How EU Member States face this perceived
short-term trade-off is of particular importance in the
context of Economic and Monetary Union. Economic
and Monetary Union reforms in recent years (see e.g.,
Rehm, 2021) relied on the assumption that banking
regulation—notably capital requirements—would, by
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reining-in banks’ excessive leverage, contribute to reduc-
ing the interdependence that tied together banks and
public finances in a vicious circle and wreaked havoc
on several Member States during the sovereign debt cri-
sis (Merler & Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Nevertheless, the EU’s
transposition of the early parts of Basel III (known as
CRD-IV) was criticised for watering down the interna-
tional framework (Véron, 2013). Previous international
political economy accounts of the negotiation have
attributed much of this dilution to some Member States’
demands for limiting the increase of capital require-
ments in order to protect the competitiveness of their
respective banking sectors, but also to preserve short-
term economic growth (see e.g., Howarth & Quaglia,
2013, 2016a).
This article pursues two objectives. The first is to pro-
vide a new examination of Member State positions on
the CRD-IV reform, analysing a larger sample of coun-
tries than previous studies and delving into the technical
detail of positions on a series of issues, some of which
have not been examined before. Analysing the responses
of fifteen Member States’ national authorities to three
EC preparatory consultations, I find that, instead of clear
general preferences for tighter rules on bank capital or
conversely, a general forbearance, each Member State’s
requests for preferential treatment focus on very specific
instruments and institutions amid a general agreement
with the necessity to increase bank capitalisation.
The second objective is to explain these particular
positions. Important literature on Basel III and CRD-IV
suggests that the lobbying of the banking industry—
in particular by large, international banks—significantly
shaped the debate on post-crisis capital requirements
(e.g., Lall, 2012; Young, 2014). However, while many of
the requested changes did benefit large banks, Member
State positions and the wish list of international banks
differ in important ways. International political econ-
omy, in turn, suggests that the ‘varieties of financial
capitalism’—that is, the country-specific institutional set-
tings that characterise banking sectors—that coexist in
Europe mediate Member State preferences on finan-
cial regulation (Story & Walter, 1997). Among relevant
factors, previous studies have notably highlighted the
role of bank capitalisation levels and bank-industry ties
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2016a) and different degrees of for-
eign ownership (Spendzharova, 2012) in national bank-
ing sectors. Here I argue that, while these are relevant
factors, in order to account for the detailed amendments
the Member States requested, we must also consider the
qualitative composition of banking sectors and the types
of instruments on which retail lending relies.
The next two sections present the analytical frame-
work (2) and methodological approach (3) of the article.
I then examine Member State positions on CRD-IV, high-
lighting the conflictual issues and suggesting variables
that explain these conflicts (4). I then discuss these find-
ings in terms of ‘varieties of financial capitalism’ (5) and
conclude (6).
2. Analytical Framework
International political economy has long framed pol-
icymakers’ preferences on banking regulation as a
‘dilemma’ between two conflicting goals: financial sta-
bility through strict capital requirements and interna-
tional competitiveness through reducing the cost of reg-
ulation of national banks (Kapstein, 1989; Singer, 2004).
The economic downturn that followed the 2008 finan-
cial crisis added short-term economic growth to the list
of concerns: Policymakers perceived that “trade-offs—
perceived or real—might still have to be made and
notably between financial stability and economic growth
because, ceteris paribus, banks need to deleverage—and
thus shrink their lending—to improve their capital posi-
tion” (Howarth & Quaglia, 2016a, p. 206). There is how-
ever no consensus among economists about the relation
between capital requirements, credit supply, and eco-
nomic growth, and while in the short-to-medium term
higher capital requirements are expected to increase
the cost of credit for borrowers (Macroeconomic
Assessment Group, 2010), higher capitalisation levels are
likely to bring net long-term benefits in terms of GDP
growth (Admati & Hellwig, 2013).
Here I assume that policymakers were aware of these
debates as well as of the short-term costs and long-term
benefits associated with higher capital requirements,
but still perceived that a trade-off needed to be made
between the long-term objective of a resilient banking
sector and the short-term objective of maintaining a
steady flow of credit to fight off the post-financial cri-
sis recession. Whether, on a particular issue of banking
regulation, Member States favoured one or the other
depends, I argue, on the structural features of their
national economies and banking sectors and the extent
to which the proposal was likely to affect the supply of
credit to the national real economy, particularly SMEs
and households. This analysis then builds on the ‘vari-
eties of financial capitalism’ approach (Story & Walter,
1997) and seeks to complement previous accounts of the
CRD-IV negotiations.
In their respective works, Howarth and Quaglia
(2013, 2016a) and Spendzharova (2012) have put for-
ward three explanatory factors to account for Member
State positions. Howarth and Quaglia explain the conflict
between the Franco-German tandem and the UK on the
level of minimum capital ratios in terms of systemic pat-
terns of bank capital (different levels and composition)
and bank-industry ties (degrees of real economy reliance
on bank credit). Spendzharova, focusing on Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries, shows how the pre-
dominance of foreign ownership in those countries’
banking sectors made their governments fearful of for-
eign banks depleting local subsidiaries in order to repa-
triate funds to the home country in case of trouble.
Following a similar approach, I argue that, in order
to account for the specific exemptions and preferen-
tial treatments the Member States requested, we must
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also take into account the types of banks that domi-
nate each country’s banking sector and the particular
instruments on which they rely to supply credit to the
real economy. Indeed, banks of different sizes (small
local banks vs. large banking groups) and legal forms
(joint stock vs. cooperative, mutual, savings, and public
banks) which rely on different sets of financial instru-
ments would be affected in very different ways by the
Basel III rules. Where each country stands in relation to
these structural factors is then likely to shape in impor-
tant ways how their common double preference for sta-
bility and growth translates into positions on specific
policy proposals. This is not to say that Member State
positions are fully determined by economic and bank-
ing sector structures—the different levels of politiciza-
tion (Högenauer, 2021), as well as different sets of value-
based ideas (van Loon, 2021) of financial regulation
issues across Member States, also contribute to shaping
positions—but that these largely determine the material
interests at stake in capital requirements. The analysis
presented in this article should thus be seen as a comple-
mentary contribution to the fruitful research agenda on
national preference formation about international finan-
cial regulation. The next section will detail which coun-
tries constitute the sample, as well as the CRD-related
issues chosen for analysis. Section 4 will then outline, for
each of the six selected issues, the positions adopted by
Member States.
3. Methodological Approach
The focus of this article on Member State governments
is justified, I believe, first by the central role that gov-
ernments play in the policymaking process for capital
requirements at the international and European level,
and second by the fact that they remain, ultimately,
responsible for macroeconomic stabilisation. I choose to
extract Member State governments’ positions on reform
proposals from the written comments they submitted
in response to three public consultations conducted by
the EC in 2008, 2009, and 2010. These documents have
the advantage (when compared to collecting positions
through interviews or a review of press coverage) that
they emanate directly from the national representatives
involved in the negotiation, offering a detailed view of
positions which have not been subject to any posthoc
reinterpretation. Furthermore, because they all respond
to the same set of EC questions, they facilitate the cross-
country comparison of positions on a given set of issues.
The period 2008–2010 corresponds to the prepara-
tory works for the EC’s 2011 CRD-IV proposal, which
the EC conducted in parallel to the elaboration of the
Basel III standards. In this article, I limit the analysis to
six broad issues: definition of capital, large exposures, liq-
uidity standards, leverage ratio, treatment of mortgage
loans, and supervisory arrangements. These constitute
only a subset of all the issues consulted during the period
but were selected for the potential of conflict among
Member States on the degree of stringency vs. leniency
and the degree of harmonisation vs. national discretion
that the new framework should permit.
15 EU Member States are analysed (see Table 1).
The selection includes all the Member States whose gov-
ernment (Treasury department) submitted an answer to
at least one of the three consultations. 14 out of the
27 EU Member States provided comments at the time,
but of these, I excluded Slovenia and added Italy and
Spain. The 2008 Slovenian response did not address any
of the substantial issues raised by the consultation—
only one minor technicality—and could not be used
Table 1. Commenting national authorities.
2008 2009 2010
Country/Year (large exposures; (definition of capital; mortgages; (definition of capital; liquidity;
(issues) supervisory arrangements) supervisory arrangements) mortgages; supervisory arrangements)
Austria Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Czechia Treasury CB Treasury
Denmark Supervisor — Treasury/Supervisor
Estonia — CB Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Finland Treasury Treasury Treasury
France Treasury/FSA* Treasury Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Germany Treasury Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury
Hungary Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB
Ireland — — Treasury
Italy — — CB
Poland Treasury/FSA* — Treasury
Slovakia CB — Treasury/CB*
Spain CB CB CB
Sweden Treasury/CB/Supervisor* — Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
UK — Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Notes: CB = Central Bank; * = Joint submission; — = No submission. The documents are available with the article’s Supplementary File.
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to extract positions. Although there were no Italian or
Spanish government responses available, I include these
two countries using responses by their respective central
banks as a proxy, supplemented by a review of finance
ministers’ public statements. With these additions, the
selected countries constitute a representative sample
of EU Member States, including in particular both large
and small banking sectors with a variety of banking sec-
tor structures.
We should note that the absence of published com-
ments from a government does not imply that it takes no
position: A government may have required that its com-
ments not be published or may have used another way,
other than the consultation, to convey its views on the
proposals (e.g., Council meetings). For reasons of com-
parability across different methods for collecting posi-
tions, I chose to limit the analysis to countries for which
responses were available, Italy and Spain constituting the
only exceptions which were partly compensated for by
their central banks’ responses.
To analyse positions, I first extracted from each doc-
ument the sections devoted to each of the six issues
and summarised them. The Supplementary File provides
the reader with this summary of each country’s position
for each of the six issues. In a second step, I applied
a “constant comparative method” (Glaser & Strauss,
1967, pp. 101–116) to identify similarities and differ-
ences across responses, thereby identifying recurrent
themes and oppositions. The result of this process is pre-
sented in Section 4.
4. Member State Positions
4.1. Definition of Capital
At its core, the Basel framework defines how much of a
bank’s assets (its various investments and the loans it dis-
tributes) must be funded through financial instruments
that contractually are able to absorb potential losses aris-
ing from borrowers defaulting or bad investments both
during the life of the bank (‘going-concern’) and in case
of failure (‘gone-concern’). These loss-absorbing instru-
ments constitute banks’ ‘capital.’ Regulatory capital is
broader than the equity held by its shareholders, and
also include a series of debt securities. Defining bank
capital then implies listing the instruments that are suf-
ficiently loss-absorbent to be part of the capital base,
which in Basel III, is divided into three buckets: common
equity tier 1 (CET1), the most loss-absorbent and broadly
corresponding to common shares or equivalents; addi-
tional tier 1, which includes debt instruments that can
be written-down to absorb exceptional losses on a going-
concern basis; and tier 2, which includes debt securities
to be written down only in case of failure. Furthermore,
‘prudential adjustments’ have to be made to amounts of
eligible instruments to account for particular situations
that may make part of the capital base unavailable to
absorb losses.
On eligibility criteria, the most recurrent theme
regarded the limitation of CET1 to common shares.
Pre-crisis, Member States could adjust the CRD rules
to local specificities in the national transposition, thus
definitions of core capital varied importantly across
countries. The harmonisation on a common shares
model would significantly affect banking sectors where
non-joint stock banks (the various forms of banks whose
core capital is not composed of traditional public listed
shares, notably cooperatives, mutuals, savings banks
and a number of public banks) are important actors,
since these banks would have to either change their
legal structures to meet the new requirements or disap-
pear. The countries calling most forcefully in defence
of non-joint stock banks’ capital instruments were,
unsurprisingly, those where non-joint stock banks rep-
resent a large part of the banking sector: Austria and
Germany above all, followed by Finland and France.
In 2016, more than half of the Other Systemically
Important Institutions (O-SIIs)—that is, domestic system-
ically important banks—in those countries were either
public banks (e.g., several German Landesbanken), or
the central institutions of cooperative and savings banks
(e.g., Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International, France’s
Groupe Crédit Mutuel, or Germany’s DZ Bank, see
Table 2), which shows their importance not only in
terms of their size but also in terms of their centrality
in the domestic economy. Illustrating the cost of har-
monisation, Germany also made a plea for temporarily
maintaining the possibility to include in tier 2 coopera-
tive bank members’ uncalled commitments which until
then had been allowed under German law but excluded
under Basel III and which constitute an important part
of German cooperative banks’ capital. By contrast, those
countries that have no non-joint stock bank among their
Table 2. Systemic importance of non-joint stock banks
(2016).
Number of non-joint stock banks to total
















Source: European Banking Authority (2016).
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O-SIIs did not insist on the issue and merely mentioned
the need to make the criteria compatible with differ-
ent legal structures. The 2010 reform of the important
Spanish Cajas sector, which transformed them into joint-
stock banks largely explains why Spain did not voice con-
cerns on this issue.
On prudential adjustments, the full deduction of
‘minority interests’ (capital instruments held by minor-
ity shareholders of a banking group subsidiary) was
opposed by a diverse set of countries: Austria, Czechia,
Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and
Spain. The deduction would affect banking groups by
reducing the contribution of subsidiaries to groups’
‘consolidated’ (i.e., aggregate) amounts of capital. For
Austria, France, Italy and Spain—home to several interna-
tionalised banking groups—important amounts of minor-
ity interests (see Table 3) reflect a strategy to raise
capital for the group through subsidiaries. Considering
the generally low levels of bank capitalisation in those
countries, minority interests were then to constitute an
important resource to meet the increased capital require-
ments. Similarly, France—the land of the bancassurance
model of financial conglomerates—forcefully opposed
the deduction of investments in insurance subsidiaries
which would also have impacted the capital ratios of
all its major banking groups (International Monetary
Fund, 2011). By contrast, the UK’s large banks, being
better capitalised than their continental peers (HSBC,
Lloyds and Barclays all had above 10% of CET1 capital at
end-2010, to be compared to 8.1% for France’s Société
Générale, 7.8% for Italy’s UniCredit and 7.1% for Spain’s
Santander; European Banking Authority, 2011), did not
need to rely on minority interests. Czechia, Hungary, and
Slovakia, in turn, are in this debate hosting the sub-
sidiaries raising minority interests (see Table 5) and high-
lighted in their comments the risk that the deduction
would create an incentive for groups to undercapitalise
local subsidiaries.
4.2. Large Exposures
So called ‘large exposures’ are a bank’s exposures to a
single client or group of connected clients that could put
the bank’s solvency at risk in case of that client failing to
repay. Limits on large exposures existed in the pre-crisis
CRD to penalise such exposures but included a number
of options for Member States to grant exemptions, in
particular to intra-group (between entities of the same
banking group) and certain interbank (between two inde-
pendent banks) transactions. In 2008, the EC suggested
strengthening the regime and consulted on withdrawing
options and exemptions. Limits on intra-group transac-
tions are especially relevant for banking groups, as they
limit their freedom to shift capital and liquidities from
one group entity to another. Limits on interbank trans-
actions are crucial for decentralised banking networks
(those where members of the network are independent
of each other but share a brand and some central insti-
tutions, for example, the German Sparkassen) inasmuch
as they impact liquidity management within the network
as well as more generally for banks’ daily liquidity man-
agement, since banks may need to borrow or lend large
amounts on the interbank market.
Among the responding countries to the 2008 con-
sultation, we find two overlapping groups supporting a
more lenient regime. One was composed of the countries
whose banking sector includes important decentralised
banking networks and was eager to maintain exemptions
for claims on central institutions of decentralised banking
networks and on transactions where both parties are part
of a joint risk-management or institutional protection
scheme, which usually is the case of decentralised bank-
ing networks. The second group includes countries that
are home to large banking groups and called for main-
taining the options to exempt intragroup transactions
between entities submitted to the same consolidated
supervision. Austria is part of the first group; Denmark,
Table 3. Capital ratios and minority interests (2010).
Country Solvency ratio (%) Tier 1 ratio (%) Minority interests to total equity (%)
Austria 13.20 9.98 15.07
Czechia 15.25 13.61 2.07
Denmark 16.24 14.07 3.45
Estonia 16.29 12.69 0.02
Finland 14.56 13.73 0.23
France 12.56 10.76 8.74
Germany 15.28 11.41 2.30
Hungary 14.09 11.55 NA
Ireland 14.50 11.56 1.33
Italy 12.06 8.66 4.46
Poland 14.01 12.59 0.64
Slovakia 12.53 11.38 NA
Spain 11.89 9.65 6.58
Sweden 12.24 10.65 0.19
UK 15.86 10.86 5.47
Source: European Central Bank (2021).
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France, Spain, and Sweden of the second; Germany
and Finland are part of both. Furthermore, countries
with highly concentrated banking sectors, France and
Sweden, expressed concerns about liquidity manage-
ment and a possible destabilisation of the interbank mar-
ket unless further exemptions were made. Finally, Poland
and Czechia joined Austria, Sweden, and Germany in wel-
coming the exemption for smaller transactions.
Conversely, Czechia and Slovakia, two countries with
foreign-dominated banking sectors (see Table 5), called
for maintaining the national discretion to impose more
restrictive limits on large intragroup transactions. This
discretion was necessary, they argued, to prevent local
subsidiaries from being exposed to the failure of group
entities in other Member States. Sweden, conversely,
strongly opposed such discretion, warning that national
authorities could use it for ring-fencing at the expense
of efficiency.
4.3. Liquidity Requirements
Liquidity standards were discussed in the 2010 consulta-
tion. Few countries had liquidity requirements in place
before the crisis and there were none in international
or European standards before Basel III and its transpo-
sition. Liquidity standards apply essentially on the assets
side of banks’ balance sheets: They require banks to hold
reserves of ‘liquid’ assets, that is, assets that can be sold
for cash immediately, even in times of crisis, without
incurring any significant loss. While the liquidity cover-
age ratio aims to ensure that banks maintain a liquid-
ity buffer sufficient to withstand a one-month-long mar-
ket stress, the net stable funding ratio requires banks to
match their long-term lending commitments with corre-
sponding long-term funding sources.
In relation to the liquidity coverage ratio, the main
issue was listing the assets liquid enough to be included
in the buffer, the so-called ‘high-quality liquid assets’
(HQLAs). Initial proposals essentially restricted eligibility
to government bonds and stable deposits, a position sup-
ported by the UK and Estonia, but opposed by most other
responding Member States (Austria, Czechia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, and
Sweden), who called for the larger inclusion of additional
assets. This conflict can easily be understood by look-
ing at levels of liquid asset holdings across countries
(Table 4). The British and Estonian banking sectors were
still in 2014 (earliest data published by the European
Central Bank) the ones with the highest share of liquid
assets in total banking sector assets (above 30%), and
Estonia—unlike the other countries—already had tight
liquidity requirements in place before the CRD-IV reform.
Conversely, almost all the proponents of a more inclusive
HQLA buffer (Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden) had ratios of liq-
uid assets to total assets below 20%, and some far below
(Austria). For those countries, a liquidity coverage ratio
with a narrow HQLA definition would force banks to mas-
sively shift assets away from less liquid but productive
assets, typically those funding the real economy.
For the pro-inclusion countries, HQLAs should
notably include more covered bonds. Covered bonds
are a particular form of securitisation where the pool of
securitised assets is, in most cases, restricted to mort-
gage loans. These market-based assets developed at an
exceptional rate across Europe since the early 2000s
to supplement insufficient deposits in meeting mort-
gage lenders’ funding needs (Johnson, Isgrò, & Bouyon,
2016, p. 7). Denmark and Sweden were the most vocal
on this issue, stressing the stability of covered bonds
Table 4. Covered bonds and liquid assets.
Outstanding covered bonds (% of total Liquid assets (% of total banking
banking sector liabilities) sector assets)
Country/Year 2008 2012 2018 2014
Denmark 28.7 41.8 50.3 10.5
Sweden 10.5 14.1 18.8 12.4
Spain 9.7 12 7 13.4
Germany 8.3 7.2 5.6 13.11
Slovakia 6.2 7.8 6.6 23.9
Czechia 5.9 5.6 5.5 NA
Hungary 5.7 5.1 3.4 16.37
Ireland 4.8 5.6 6.0 26.39
France 3.8 5.6 4.8 15.46
UK 2.5 1.9 1.1 31.11
Austria 2 4 6.6 5.6
Finland 1.6 4.6 5 16.6
Italy 0.6 4.8 6.9 11.8
Poland 0.3 0.3 1.3 18.5
Estonia 0 0 0 39.22
Sources: European Central Bank (2021); European Covered Bonds Council (2020); author’s calculation.
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through the financial crisis, their importance for (mort-
gage) banks’ funding and the likely destabilising effect
on covered bond and mortgage markets should they
be excluded. In Denmark, the entire mortgage credit
system—the defence of which in CRD-IV was “absolutely
central” for finance minister Brian Mikkelsen (“Minister
diskuterer,” 2010)—relies on covered bonds. The fact
that the EC specifically asked about covered bonds in
its consultation is already evidence of their importance
in European banking. As can be seen from Table 4, cov-
ered bonds constitute an important source of funding for
banks, upon which they increasingly relied through the
crisis years. Germany’s stance on the issue should, for
instance, be seen in light of the fact that their reliance
on the stable Pfandbriefe market enabled German sav-
ings and cooperative banks to maintain lending levels
through the crisis (Hardie & Howarth, 2013a). The Basel-
proposed cap on covered bonds in HQLAs would have
depressed market demand for these assets, drying up
an important source of refinancing for mortgage loans.
By contrast, Spain’s large covered bond market, which
made possible the Cajas’ frenzy of real-estate lending
(Royo, 2013), was bound to adjust, which may explain
the Banco de España’s silence regarding their inclusion
in HQLAs.
Countries with important non-joint stock banking
sectors also called for different types of preferential
treatment for them. Germany called for the inclu-
sion of “debt securities fully guaranteed by sovereigns
or…securities of promotional banks under public own-
ership” (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2010, p. 2;
see Supplementary File), that is, securities issued by its
Landesbanken. Austria, Poland, and Slovakia, which all
have cooperative or savings banks’ central institutions
among their systemically important institutions, asked
for cooperative banks’ deposits in their central institu-
tions to be recognised as ‘stable,’ therefore contributing
more to these institutions’ stock of HQLAs.
On the net stable funding ratio, only Estonia
defended a more conservative treatment than that pro-
posed by the EC. All the other respondents to the
2010 consultation warned of its potentially destabilising
effect on lending. Indeed, since it requires banks to bal-
ance the maturity of their liabilities and assets, it effec-
tively forces banks to either reduce their reliance on
short-term wholesale funding or limit their lending to
and investments in long-term assets, notably loans to
corporates and households, that is, the real economy.
The UK authorities (HM Treasury & Bank of England,
2010, p. 7; see Supplementary File) thus warned that
the ratio “could significantly disadvantage SME and retail
loans relative to lending to large highly-rated corporates.”
It then sided with Austria, Germany, and Slovakia in call-
ing for more favourable treatment of retail lending in
terms of the stable funding required. Regarding the pro-
vision of stable funding, countries with important net-
works of independent cooperatives (Austria, Germany,
but also Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) called for pref-
erential treatment of these banks’ deposits with their
central institutions. Calls for preferential treatment of
covered bonds were also made, in particular by Austria,
Denmark, France, and Germany.
The choice of the level of application (entity-level
or consolidated level) and the proposal to shift the
supervision of cross-border branch liquidity to the home-
country supervisor were two issues marked by oppo-
sition between CEE Member States plus the UK, and
the other governments. While the latter supported shift-
ing decision-making power to the home-country super-
visor (supervising the group) on liquidity issues, the for-
mer insisted on preserving the freedom of the host-
country supervisor (supervising a subsidiary) to impose
the respect of liquidity coverage ratio and net stable
funding ratio at the level of branches and subsidiaries.
Observing the varying degree of foreign ownership in
national banking sectors (Table 5) helps make sense of
Table 5. Foreign ownership of national banking sectors.
Foreign-owned assets in total banking Foreign O-SIIs to total number of















Source: Claessens and van Horen (2012, p. 34); European Banking Authority (2016).
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this divide: CEE banking sectors are characterised by a
dominance of foreign banks, which own between a third
and nearly all of total banking sector assets, and for-
eign banks constitute a major source of systemic risk in
those countries, where they represent the majority of
O-SIIs. The British banking sector is in a similar situa-
tion of exposure to foreign banks’ systemic risk, with 12
out its sixteen O-SIIs being foreign-owned. By contrast,
those countries supportive of home-country supervision
are predominantly—Ireland being the exception—home
to internationalised banking groups and little exposed to
foreign banks.
4.4. Leverage Ratio
A leverage ratio requirement was a novelty introduced
with Basel III: It is intended to act as a complement
to risk-based capital requirements by setting a maxi-
mum nominal amount (not risk-weighted) of assets that
a bank can acquire with its capital base. The most
controversial issue was whether the new requirement
should be a binding minimum (Pillar 1) or an indicator
upon which supervisors could impose additional capi-
tal requirements if necessary (Pillar 2). A binding lever-
age ratio was expected to particularly affect undercapi-
talised banks, but the risk-insensitiveness of the measure
was also expected to put relatively safer banking activi-
ties, notably traditional deposit-taking and retail lending,
at a disadvantage: under the leverage ratio, they would
‘cost’ as much capital as riskier activities through yielding
less income. The Swedish authorities (Regeringkansliet,
Finansinspektionen, & Sveriges Riksbank, 2010, p. 4; see
Supplementary File), for instance, thus considered it
“important that a leverage ratio is not designed and cali-
brated so that it endangers the supply of mortgage credit
to Swedish households.”
Table 6. Leverage (2011).

















Of the respondents to the 2010 consultation, only
the UK unambiguously argued in favour of a binding ratio.
At the other extreme, France and Germany forcefully
rejected the proposal, denouncing its likely unintended
effects on bank lending. All the other respondents
(Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Poland,
Sweden) argued for an introduction in Pillar 2. Beyond
average leverage levels across countries (Table 6), under-
standing the opposition requires one to consider the
parallel effect of proposals on the definition of capital,
notably the deduction of minority interests and invest-
ments in insurance subsidiaries (see above) that would
reduce the capital base of continental European banks
more than that of their British competitors.
4.5. Treatment of Mortgage Loans
The 2009 and 2010 consultations contained proposals
to reform the prudential treatment of mortgage loans
(loans that are guaranteed by commercial or residential
real estate) and in particular the conditions for grant-
ing them a preferential treatment under the form of a
reduced 35% risk weight to part of the loan (i.e., only
35% of the amount would count towards the bank’s risk-
weighted assets). The pre-crisis framework gave Member
States an important degree of discretion to decide which
loans could benefit from the preferential treatment.
The EC proposed setting a harmonised condition under
the form of a maximum loan-to-value ratio: The preferen-
tial risk-weight could be applied to the lent amount only
up to a certain threshold relative to the value of the mort-
gaged real-estate property (40% in the 2009 proposal,
80% in 2010); the remaining amount would be applied
a much higher risk weight (1,250%) in order to discour-
age lending to highly leveraged clients.
Respondents to the 2009 consultation unanimously
rejected the proposed 40% loan-to-value ratio, denounc-
ing its likely impact on mortgage credit supply. Indeed,
the proposal would have led to most mortgage loans
being more costly for banks (more regulatory capital),
who would pass the extra cost to clients. In 2017, across
the sample of countries, mortgage loans represented
on average 42.82% of all bank loans and advances
(European Central Bank’s Statistical Data Warehouse),
ranging from 18.35% (France) to 61.62% (Estonia).
The emergence of mortgage lending in Europe since
the 1990s owes a lot to favourable legislation (Johnson
et al., 2016) and has become an essential instrument for
home ownership. In 2017, more than a third of home-
owners had a mortgage in Denmark, France, Finland,
Sweden, and the UK, with CEE markets are quickly catch-
ing up (European Mortgage Federation, 2019, p. 40).
The cost increase would then affect the masses, which
may explain why even in a country like Spain—where
a real-estate bubble brought about a banking crisis—
was reluctant to increase requirements on all mortgages
(Banco de España, 2009, 2010; see Supplementary File).
In 2009, the EC also suggested tightening specifically
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 196–207 203
the treatment of mortgage loans denominated in a for-
eign currency. The issue was taken up only by the three
responding CEE countries: Czechia, Estonia, and Hungary,
who criticised the harshness of the proposals, whereas
Austria welcomed them. Estonia and Hungary notably
called to differentiate loans denominated in euros from
loans in other currencies, the exchange rate risk being
lower with the former.
The 2010 proposal for an 80% loan-to-value, more in
line with industry practices, was more welcome. However,
all respondents rejected the proposal to align the
treatment of residential real-estate mortgages on that,
more demanding, of commercial real-estate mortgages.
The heterogeneity of European real-estate markets
sparked calls from Denmark, Germany, Poland, Sweden,
and the UK to maintain a certain degree of national dis-
cretion. The German government (Bundesministerium
der Finanzen, 2010, p. 24; see Supplementary File) thus
invoked the “particular importance of RRE [residential
real-estate] financing” in its call to retain existing options.
Only France, whose banks rely comparatively less on
mortgages and which have large foreign retail activities,
explicitly welcomed full harmonisation.
4.6. Supervisory Arrangements
Proposals regarding the degree of freedom granted
to national authorities—legislator and supervisor—to
adapt EU standards to banks active in their jurisdiction
saw a clear opposition appear between ‘home’ and ‘host’
countries. The EC notably consulted in 2008 on ‘colleges
of supervisors’ for cross-border banking groups. Czechia,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (the four ‘host’ countries;
see Table 5) responded: First, by forcefully defending
guaranteed rights for host-country supervisors to partici-
pate in colleges, against the proposal to leave the home-
country supervisor to decide on the composition and,
second, they called for the limiting of colleges’ decision-
making powers, not to impinge on host-country supervi-
sors’ competences. Among these ‘home’ countries the
positions varied: Austria and Finland agreed on the issue
of composition, while France called for granting a strong
decision-making role to colleges and an important role
for the consolidating supervisor within them. In 2008,
the criteria for designating branches of foreign banks
as ‘systemically important’ were also discussed. The EC
proposed additional rights for host-country supervisors,
which Slovakia and Poland explicitly welcomed, although
Poland called for a lower threshold (branch deposits to
total banking sector deposits) for considering a branch
as systemically relevant. Conversely, Germany opposed
shifting additional branch supervision powers to host-
country supervisors, and Finland and Sweden opposed
any threshold lower than 5% of a national banking sec-
tors’ total deposits.
The 2009 and 2010 consultations furthermore sug-
gested the removal of most of the existing options
and national discretions in the CRD and the maxi-
mum harmonisation of Pillar 1 requirements across
the EU. This move to maximum harmonisation would
deprive national authorities of the possibility to adapt
European standards to local circumstances. France was
the most vocal supporter of maximum harmonisation,
which Denmark, Finland, and Germany also welcomed.
Austria and Ireland equally supported the removal of
options and national discretions, with the exception of
real-estate. Conversely, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the UK
(which I consider as a ‘host’ country due to the impor-
tance of foreign O-SIIs in its banking sector), but also
Spain and Sweden rejected maximum harmonisation for
the sake of financial stability, doing so both individually
(in their responses to public consultations) and collec-
tively in a letter to Commissioners Michel Barnier and Olli
Rehn (Djankov et al., 2011).
As with liquidity requirements and large exposures,
CEE countries’ and the UK’s opposition to transfers
of supervisory competence and reduction of national
discretion appear motivated by the need to ensure
against the systemic risk posed by the important oper-
ations of foreign banks within their jurisdictions. The link
that CEE responses establish between national discre-
tion and national responsibility for financial stability
(e.g., Ministry of Finance of Estonia, Bank of Estonia,
& Estonian Financial Supervisory Authority, 2010, p. 13;
Hungarian authorities, 2008, p. 1; Polish Ministry of
Finance & Polish Financial Supervision Authority, 2008,
p. 2; see Supplementary File) illustrate Spendzharova’s
(2012, p. 319) observation that these governments
“were not apprehensive about transferring power to the
supranational level per se. They did worry, however,
about the fiscal and accountability consequences.” Czech
finance minister Miroslav Kalousek thus stated in May
2012: “There was a danger that the bank’s regulator
abroad would have more power over banks than the
Czech supervisor….This could mean that parent banks
could vacuum the Czech branches” (“EU: Na banky,”
2012). Spain and Sweden, conversely, are among the
countries least exposed to foreign banks, and their par-
ticular opposition to maximum harmonisation (but not
to home supervision) finds its roots in their respective
choice to increase capital requirements nationally to
fight off domestic banking crises (in Sweden in the 1990s
and in Spain with the Cajas from 2009).
5. Discussion of Results
We can already see governments’ will to find a com-
promise between reducing bank leverage and preserv-
ing retail lending in the French and British attempts to
impose retail-lending targets in exchange for bailouts
(Jabko & Massoc, 2012; Macartney, 2014). A review of
finance ministers’ public statements around the time
of the CRD-IV negotiation further reveals their fear
that Basel III “risk[ed] threatening the financing of the
economy” (“Christine Lagarde,” 2010). Already in July
2009, Germany’s Peer Steinbrück advocated a relax-
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ation of Basel II rules so that banks could increase lend-
ing to avoid a credit crunch (“Regierung und,” 2009)
and Austria’s Josef Pröll reformed national taxes on
banks to make retail lending a comparatively more
attractive business (“Neuer Zwist,” 2010). For Italy’s
Giulio Tremonti “Basel 3 [was] the direct way to pro-
duce a credit crunch” (“Banche: Tremonti,” 2010) and
Germany’s Wolfgang Schaüble summed up the general
mood stating: “We want a tightening of the rules [but]
the financial sector must be in a position to continue
to carry out its business” (“Highlights-Comments,” 2010).
As we could see in the previous section, this general will
to find a compromise between strengthening financial
stability and preserving lending however led Member
States to adopt contrasted positions, which reflect the
‘varieties of financial capitalism’ (Howarth & Quaglia,
2013; Story & Walter, 1997) that persist in Europe.
Across the issues examined above, we could thus
see the importance of the qualitative composition of
national banking sectors—in terms of the legal form
of banks that dominate them and whether they adopt
the form of large, consolidated groups or decentralised
networks—in shaping Member States’ wish list. Indeed,
the presence of (systemically) important cooperative,
savings or public banks in countries such as Austria,
Germany, France, but also Hungary or Poland is reflected
in their insistence on exemptions and exceptions tai-
lored to those particular types of bank, which have
been shown to constitute important sources of finance
for the local economies where they are established
(Ayadi, Llewellyn, Schmidt, Arbak, & De Groen, 2010;
Groeneveld, 2014). In June 2010, Austria’s finance min-
ister Josef Pröll explicitly linked his call for favourable
treatment of cooperative banks to avoid a credit crunch
(“Bankenabgabe kommt,” 2010). Similarly, countries
whose banking sectors are concentrated on a few large,
internationalised national champions responsible for a
major share of retail lending (e.g., France and Sweden)
were keen to support these champions.
The particular instruments banks use to provide
credit to corporates and households also appeared as
key factors. The unanimous rejection of a sharp tight-
ening of the treatment of mortgage loans reflected the
importance of that particular form of credit in all sam-
pled Member States, with those Member States where
a majority of loans are mortgages (Estonia, Denmark,
Sweden) making the most critical comments. Similarly,
the strongest defence for covered bonds came from
the countries where covered bonds markets are the
most developed and stable (e.g., Denmark, Sweden,
Germany). The particular defence of covered bonds may
be interpreted in view of the fact that these instruments
are specifically designed to support mortgage lending—
hence help maintain lending levels—and were resilient
through the financial crisis, so their inclusion would not
jeopardize the pursuit of financial stability.
Finally, on issues related to the distribution of com-
petences between home—and host-country supervisors
and to harmonisation vs. national discretion, we can see
a divide among Member States that reflects the varying
importance of foreign bank operations across national
banking sectors. The general reluctance of host coun-
tries (countries where foreign banks dominate the bank-
ing sector in terms of total assets or systemic impor-
tance; see Table 5) to give up national discretion reflect
their exposure to the risk that foreign parents repa-
triate resources to the home country in times of cri-
sis to benefit from nationally-oriented bailout schemes
(Roubini & Setser, 2004), closing local subsidiaries or forc-
ing them to deleverage rapidly, both resulting in a sharp
decline of local credit supply. Host countries’ insistence
on national discretion can then also be interpreted as
reflecting the general will to balance banks’ contribution
to the growth of the national economy with the systemic
risk they represent.
6. Conclusions
In this article, I sought to examine the detailed positions
of EU Member States on the post-crisis reform of capi-
tal requirements and to suggest factors that may explain
these positions. In so doing, I have shown the importance
of a series of structural features of national banking sec-
tors (diversity of banking sector compositions, types of
instruments used for retail lending, and varying degrees
of foreign ownership) for Member States’ assessment
of policy proposals. I find that in most of the exam-
ined cases these factors explain the particular positions
expressed by Member States. As such, my findings con-
firm the relevance of ‘varieties of financial capitalism’
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2013, 2016a; Story & Walter, 1997)
for our understanding of conflict between EU Member
States on issues of financial regulation: the particular
institutional setting on which each national banking sec-
tor relies to supply credit to the real economy mediates
governments’ double preference for stability and growth,
resulting in sometimes conflicting positions.
Covering only a subset of EU Member States and CRD-
related issues, this analysis is necessarily limited and
the explanation it provides for positions should be seen
as complementary to other international political econ-
omy accounts. Further research is likely to uncover addi-
tional dimensions of Europe’s ‘varieties of financial capi-
talism’ that shape Member State positions in important
ways. Furthermore, since 2010, important events have
occurred with major consequences for the setting of
capital requirements. Banking Union, first, redistributed
banking supervision and financial stability responsibil-
ities, affecting perceived trade-offs between stability
and growth (Epstein, 2017; Howarth & Quaglia, 2016b).
Second, if after Brexit the UK adopts a deregulatory
agenda on finance, the goal of promoting the competi-
tiveness of their national champions may regain impor-
tance for the remaining Member States home to interna-
tionalised banks.
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1. Introduction
The outbreak of the financial and Eurozone crisis in
2010, highlighting the deficiencies of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) governance framework, led to a
swift consensus amongst the heads of state and govern-
ment of the European Union (EU) “to restore the sound-
ness and stability of the European financial system”
(European Council, 2010, p. 6). Although the necessity
to act sparked immediate response, in the form of the
European Commission proposing multiple reform pack-
ages and proposals, Burns, Clifton, and Quaglia (2018,
p. 372) argue that no considerable alterations have been
undertaken at reforming financial regulation: “EU post
crisis financial regulation underwent only incremental
change, rather than transformation.” While the finan-
cial and Eurozone crisis immediately increased financial
regulation’s salience and called for prompt substantial
action, considerations on financial reforms’ acceleration
and design oftentimes induced controversies between
individual member governments (van Loon, 2018). Due
to the unanimous decision making procedure several
governments acted as veto players in delaying or block-
ing reform proposals on the EU level. One considerably
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contested reform proposal, which failed to garner con-
sensus among member governments and still lingers in
the reform pipeline, the financial transaction tax (FTT),
serves as a case in point. The FTT, as an instrument of
regulating the financial market, will have an influence
on the banking sector in the EU in particular, and shape
the overall outcome of the banking union (Högenauer,
2021). It was disapproved by Ireland (Hardiman &
Metinsoy, 2019) clashing with favorable German and
French stances (van Loon, in press). Consensus and desir-
ability for financial regulation reform have thus, at times,
been severely constrained.
In explaining governments’ variation of reform sup-
port or opposition, a turn to the domestic level of
European financial governance demonstrates that these
governments equally faced potential veto players within
their countries’ societies. Pursuing the line of reason-
ing that the urgent, uncertain threatening crisis situa-
tion advanced political contestation, a so-called politi-
cization (De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016) created
a particular change from quiet to noisy politics induc-
ing (1) an increase of governments’ responsiveness to
citizens’ demands, which simultaneously led to (2) a
decrease of interest groups’ ability to shape a govern-
ment’s position (Culpepper, 2012). This mirrors a pro-
cess leading away “from permissive consensus towards
constraining dissensus,” while spilling “beyond interest
group bargaining into the public sphere” (Hooghe &
Marks, 2009, p. 5). Heated public discussions, gener-
ated by the immediate spotlight on EMU’s weaknesses,
paired with its increased issue salience, induced a broad
actor plurality, ranging from business associations and
trade unions to non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and voters, favoring or opposing reform proposals during
EU level negotiations (Kastner, 2018). Assessing domes-
tic level societal dynamics shaping governments’ pref-
erence formation, and thus reform positions, is a vital
preceding component in comprehending how and why
these positions were pursued at the EU level. Examining
domestic preference formation is hence of importance
when accounting for past, current, and future govern-
ments’ positions towards EU reforms.
Whereas some studies put the positions of mem-
ber states at center stage in explaining Euro crisis deci-
sion making (Degner & Leuffen, 2019a; Schoeller, 2018),
other research involves positions of member govern-
ments in EMU reform, whereby these largely reflect sin-
gle country case studies on France (Rothacher, 2015),
Germany (Degner & Leuffen, 2019b), Italy (Bull, 2018),
Ireland (Hardiman & Metinsoy, 2019) or the UK (Kassim,
James, Warren, & Hargreaves Heap, 2020). These studies
examine whether governments’ preferences are mainly
determined by so-called structural economic factors
or by political considerations (Tarlea, Bailer, & Degner,
2019), or by a “battle of the systems” and a “battle
of ideas” (Van der Veer & Haverland, 2019, p. 1399).
Through application of the societal approach to gov-
ernmental preference formation (Schirm, 2011, 2016,
2020), this article contributes to the literature by examin-
ing both material and ideational considerations towards
the FTT from a domestic level perspective stemming
from a cross-country comparison of three EU govern-
ments’ preference formation processes. It argues that
the Euro crisis may genuinely have enhanced the legiti-
macy of governments’ position taking, particularly dur-
ing the first phase of EU decision making, governmental
preference formation (Degner & Leuffen, 2019b).
Contemporary Eurozone crisis literature points to
the aspects of issue salience and actor plurality usu-
ally through employment of competing European inte-
gration theories such as liberal intergovernmentalism
(Rehm, 2021; Schimmelfennig, 2015), neofunctional-
ism (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015), or post-functionalist
approaches (Puetter, 2012). Csehi and Puetter (2020,
p. 17), having reviewed these theoretical perspectives,
identify government autonomy as a common line of
argument and conclude that most have lost their “‘lib-
eral angle”…with decisions “decoupled from domestic
influences.”’ A particular focus on domestic preference
formation is therefore of importance as, in post-crisis
European financial governance literature, imbalanced
views have emerged that crisis management solutions
were criteria of output legitimacy rather than input legiti-
macy (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2016). Due to the Euro crisis gen-
erating high uncertainty and unknown consequences,
Lodge and Wegrich (2012, p. 1) perceive this output legit-
imacy as a specific “hour of the executive,” leading to a
democratic deficit in decision making, leaving reform ini-
tiatives thus falling short of democratic legitimacy. This is
in line with Bauer and Becker (2014) who argue that the
European Commission gained more influence in imple-
menting governance rules, while Schmidt (2015) under-
lines that reforms were initiated and applied without
public input. This contrasts with the new intergovern-
mentalism literature, which states that “de novo bodies”
increased autonomy, primarily through intergovernmen-
tal coordination within the European Council framework,
resulted in less empowerment of supranational institu-
tions, such as the Commission partly departing from the
Community method (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015,
p. 705). This article aligns with the latter and argues that
the uncertain threatening crisis situation advanced a so-
called “particular environment of democratic citizenship
in flux” (van Loon, 2021, p. 66), with a variety of domestic
actors being well informed and highly concerned about
their governments’ positions in EU reform negotiations.
Literature underlines the importance of governments’
responsiveness to voters during times of political contes-
tation (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 310), or to busi-
ness associations’ efforts in delaying the FTT (Kalaitzake,
2017; Kastner, 2017). Considering governments’ respon-
siveness relating to decision makers prioritizing different
actors with wide-ranging issues, especially during times
of crisis, this article contributes to examining a wide
range of actors situated within three different domes-
tic societies (Ireland, France, and Germany) and instantly
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affected by revamping the EMU framework, in shape of
the FTT. Considering actor plurality and issue salience,
which domestic actors did these governments respond
to during FTT reform discussions and why?
By paying particular attention to the impact of issue
salience and actor plurality, which led to political con-
flicts of a broad range of stakeholders in the domestic
sphere, this study’s analysis encompasses business asso-
ciations, trade unions, NGOs and voters having shaped
the French, German, and Irish domestic preference for-
mation processes. The principal aim is to ascertain who
determined these governments’ responses during the
FTT debate and why, as well as under which circum-
stances some domestic actors were either paid atten-
tion to, or largely ignored in informing these positions.
By applying the societal approach to governmental pref-
erence formation, two explanatory variables, material
interests and value-based ideas, dominant in these coun-
tries’ domestic politics, are investigated to account for
when each of these mattered, how they interacted and
which of these prevailed in the French, German, and
Irish governments’ positions. By means of political dis-
course analysis (PDA), a methodological framework is
employed in which a practical argumentation scheme
highlights the broad public FTT debate. By using sev-
eral premises (circumstance, goal, concern/value, and
target), governments’ responses to and dealing with the
specific reform proposal, are linked for correlation pur-
poses to diverse material interests and value-based ideas
of particular domestic actors (Fairclough & Fairclough,
2011, 2012a, 2012b).
The article proceeds in the following four steps. The
next section, and while touching on several domestic
politics approaches, presents the societal approach to
governmental preference formation. This includes defin-
ing the variables and formulating the core hypotheses.
Subsequently, the PDA framework and operationaliza-
tion of the variables is explained. This is followed by
the empirical case study examining whether the FTT
positions of the governments under scrutiny correspond
to domestic material interests or value-based ideas, or
both, in a cross-country comparison. The last section con-
cludes with a brief comparative summary on the theoret-
ical and empirical findings.
2. Analytical Framework
Due to its distinguished emphasis on endogenous soci-
etal dynamics, material interests and value-based ideas,
dominant in countries’ domestic politics, preceding an
intergovernmental or international bargaining context,
the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation (Schirm, 2011, 2016, 2020) allows for an explicit
unfolding of the black box in explaining variation in gov-
ernments’ reform positions (van Loon, 2020). A third
explanatory variable applied in this approach, domestic
institutions, is due to space constraints not part of this
analysis. For an elaborative explanation on all variables
and conceptualization of hypotheses, see Schirm (2020).
While employing and augmenting domestic politics the-
ories such as IR liberalism (Moravcsik, 1997), domes-
tic sources of economic policies (Goldstein & Keohane,
1993), as well as varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice,
2001), this approach engages in a unique advancement
of these. Similar to these theories is its core assertion
that elected governments in democratic political systems
aspire to remain in office, ergo their positions mirror soci-
etal actors’ preferences (Schirm, 2013, p. 690). Yet, con-
trary to hailing the importance of either societal interests
or ideas, this analytical instrument embraces both soci-
etal dynamics in explaining governmental preference for-
mation as the dependent variable.
The interrelationship of these societal dynamics has
been endorsed by Hall (1997), Goldstein and Keohane
(1993, p. 25) and Milner (1997, p. 16), yet enthusiasm
to truly explore this interdependence has been lacking
and awaits further theoretical development. The societal
approach to governmental preference formation caters
for a systematic examination of the individual role of
both societal interests and ideas, in supporting or oppos-
ing each other, their interplay and plurality in shaping
governments’ positions. It is essential in “refining” exist-
ing domestic politics approaches both theoretically and
empirically (Schirm, 2020) and consequently, a theory-
guided empirical investigation is solely complete when
it has been determined which of these explanatory vari-
ables accounts for variation across governments’ posi-
tions, and why they do so. Schirm (2018, p. 65) states
that “the conditions for the relative prevalence of either
ideas or interests” has not been anticipated in previ-
ous domestic politics approaches. Through application of
these variables, this article addresses the controversies
around the FTT debate triggering an active involvement
and engagement of domestic actors such as voters and
NGOs. With European financial governance increasingly
touching domestic politics, thereby ‘catalyzing’ a range
of materially and ideationally motivated societal stake-
holders, who aim to shape their respective governments’
positions, justifies employing this approach.
The societal approach to governmental preference
formation, in reflecting previous scholars’ research
outputs, connects domestic actors’ specific attribu-
tions: Encompassing and furthering Milner (1997) and
Moravcsik (1997), the material interest variable is delin-
eated as economic sectors’ distributional calculations
adjusting swiftly to changes in the European (interna-
tional) economy through FTT introduction. Furthermore,
while connections with Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993)
as well as Moravcsik’s (1997) work are echoed, the
variable value-based ideas is defined as voters’ endur-
ing joint expectations on apt government FTT manage-
ment. As this article expands its examination to a broad
array of stakeholders, supplementary domestic actors
are involved in the analysis (van Loon, 2021; van Loon,
in press): Trade unions complement the domestic mate-
rially motivated business associations as sources for
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material interests, while NGOs enhance the ideation-
ally motivated voters’ examination as sources for value-
based ideas. The variables’ precise characterization sup-
ports three individual hypotheses’ articulation on the
conditions for prevalence in shaping governments’ posi-
tions. These central hypotheses explain the impact of
economic sectors (material interests) and societal expec-
tations (value-based ideas): When economic sectors face
meaningful distributional calculations, material interests
predominate in shaping governments’ FTT positions, due
to intense lobbying; and when fundamental questions on
the role of politics in managing the economy are affected,
ideas will prevail in shaping governments’ FTT positions
(Schirm, 2016, p. 69). A third hypothesis accounts for
the variables’ interplay: When both cost-benefit calcula-
tions for economic sectors as well as fundamental soci-
etal expectations on governments’ apt role in managing
the economy are affected, then these either compete
and weaken, or reinforce and strengthen each other in
shaping governments’ FTT positions.
3. Operationalization
Fairclough and Fairclough’s research in political respond-
ing to and dealing with the financial and Eurozone cri-
sis views PDA mainly as a type of “practical argumenta-
tion” which “demands systematic analysis” of arguments
for or against particular types of governments’ actions
(Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012a, pp. 1–2). Such govern-
ments’ responses shed light on the broad public debate
on the causes of the crisis in general, as well as par-
ticularly on reforms proposed. In arguing practically in
support or opposition of reform proposals, these are
linked to the diverse concerns/values of domestic actors.
Arguing practically over particular types of actions, in the
crisis context of uncertainty and risk, is designed to lead
to a reasonable and legitimate outcome precisely in the
absence of consensus:
In a modern democratic state, people expect politi-
cians to be bound by the promises they make, and
expect the institutions of the state to act justly and
treat them as equals. Action based on such rea-
sons is legitimate both because a concern with doing
one’s duty or fulfill ing one’s obligations enjoys pub-
lic recognition, but also because these reasons can
be argumentatively and publicly justified as insti-
tutional facts, regardless of whether agents want
to act in accordance with them or not. (Fairclough
& Fairclough, 2012b, p. 26; see also Fairclough &
Fairclough, 2012a, p. 177)
In this sense, PDA is attached to domestic individual
and collective actors (interest groups, trade unions, vot-
ers, NGOs, and governments) involved in political pro-
cesses within institutional contexts, in which these actors
can engage, in an environment of uncertainty, risk
and disagreement on decisions on matters of common
concerns/values. According to Fairclough and Fairclough
(2012a, p. 34), giving primacy to practical argumenta-
tion means:
Carefully weighing a variety of relevant considera-
tions…in a democratic setting where a wide range of
viewpoints can be expressed and taken into account,
will not only produce a legitimate decision…but will
also enhance the rationality of the decision-making
process.
In applying PDA, the authors establish a framework, ana-
lyzing a claim for action (action to be pursued) which
is distinguished from the premises illustrating the cir-
cumstances of action (current context) from premises
expressing the goals of action (future state of affairs)—
which, in turn, are explicitly informed by values and con-
cerns (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012a, p. 15). Fairclough
and Fairclough (2012a, p. 44) propose practical argumen-
tation which, inserted within the context of this study of
the FTT, can be applied by taking the following system-
atic steps: (1) in accordance with material interests (con-
cerns) and/or value-based ideas (values), and (2) given
the actual problematic context of action (circumstances),
as well as (3) the desired future state of affairs (goals);
(4) the solution to the problem is the action to be pur-
sued (target). Therefore, concluding that the action to
be pursued will be the right means to achieve the goal,
the link from the premises to conclusion is done by a pre-
sumptive means-end relation that goes from the actual
circumstances to the future current state of affairs.
This empirical analysis examines whether the three
governments’ FTT positions, expressed in statements
of responsible elected politicians (finance minister and
head of government), correlated with either (1) interest-
related indicators articulated by business associations’
and trade unions’ demands in the form of posi-
tion papers and representatives’ statements, or to
(2) ideational-related indicators such as voters’ and
NGOs’ attitudes as indicated by public opinion polls
and positions papers, or if in fact (3) a correlation
occurred between interest and ideational-related indi-
cators. Concerning public opinion surveys, societal atti-
tudes from the Eurobarometer are highlighted, as well
as one dyad of value-based ideas on the role of the
government in steering the economy: trust in govern-
ment’s regulation versus trust in market forces (Schirm,
2011, p. 50).
4. The Proposed European FTT
After the failure of the 2010 G20 Toronto Summit in
reaching agreement on globally coordinated action to tax
the financial sector, President of the Commission, José
Barroso, proposed a Directive in September 2011 to cre-
ate a harmonized broad-based FTT in response to the
global financial and Euro crises. To serve as an example
of potential global implementation, the FTT was to be
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installed by member governments. This tax was “to make
the financial sector pay its fair share [and] to reduce com-
petitive distortions in the single market, discourage risky
trading activities and complement regulatory measures
aimed at avoiding future crises” (European Commission,
2011). Many member governments contested the FTT
mainly due to the risks of hindering growth and financial
sector relocation. Once unanimity to pass the proposal
proved difficult to achieve, the most reluctant govern-
ments such as Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK were
bypassed primarily by Germany and France in request-
ing the Commission to introduce the enhanced coopera-
tion mechanism. This would permit those favorable FTT
member states to participate in implementing the tax.
The mechanism was supported by 11 EU member states
representing more than 90% of Eurozone GDP and was
approved by the European Parliament in December 2012
and the Council of the EU in January 2013. However,
FTT introduction still lingers in uncertainty. Statements
of support mainly come from Germany and France, regu-
larly putting the FTT on the ECOFIN agenda to advance
the issue and renew the political commitment of the
remaining member governments. Contemporary devel-
opments seem to slightly accelerate this process, as
Brexit and the subsequent exclusion of the UK as a ‘foot-
dragger’ (Quaglia, 2017, p. 1) in blocking FTT negotia-
tions, and the current COVID19-pandemic crisis, have ini-
tiated the German Council Presidency, to call on EU mem-
bers’ “solidarity, cooperation and joint solutions” to fund
the EU’s budget and “manage the economic effects” in
response to the corona virus (German Federal Ministry
of Finance, 2020).
4.1. German, French, and Irish Governments’ Positions
From the perspective of the French and German govern-
ments, the political context of action (circumstances) was
similar in their basic features. At the beginning of the
crisis Christine Lagarde, French Finance Minister, stated
in the Assemblée Nationale that it was “the result of a
deregulation of liberalism” (Assemblée Nationale, 2009).
Her successor François Baroin added, referring to inter-
national structures, that “if we wait for a consensus
and a global agreement, this tax will not be introduced”
(Assemblée Nationale, 2012b). Referring to the lack of
regulation of the financial markets identified, Lagarde
stated as a solution to the problem (target premise) “to
rebuild the rules that ensure the smooth functioning of
the markets” (Assemblée Nationale, 2009). Baroin also
demanded that “the financial system should contribute
to repairing the damage it has itself caused by devel-
oping a financial industry that got carried away with
subprime mortgages and Lehman Brothers” (Assemblée
Nationale, 2012a).
Similarly interpreting the circumstances, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel stated in the Bundestag that
the “financial crisis could only have arisen because
the regulation of the financial markets was insuffi-
cient” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). German Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble estimated the “chances
of us achieving a global financial transaction tax…very
small” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010c). Schäuble added
that the “lack of regulation of the financial markets”
was one cause, but the main cause was the “excess
of public debt in the national budgets” (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2011) and thus gave higher priority to reduc-
ing public debt. Merkel’s target premise was again sim-
ilar when she stated that “there is no way around the
fact that the financial sector is sharing the costs of
the crisis” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010b). In addition,
Merkel exceeded Lagarde’s regulatory ideas with her
demand that “every financial center, every financial mar-
ket player and every financial product should be sub-
ject to regulation, if possible not only in Germany, if
possible not only in Europe, but if possible everywhere
in the world” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). This should
“restore the primacy of politics over the financial mar-
kets” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010a).
The Irish government’s position is in stark contrast to
the German and French positions in terms of the polit-
ical context of action (circumstances). In the discussion
in the Dáil Éireann on the introduction of a European
FTT, Prime Minister Enda Kenny emphasized that the
financial sector was a “very important sector for Ireland”
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012a), as “32,000 peo-
ple are directly employed in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin, which is the location of more
than 5,000 firms” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012a).
The International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) is thus
not only “an important part of the economy” (Houses of
the Oireachtas, 2012b), but “vital to the Irish economy”
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012c), as the financial sector
contributes “€2.1 billion in corporate and payroll taxes to
the Irish Exchequer” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012a).
Accordingly, the Irish government primarily focused on
the relevance of its financial sector. Kenny expressed the
target premise of “continuing to adopt, articulate and
implement a clear vision for the future of the IFSC and
demonstrating Ireland’s commitment to the promotion
and growth of this sector” (Houses of the Oireachtas,
2012a). This target premise of the Irish government, by
focusing on promoting the national economy, contrasts
with the German and French stances, bearing in mind
that Ireland also opposed the FTT due to the UK’s resis-
tance (Hardiman & Metinsoy, 2019).
4.2. German, French, and Irish Domestic Material
Interests
As a representative of the German credit institutions,
the Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft (DK) warned that a
FTT “because of possible evasive reactions, is fiscally
justifiable—if at all—only if it is introduced globally or at
least EU-wide (EU-27)” (DK, 2011, p. 2). From the DK’s
perspective, the financial sector is “not undertaxed com-
pared to other sectors of the economy” and “even if it
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were introduced at the international level, many prob-
lems would still arise” (DK, 2011, pp. 6, 10). In addition,
the association stressed:
That the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax
would have negative consequences not only for finan-
cial institutions, but also for companies and citizens in
general, as well as for the economy and financial loca-
tions of the affected states as a whole. (DK, 2011, p. 2)
The Fédération Bancaire Française (FBF), equal to the
DK, argued that “the financial sector, and in particular
the banking sector, contributes as much and perhaps
even more than others to public charges in the broad-
est sense” and that “in this context the…financial trans-
action tax (FTT) is not legitimate” (FBF, 2011). The FBF
similarly argued that “a tax on financial transactions
can only be conceived on a global level to maintain
the competitive conditions of the financial centers and
not to penalize the market financing of European com-
panies” (FBF, 2011). The rejection of the FTT, whether
national or regional, highlights the concerns premise of
these national business associations clearly reflecting
the national locational advantage in international com-
petition and the relevance of this, as it would harm
the financial sector. Thus, the interests of the German
and French financial sectors conflicted with the respec-
tive government positions that advocated FTT introduc-
tion. The Irish Banking Federation, in cooperation with
Financial Services Ireland (FSI), commissioned a study
on the advantages and disadvantages of an FTT. The
aim of the study was “to independently review and
distil the main points…on the European Commission’s
initial…and the subsequent authorized proposal for an
FTT…to provide an indication of the expected impact
of the FTT across the financial services sector and its
constituent product groups” (PWC, 2013). Based on this
report, Brendan Bruen, Director of the FSI, concluded
that “Ireland has made the right decision to stay out of
any FTT” as it “harms any country that introduces one”
and “is ultimately paid by the real economy, in increased
costs for business, lost jobs and lost payroll” (FSI, 2013).
With the Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) and
the Confédération française démocratique du travail
(CFDT), the largest trade union federations in Germany
and France spoke out in favor of the introduction of a
European FTT. The CFDT supported a campaign by the
European Federation of Public Service Unions, which
focused on the demand for “fairer and more progressive
taxation” in the form of a “European financial tax” as
it believed it to be “high time that the financial sector
also paid its share” (CFDT, 2011). The DGB contradicted
the view of the German financial sector that a FTT “must
be introduced worldwide” and supported “the introduc-
tion of a Financial Transaction Tax in the EU…even if the
rest of the world community does not follow suit,” so
that “financial speculators, as the cause of the finan-
cial and economic crisis, to share in its consequential
costs” (DGB, 2011). This echoes the view of the ICTU,
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, while adding that the
FTT contributes:
To state revenue at a time when the state finances
are under unprecedented pressure and it shows cit-
izens that the institutions which were the main cul-
prits in our economic collapse are making some con-
tribution towards a recovery. It will alter economic
behaviour by making risky transactions more costly,
while in turn allowing a more rational allocation of
economic resources. (ICTU, 2012)
The trade unions’ demands (concerns premise) for a
European FTT correlates with the German and French
governments’ positions. The financial sector is to be held
accountable through stronger regulation and the respon-
sibility for the costs of the crisis is accompanied by a
sense of justice, which the German and French govern-
ments also emphasized, yet diverged from the Irish gov-
ernment’s stance.
4.3. German, French, and Irish Domestic Value-Based
Ideas
To illustrate the increased issue salience, the importance
the public attached to the FTT reform proposal and its
subsequent politicization, media analyses from Kastner
(2017) and Degner and Leuffen (2019b) confirm that
public attention increased instantly, particularly during
the years 2011 to 2013. Concerning the question of an
apt government’s role in managing the economy and
trust in governments regulation versus trust in market
forces, highlighting the values premise, weak governmen-
tal regulation of the financial sector enjoyed support
among the Irish population. In a Eurobarometer survey
recurring since 2010, respondents were asked to indicate
whether they support or oppose specific EU measures.
In Ireland, on average 44% supported the introduction
of a FTT, compared to 43% who opposed it. These fig-
ures are very different from the results in Germany (75%
pro/16% contra) and France (64% pro/24% contra; see
EUOPD, 2014–2018). The enforcement of the EU Troika’s
bailout program, including conditions of austerity mea-
sures imposed on the Irish society to decrease govern-
ment expenditure, might have contributed to this dif-
ference in Irish attitudes towards FTT introduction. The
German and French governments’ target premise of hav-
ing the financial sector share the costs of the crisis is
reflected in a Eurobarometer survey recurring since 2013.
When asked whether the EU is ensuring that the finan-
cial sector pays its fair share, 21% of French and 37%
of German (as well as Irish) respondents surveyed felt
that the financial sector is paying its fair share. A major-
ity of 55% of French respondents felt that the EU was
not holding the financial sector sufficiently accountable.
In Germany and Ireland, 50% each shared this view
(EUOPD, 2014–2018). In the FTT debate, the emphasized
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value of fairness (the financial sector must pay its fair
share) can be correlated to the values equality, justice,
and freedom. In the question of whether “[we need]
more equality and justice, even if this means less free-
dom for the individual” (EUOPD, 2014–2018), an abso-
lute majority of respondents in Germany (62%), Ireland
(63%) and France (64%) voted on average for the val-
ues of equality and justice, whereas in contrast, 31%
(France), 25% (Ireland), 34% (Germany) preferred the
value freedom.
The internationally active NGO Tax Justice Network,
which maintains partnerships with the Tax Justice
Network Germany and Attac France, contributed to
the debate on the introduction of a Europe-wide FTT.
The Tax Justice Network advocated “the introduction of a
Financial Transaction Tax because only this is suitable for
financing current crisis management measures and for
preventing or at least mitigating future crises” (Netzwerk
Steuergerechtigkeit Deutschland, 2010). In addition, the
Network for Tax Justice was one of 100 other spon-
sors of the German nationwide campaign ‘Tax against
Poverty’ (Steuer gegen Armut). An open letter, which
forms the basis of the campaign, states: “[We want] to
ensure that the financial sector contributes to overcom-
ing the consequences of the crisis” (Steuer gegen Armut,
2009). Attac France viewed the introduction of a FTT
as a service to social justice, as it would “shift the bur-
den of the crisis from the citizens to the financial sec-
tor” (Attac France, 2010). It celebrated the Commission’s
proposal for a pan-European FTT as a “victory for Attac’s
ideas” but regretted that “the proposed rate is only
0.01%” and that “the scope of the proposal…is limited by
the exclusion of taxation of transactions on the foreign
exchange market” and hence, the proposal is “too little,
too late” (Attac France, 2011). The NGO Financial Justice
Ireland called for an “EU-wide financial transaction tax”
(Financial Justice Ireland, 2014) “to reclaim what we
have paid out to banks and ‘bail-outs”’ (Financial Justice
Ireland, 2013b). “Part of the FTT revenue should be used
to repay part of the bank debt in the global North and
South” (Financial Justice Ireland, 2013a). The positions
of the NGOs show a strong consensus on the demands
(values premise) for a Europe-wide FTT and reveal that
the planned FTT introduction not only affects the mate-
rial interests (concerns premise) of the financial sector
but also societal expectations about the role of the gov-
ernment in managing the financial market. The positions
of the German and French NGOs are consistent with their
respective government positions in their claim for action
to demand a European FTT and in their target premises
of making the financial sector share in the costs by regu-
lating the financial system and the associated values of
equality and justice. On the other hand, the rejection
of a FTT in the Irish government’s claim for action cor-
relates neither with the position of Irish NGOs nor with
the widespread demands in Irish society for equality and
justice in the financial markets.
5. Conclusion
Both the German and French governments’ context
of action (circumstances) to introduce a FTT at the
European level is in line with the demands of the vot-
ers, of NGOs and trade unions, and runs counter to the
material interests of the financial sector, which consid-
ered the introduction of a FTT at the European level to
be harmful to the economy. These governments’ target
premises of using the FTT to regulate the financial sector
and make it share the costs of the crisis can be plausi-
bly explained by the high approval rates for a European
FTT and the widespread view, expressed by the trade
unions and NGOs, that the financial sector has not been
held sufficiently accountable. In the analysis of the Irish
government’s position, it deviates from the German and
French governments’ stances, correlating in its circum-
stances with the material interests of the financial sector,
as well as with the expectations of the Irish voters, which,
unlike in the German and French cases, did not support
the introduction of a FTT at the European level with an
absolute majority.
Reflecting these empirical results, the hypotheses of
the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation and its explanatory variables, material interests
and value-based ideas, account for when these mattered,
how they interacted, and which prevailed in shaping
these governments’ FTT positions. The first formulated
hypothesis focused on the prevalence of business associ-
ations and trade unions in shaping the governments’ FTT
positions. Strengthening EU financial regulation would
directly affect specific economic sectors, leading to cost-
benefit calculations instigating these domestic actors
to engage in vocal lobbying efforts, thus dominating
domestic preference formation. The comparative empir-
ical analysis on material interests reveals that these actor
types were divided regarding their FTT demands. Due to
the role they play in the national economy, contributing
to employment, exports and GVA, more so for Ireland
than for France and Germany, business associations were
highly opposed to strengthening financial integration.
Trade unions, specified as material interests due to the
importance of labor to the national economy, were sup-
portive of the FTT as they blamed the finance sector for
the dire economic situation, which had induced unem-
ployment and immense costs for the taxpayer. The FTT,
in punishing the financial sector, would raise revenues
and contribute to political stability, economic prosperity,
and social security.
The second hypothesis turned attention to voters’
and NGOs’ concerns if strengthening EU financial regu-
lation involves fundamental and salient enduring soci-
etal expectations on apt government’s role in steering
the economy. The cross-country comparison illustrated
that all NGOs had a unified position towards FTT intro-
duction. French and German public opinion were more
in line regarding pro-regulation versus pro-market atti-
tudes, while in Ireland trust in market forces reflected
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the negative correlation to strengthening financial mar-
ket regulation. This equally corresponds to the large per-
centage of French and Germans in favor of the FTT, yet
also complies with the Irish public opinion being largely
divided over this tax issue.
So far, this article has highlighted the importance
of both domestic explanatory variables, whereby it has
become clear that not only competition took place within
these variables in the three country case studies (mate-
rial interests: finance and business industries versus trade
unions) or in Ireland only (value-based ideas: NGOs versus
voters) but competition took also place between these
societal dynamics, hence they can also reinforce each
other. The third hypothesis concentrated on the variables’
interplay: The strengthening of financial regulation would
directly affect cost-benefit calculations as well as funda-
mental enduring societal expectations on the apt govern-
ment’s role in steering the economy. The comparative
empirical examination has supported that trade unions’
demands collided with these from finance and indus-
try associations, thus a certain weakening of the latter
demands took place in the domestic preference forma-
tion processes. This weakening occurred more so since,
particularly in France and Germany, trade unions were
joined by both voters and NGOs in their support for the
FTT, thereby reinforcing each other. Hence, an interaction
between the societal dynamics took place. In Ireland’s
domestic preference formation process, business associ-
ations’ opposition was most likely reinforced by the pub-
lic’s divided opinion. Not having been able to form a solid
positive attitude towards the FTT, the regulation-adverse
attitudes reinforced the material interests opposed to
financial strengthening. Hence, in France and Germany
trade unions, voters and NGOs were able to circumvent
the business associations’ interests and were thus more
decisive in shaping its government’s position towards sup-
porting the proposed reform, whereas in Ireland these
domestic actors were ultimately not able to counter a
unified financial industry overwhelmingly opposing the
tax. In sum, this article has illustrated that, even in an
uncertain crisis situation in which governments have to
act prompt, a broad range of directly affected domestic
stakeholders were able to voice their concerns in shaping
the governments’ responsiveness, hence public input in
the FTT reform negotiations genuinely enhanced the legit-
imacy of governments’ FTT position taking.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007 created high costs for taxpay-
ers and led to a hike in sovereign debt when EU mem-
ber states stepped in to recapitalize banks. The resulting
frustration motivated policymakers to create a banking
union. The goal was to stabilize the European banking
system through stricter rules and capital requirements
for banks, a more centralized banking supervision on the
European level, a European approach to bank restructur-
ing and resolution that would limit the burden on tax-
payers, and a European deposit guarantee scheme that
would protect savers (Howarth & Quaglia, 2016b).
Despite broad agreement on the desirability of pro-
tecting savers and taxpayers, there were substantial dis-
agreements on the details. Not all member states had
been affected by the financial crisis to the same extent:
some were able to bear the burden alone, while oth-
ers could not. There was a risk that the costs and ben-
efits of banking union would be unevenly distributed
across member states, and that risk-averse banks might
end up paying for risk-taking banks. Questions relating
to the mutualization of risk, the inclusion of small and
local banks in the scheme, and also the correct decision-
making bodies became disputed. Franco-German leader-
ship broke down as the two countries were on opposing
sides on most questions (Schild, 2018). The two coun-
tries were nevertheless important in the negotiations
due to their sheer size and economic weight (Cassell
& Hutcheson, 2019; Howarth & Quaglia, 2013). This is
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particularly obvious in Germany’s veto of the creation of
a European deposit guarantee scheme, which is general-
ly attributed to high domestic pressure (Schild, 2020).
In line with the aims of this thematic issue
(Högenauer & Rehm, 2021), the article aims to analyse
the domestic politics of the banking union in France and
Germany through the positioning of their parliaments
and parties. To what extent did the two governments
face parliamentary pressure to defend specific positions?
To what extent did the parliamentary politics reflect
the material interests of the country and/or public atti-
tudes towards the issue? The analysis will focus on the
Lower Houses, i.e., the Bundestag and the Assemblée
Nationale (AN). The Lower Houses perform the main
function of representing the national electorate. By con-
trast, the Upper Houses, the Bundesrat and the Senate
are not directly elected and the Bundesrat’s primary
function is not to represent the electorate but the state
governments. They are extremely diverse in their com-
position and powers.
The first question relates to literature that shows
that Eurozone governance has become more salient and
controversial among parliamentarians (Auel & Raunio,
2014; Closa&Maatsch, 2014; Högenauer, 2019;Wendler,
2014). As a result, national parliaments have become
more assertive in their scrutiny of key EU and Eurozone
decisions. The German Bundestag is particularly active
on eurozone crisis policies and has extensive powers
(Auel & Höing, 2014; Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2014;
Höing, 2013; Moschella, 2017). The question is to what
extent these dynamics led to a close scrutiny of bank-
ing union that could potentially constrain governments
(Donnelly, 2018). This is highly relevant, as EU crisis poli-
cymaking has often been criticized for lacking democrat-
ic input and debate (e.g., Sebastiaõ, 2021). An answer
to this question requires an examination of the parlia-
mentary salience of banking union, the timing of debates
and resolutions, and the polarization of debates. By par-
liamentary salience, we mean how frequently the issue
is raised in debates (Hutter & Grande, 2014; see also
De Wilde, 2011; De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016).
Polarization captures the extent to which actors adopt
different positions on an issue. In this multi-level con-
text, it can refer to either disagreement between differ-
ent groups of MPs or the disagreement of national politi-
cians with European proposals.
In addition, the timing of activities matters: If par-
liaments hope to influence European negotiations or to
control the government’s position, the debates would
have to predate the adoption of the policy. If plenary
debates occur after the decision, they are reactive and
can at most comment on the performance of the govern-
ment or indicate (dis)agreementwith the policy, but they
can no longer shape the policy.
The question about the extent to which the debates
reflect ideas and economic interests will draw upon
the societal approach as used by Schirm (2011, 2020)
and Van Loon (2021). Schirm (2011, 2020) defines ideas
as values held by the public. Material interests are
determined by the relative weight of economic sec-
tors. So far, existing studies often emphasize the impor-
tance ofmaterial interests or structural economic factors
in explaining government positions in eurozone crisis
decision-making (e.g., Tarlea, Bailer, & Degner, 2019),
for example, whether banks are largely domestically or
foreign-owned (Spendzharova, 2014), on the role of bank
capitalization levels and bank-industry ties (Howarth &
Quaglia, 2016a), and on the qualitative composition of
the banking sector in terms of whether there be large
national champions or decentralized networks of coop-
erative and savings banks (Commain, 2021). The qualita-
tive composition is particularly important in the context
of France (large champions) and Germany (networks of
savings and cooperative banks) as it fuels different views
on what type of bank should be covered by European
mechanisms andhowmuch they should contribute finan-
cially to the stabilization of the European banking sector.
However, Van Loon (2021) shows that ideas and interests
do not necessarily pull in opposite directions, but can
potentially work to reinforce each other.
In this vein, the following sections will first provide a
short overview of the main elements of banking union
and the positions of the French and German govern-
ments. Then French andGerman ideas and interests with
regard to banking union will be analysed based on exist-
ing surveys, the literature on the politicization of bank-
ing union, and structural economic factors. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the data collection on parlia-
mentary scrutiny and an analysis of the findings in terms
of the salience and polarization of banking union in the
Bundestag and the AN.
2. Banking Union and Franco-German Divisions
The decisions on banking union represent one of the
biggest steps forward in European integration since the
launch of EMU (Degner & Leuffen, 2019; Epstein &
Rhodes, 2016).
In 2013, agreement was reached on the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for Eurozone banks:
Located within the European Central Bank (ECB), it is
responsible for the direct supervision of systemically rele-
vant banks and banks with substantial cross-border activ-
ities, while other banks are supervised by national super-
visors under the responsibility of the ECB (Gren, Howarth,
& Quaglia, 2015; Kern, 2014).
In 2014, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)
was established in order to reduce the costs of bank
resolutions for taxpayers. The Single Resolution Board
takes decisions for those banks supervised directly by
the ECB. In the event of a resolution, the bank’s share-
holders and creditors are first bailed-in, then the nation-
al compartment of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF)
steps in. The national compartments are financed by
levies from national banks and are backed up by nation-
al credit lines from the member state. By 2023, the
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national compartments will be merged (Howarth &
Quaglia, 2016b).
In 2015, the European Commission planned the cre-
ation of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)
with the aim of merging national deposit insurance
schemes. However, this proposal was ultimately blocked
by division in the Council (Cassell & Hutcheson, 2019).
In European decision-making on banking union, the
established pattern of Franco-German leadership on
monetary policymaking was disrupted. The two coun-
tries were often on opposing sides of the argument
(Schild, 2018). They disagreed on the purpose of bank-
ing union and the costs and benefits of banking union
generated distributional conflict. In the absence of a
Franco-German agreement, EU institutions filled the
gap and provided supranational leadership (Nielsen &
Smeets, 2018), but some elements of banking union
were delayed or blocked.
Disagreements emerged largely along two dividing
lines: the extent of risk-sharing across member states
and the centralization of decision-making (Cassell &
Hutcheson, 2019; Schild, 2018). France, Italy, and Spain
pushed for a rapid move towards banking union to dis-
rupt the feedback loop between banking crises and
sovereigns: States tend to rescue national banks with
public funds thereby potentially entering a public debt
crisis, which then affects national banks, which hold
public debt. Germany, on the other hand, wanted to
avoid sharing the risks of bailouts in other Eurozone
states and preferred to focus on avoiding future crises
(Schild, 2018).
As a result, whereas France wanted the European
banking supervision and resolution to cover all Eurozone
banks, Germany wanted it to cover only on systemically
relevant banks, rather than its smaller savings and coop-
erative banks. Domestically, there were doubts about
whether the ECB was the ideal banking supervisor giv-
en the potential conflict of interest with its role in mon-
etary policy (cf. Högenauer, 2019), but the government
ultimately agreed that the ECB should take on this role.
Where France wanted the European Commission to play
a key role in the restructuring and resolution of banks,
Germany preferred a network of national resolution
authorities (cf. Degner & Leuffen, 2019). On this issue,
Germany ultimately got its way in the form of a Single
Resolution Board consisting of a Chair, four full-time
members, and a representative of each national resolu-
tion authority. The Commission and Council of the EU
would be able to veto Single Resolution Board decisions
(Schild, 2018).
In addition, unlike France, Germany wanted to lim-
it the use of public funds—and especially European
funds—in the recapitalization of banks. As a result,
whereas France favoured the use of the ESM to recapi-
talize banks with bad assets, Germany insisted that lega-
cy assets should be a national responsibility and that the
ESM should be used only for future crises. It also insist-
ed on a recapitalization sequence: first private sharehold-
ers, creditors and large depositors, then national resolu-
tion funds financed via bank levies, then national public
capital, and then as a last resort, European capital from
the ESM. The bailing in of private capital would reduce
the burden on the taxpayer, and by asking for national
recapitalization first, European risk-sharing would be lim-
ited. Germany also wanted to reduce the contribution
from small banks, whereas France tried to limit the con-
tributions from large banks, and there was disagreement
on whether there should be a single resolution fund or a
network of national funds. Finally, for the same reasons
of aversion against the mutualization of risk, Germany
vehemently blocked the creation of a EDIS using the argu-
ment that risks to bank’s balance sheetswould have to be
reduced first (Schild, 2020).
3. French and German Ideas and Interests on
Banking Union
The financial crisis harmed trust in the ECB. According to
the 2010 Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2010),
45% of French and German respondents distrusted
the ECB, but in Germany distrust was growing partic-
ularly fast. The same survey showed that support for
European banking supervision, European supervision
when public money was spent to rescue financial insti-
tutions, and regulation of the financial sector was high-
er in Germany (80%, 80% and 77% respectively) than
in France (73%, 68% and 71%). As the eurozone cri-
sis dragged on, German attitudes towards EU banking
supervision became less positive, as did French attitudes:
Eurobarometer 81 (European Commission, 2014) shows
that 75% of German and 67% of French respondents
were in favour of banking supervision.
Thus, the German public is actually more strongly
in favour of the fundamental idea of a banking union,
despite the negative debate in the media. These sur-
veys do, of course, only capture very general attitudes
and cannot provide information on the kind of banking
supervision citizens want. Nevertheless, it is interesting
that there is a disconnect between the reluctance of
the German government in decision-making on banking
union and the overwhelming support of Germans for the
idea of European banking supervision.
In addition, the fact that there were only 4% of
‘don’t knows’ by German and 13% by French respon-
dents on the question on banking supervision (European
Commission, 2010) is an indication that the public
considered this issue quite important. Schild (2018)
argues that the German government—unlike the French
parliament—was under particular pressure due to the
high public salience of European policies, the predom-
inantly negative attitudes towards solidarity between
countries, and the emergence of a Eurosceptic right-wing
party, the AfD. The public salience of EDIS was particu-
larly high in Germany (Cassell & Hutcheson, 2019). Kriesi
and Grande (2016) also argue that politicization of euro-
zone crisis policies was particularly high in Germany,
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whereas politicization in France only reached 40% of the
German level.
This is likely to influence parliamentary scrutiny:
Baglioni and Hurrelmann (2016) argue that there are dif-
ferent arenas of politicization, such as the citizen are-
na, an intermediary arena for business groups or oth-
er specialized actors, and an institutional arena (e.g., a
parliament). The different arenas are connected, in that
public salience can raise the salience for politicians, and
the strategies of politicians in parliaments can contribute
to the (de)politicization of an issue (cf. Gheyle, 2019;
Wendler, 2019). According to Gormley (1986), the com-
plexity and public salience of an issue interact to cre-
ate different policymaking dynamics. When complexity
is high (as is the case with banking union) and public
salience is low, politicians operate in ‘board room’ mode:
Affected business groups can influence politics and politi-
cians are free to make compromises as the media and
public do not take much interest. However, in such a
situation politicians deal with complex issues as little
as possible, due to the absence of electoral incentives.
When complexity and salience are both high, politics take
place in ‘operating room’ mode: politicians are not free
to make compromises, as the public has strong expec-
tations and the media reports on the issue (although
Gormley suggests that reporting is likely to be faulty).
The problem with this typology is that its description
of the dynamics does not entirely fit the European con-
text, as there is an underlying assumption that diffi-
cult decision-making is delegated to agencies. In the EU
context, however, the most contentious decisions often
have to be taken at the level of the European Council or
at least the Council ofMinisters. As a result, high salience
and complexity do not necessarily lead to delegation to
bureaucrats. Banking union in practice corresponds bet-
ter to Gormley and Boccuti’s (2001) typology of issues
based on conflict and public salience, where they argue
that issues that governments insist on staying in control
of issues that are salient and conflictual, whereas they
involve stakeholders in issues that are high in conflict
and low in salience. In the US case, the absence of con-
flict and salience results in the federal level having lit-
tle interest in tightly controlling the state level. In our
case, we assume that the incentives for parliamentary
scrutiny are low. This is also in line with the argument
by De Wilde et al. (2016) that politicization is driven by
the critics rather than supporters of an issue. If we take
conflict to mean the opposition to the European plans
and/or conflict between domestic actors, this would
mean that:
H1: Politicians take business interests on board when
the public salience of the issue is low, but the conflict
on the issue (e.g., between businesses and the EU) is
high (expectation: Germany on SSM, SRF);
H2: When both conflict and public salience are high,
politicians take control of the decision, but have
limited political room for manoeuvre (expectation:
Germany on EDIS);
H3: When public salience and conflict are low (expec-
tation: France, especially on the SSM, SRF, EDIS),
parliamentarians will have no interest in the close
scrutiny of executives;
H4: Parliaments are more likely to be proactive in the
face of high public salience.
However, the precise powers of the parliaments could
be considered a mediating factor. While national parlia-
ments have no direct influence over EU policymaking,
they can put pressure on their national governments
to represent the ‘correct’ position in the Council of the
EU via committee and plenary debates (Raunio, 2009)
and resolutions. In this context, a high level of activity is
usually used to signal that the parliament considers the
issue important. However, the AN has moderate scruti-
ny powers over EU affairs and is usually less active while
the Bundestag has strong scrutiny powers and tends to
be quite active (Auel et al., 2014). The Bundestag has
control over the plenary agenda, whereas the French
government had almost complete control over the ple-
nary agenda of the AN until 2008/2009 (Auel & Raunio,
2014). However, following constitutional amendments,
the AN now controls roughly one-third of its agenda
and can hold plenary debates on EU affairs if it sees
fit. Indeed, it tends to schedule at least one EU debate
per month (Thomas & Tacea, 2014). In addition, the
opposition has the right to table motions in both par-
liaments. In the case of the AN, there is a specific tool,
‘European resolutions,’ which can be adopted by the
European Affairs Committee on virtually any EU docu-
ment and which become final if the relevant sectoral
committee does not counteract them (Thomas & Tacea,
2014). In the case of the Bundestag, one-quarter of
MPs can force the government to publicly explain why
it deviated from a previously passed Bundestag resolu-
tion (Höing, 2015). Thus, while a lower number of AN ple-
nary debates is to be expected given the influence of the
government, the AN is not substantially weaker than the
Bundestag with regard to resolutions. Substantial differ-
ences in activity have to be ascribed also to different lev-
els of motivation. For example, Högenauer and Howarth
(2019) have shown that the AN scrutinizes the Banque
de France more actively than the Bundestag scrutinizes
the Bundesbank, despite the fact that the Bundestag is
also considered stronger than the AN outside EU affairs:
Because it chooses to take an interest.
In terms of material interests, there are arguably
two factors at play, the general divide between credi-
tor and debtor states, and the composition of the bank-
ing sector. Thus, Lehner and Wasserfallen (2019; see
alsoWasserfallen, Leuffen, Kudrna, &Degner, 2019) stud-
ied government positions on 47 issues of the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) reform and found that the
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predominant dimension was between fiscal transfer (led
by France) and fiscal discipline (led by Germany). This
dimension had very strong explanatory power for sever-
al banking union-related issues, such as banking supervi-
sion, the build-up and mutualization of the SRF and the
fiscal backstop for the SRF. The findings make sense in
light of the high exposure of banks to domestic sovereign
bonds. Both Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen (2016) and
De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) find that there is a
‘moral suasion’ mechanism whereby banks that are pub-
licly owned or influenced by politicians (e.g., via the
board of directors) collude with national governments
and buy larger quantities of domestic sovereign bonds
than would be in their interest. In the eyes of Germany,
their high exposure to Spanish, Greek, and Italian banks
could affect their stability and therefore the chances of
other European banks having to step in with ‘their’ con-
tributions to the proposed SRF or EDIS. For France, which
started to experience rising public debt during the cri-
sis, there was a correspondingly greater willingness to be
more open to solidarity and transfers between countries.
Secondly, the banking sectors of France andGermany
are structured differently, which also generates differ-
ent material interests. The German banking sector is
organized around three pillars (private banks, corporate
banks, and savings banks) that often consist of smaller
banks that focus on risk adverse operations and SMEs.
The three pillars already had their own deposit insurance
schemes in place, which reduced the perceived need
for a European scheme (Zimmermann, 2013). In addi-
tion, the aim was to avoid the situation in which small,
risk-averse banks might have to cover the losses of large
risk-taking foreign banks. The situation was different for
France, where it was attractive to place large national
champions under a European scheme rather than to risk
having to bail themout nationally (cf. Commain, 2021, on
the French banking sector). On the whole, Zimmermann
(2013) concludes that the existence of strong embedded-
ness of national deposit insurance schemes into differ-
ent varieties of financial capitalism means that a com-
mon deposit insurance scheme is unlikely to emerge.
The strong connections linking the banking sector to
politicians in key countries such as Germany increase the
ability of economic interests to influence policymaking.
4. Data Collection
The article analyses plenary debates and proposed reso-
lutions from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2016 cov-
ering the adoption of the first three pillars of banking
union (SSM, SRM, SRF) and the blocking of EDIS. This peri-
od starts before the Commission proposal on the SSM
and ends after a natural break in the data: There were
no debates after February 2016 until 2018.
The analysis focuses on the plenary debates and pro-
posed resolutions. Plenary debates fulfil a communica-
tion function: As they are more likely to attract media
attention, parties and parliamentarians can use them to
demonstrate to voters that they take a close interest in
a certain topic and to communicate their stance on that
topic. Theminutes of Bundestag and AN plenary debates
are published in full and are broadcast live on the internet
and/or TV. Resolutions also make the parliament’s or a
party’s position visible. By contrast, committee meetings
tend to be much less visible (cf. Raunio, 2016). In addi-
tion, the finance committee of the Bundestag does not
publish minutes and meetings are closed to the public.
Due to the different archival systems of the AN and
the Bundestag, the relevant debates had to be select-
ed following different strategies: In the case of the
Bundestag, a keyword search of all plenary debates in
that period was used to identify all debates where the
SSM, the SRM, the SRF, or the deposit guarantee scheme
were mentioned at least once. The German names of
these policies were used as a search term. In a second
step, plenary debates specifically on banking union were
filtered out through a manual analysis of the titles and
contents. This allowed us to identify 18 debates on bank-
ing union. The electronic archive of theANdoes not allow
for a keyword search of plenary debates but publishes
the topics of the debates in an easy-to-browse format.
Therefore, all debates that could potentially be on bank-
ing union were preselected. Then a manual analysis of
the debates showed that only four were specifically on
banking union. In both the Bundestag and the AN, one
debate can cover several pillars of banking union.
In addition, a keyword searchwas used to identify rel-
evant resolutions.
In order to measure the degree of polarization, i.e.,
the extent to which opinions diverge (De Wilde, 2011;
De Wilde et al., 2016; Hutter & Grande, 2014), three
German debates on the SSM, the SRM/SRF, and EDIS
were analysed in depth. In light of the limited number of
French debates (and the fact that twowere transposition
debates), a debate on banking union is used to analyse
the general position on the SSMand EDIS, while a second
debate covers the SRF. The SRM and SRF are discussed
together, as parliamentary debates usually treat them as
linked. The selected debates are the earliest debates on
the issue.
5. Banking Union in the Bundestag and the
Assemblée Nationale
5.1. Salience and Timing
Figure 1 shows that banking union was indeed a salient
topic for the German Bundestag from an early stage and
that the interest was sustained over time and across
the different policy elements: Banking union was dis-
cussed in 18 plenary debates, 13 of which were specifi-
cally on banking union and five of whichwere debates on
Commission work programs or reports on the European
Council that focused on banking union.
By contrast, in the AN, only four plenary debates
focus on banking union. Two were implementation
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Figure 1. The number of plenary debates on banking union.
debates, one on banking union in general and one on the
SRF. This is in line with H3 that public salience and parlia-
mentary salience are linked and that low public salience
provides low incentives for parliamentary scrutiny.
In addition, the AN’s approach was reactive: Only
AN debate 20140152 of 30 January 2014 on banking
union contains a discussion of the SRF/SRM that pre-
dates the European decision (of July 2014). The oth-
er debates follow European decisions and comment
on the government’s and EU’s performance after the
facts. The Bundestag was far more proactive: The first
EDIS debate of 5 November 2015 preceded the offi-
cial Commission proposal of 24 November. Three SSM
debates and four SRM/SRF debates predate the respec-
tive European decisions. There is thus a mix of German
debates that formulate positions and debates that com-
ment on outcomes. This confirms H4 that high public
salience encourages politicians to be proactive (especial-
ly in the case of EDIS, where the Bundestag opposed
faster than the European Commission could propose).
In addition, the AN adopted one cross-party resolu-
tion in January 2014 encouraging the creation of the SRM
and SRF, the use of the ESM as a backstop, and the cre-
ation of a European deposit guarantee scheme in the
long run. There was one further tabled resolution that
was not adopted. By contrast, there were 19 tabled res-
olutions in the Bundestag, 15 failed opposition resolu-
tions and four adopted government resolutions, confirm-
ing H2, H3, and H4 about the connection between public
salience and parliamentary scrutiny (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Proposed resolutions on banking union.
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5.2. Framing and Polarization
In order to gain greater insight into how the issue was
framed by MPs, all plenary debates were analysed man-
ually. Five representative debates are presented below:
the two French debates on banking union and on the rat-
ification of the SRF, and three Bundestag debates on the
SSM, the SRM/SRF, and on EDIS.
This analysis shows two things: Firstly, the governing
parties defend the European decisions and MPs praise
the achievements of their governments—even in the
case of Germany and the SRM/SRF, where the govern-
ment was originally concerned about the mutualization
of risk. The German opposition is prone to point out
the flaws of decisions, such as the small size of the SRF.
In France, where the government was eager to reach an
agreement and public salience was low, in line with H3,
there is no clear government-opposition divide on the
European policies. Instead, government-opposition argu-
ments focus on the national question of whether the
size of the French banks should be reduced. H2 is cor-
rect in that the German government parties did assume
an active role on the highly salient EDIS, which was dis-
liked by the public and stakeholders, and rejected it even
before the European Commission officially proposed it,
leaving themselves little room for compromise. In line
with H1, for the SSM and SRM/SRF, where German public
opinion and economic interests were sceptical towards
the EU’s plans, but public salience was lower, the govern-
ment parties took on board the interests of stakehold-
ers and argued that these measures clearly should not
apply to savings and cooperative banks. This is broad-
ly in line with a survey of the preferences of French
and German MPs on reforms to the EMU by Blesse,
Boyer, Heinemann, Janeba, and Raj (2019) where French
MPs were found to be more strongly in favour of new
Eurozone competencies.
In addition, it is interesting to note that intra-
party unity was extremely high in Germany across all
parties and that the governing coalitions (CDU-FDP,
then CDU-SPD) also spoke consistently with one voice.
The German government did thus face a clear majority
position that largely reflected its own demands, but also
made it potentially difficult to compromise. The French
government did not face comparable pressure: while all
French parties wanted decisions as close as possible to
the Commission proposals, the low number of debates
and resolutions before decisionsmeant that the pressure
was in practice much lower.
5.2.1. The Positions on the Single Supervisory
Mechanism
AN debate 20140152 of 30 January 2014 on the progress
of banking union and economic integration shows that
all MPs welcomed banking union and the creation of the
SSM, while criticism was limited to details and was not
organized in a strong block of MPs. In line with H3, this
positioning did not constrain the government. Among
the most positive voices are Christophe Caresche (PS)
who defended the choice of the ECB as supervisor and
argued that the in-house separationwouldwork and that
the ECB had a vested interest in the success of bank-
ing union to maintain its credibility. Éric Alauzet (EELV)
emphasized that banking supervision by the ECB would
increase transparency. He only deplored that not all EU
member states and banks were covered, and he would
have liked to see a better involvement of the European
Parliament to improve the democratic legitimacy of the
process. Pierre Lequillier (UMP) also believed that the
ECB would add clarity and independence to banking
supervision, but would have liked national specificities to
be taken into account. Valérie Rabault (PS) would have
liked banking supervision to go further and to impose
higher capital requirements in some cases.
However, Annick Girardin (Radical party of the left)
criticized the complexity of the four different criteria to
determine whether a bank falls under ECB supervision.
Like Éric Alauzet, she wondered why banking supervi-
sion and banking resolution were not dealt with by the
same institution, but she felt that the ECB was the wrong
choice, due to crisis resolution having little to do with
monetary policy, and that this new function could have
undermined the independence and credibility of the ECB.
Danielle Auroi (EELV) also opposed the appointment of
the ECB as supervisor.
The Bundestag debated the SSM on 17 May 2013
(protocol 17241). The principle of European banking
supervision was not particularly controversial. In fact,
almost all speakers with the exception of Axel Troost
(Die Linke) were in favour of European banking supervi-
sion. Troost also agreed in theory but felt that therewere
not enough guarantees that supervision would become
stricter and better than the German Bafin. He also ques-
tioned art. 127 TFEU as a legal basis for banking union.
Polarization mostly existed on whether the ECB
was an appropriate choice as banking supervisor and
whether it would be able to neatly separate banking
supervision and monetary policy in-house. As Manfred
Zöllmer (SPD) argued, the ECB would be a business
partner and creditor. By contrast, the MPs from the
governing parties defended the ECB’s ability to sepa-
rate its two functions (e.g., Volker Wissing, FDP; Peter
Aumer, CDU/CSU). Although Ralph Brinkhaus (CDU/CSU)
did question the ability of the European Parliament
to scrutinize the ECB in its role as banking supervisor.
Institutionalized ideas about the importance of central
bank independence thus played a role.
The other German plenary debates also show that
the opposition (the Greens and Die Linke) questioned
the choice of the ECB as supervisor, that the SPD main-
tained scepticism towards the ECB after it entered gov-
ernment in 2013 and that even CDU MPs argued, as
late as 2016, that the ECB should eventually be replaced
by a separate body. There was also broad agreement
that European banking supervision should focus only on
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system-relevant banks, i.e., both government and oppo-
sition parties defended the same structurally relevant
economic interests in line with H1.
5.2.2. The Positions on the Single Resolution
Mechanism and Single Resolution Fund
In AN debate 20150219 of 5 May 2015 on the SRF agree-
ment, all speakers supported the SRM and SRF’s goal
of breaking the feedback loop between bank failures
and sovereign debt problems and of protecting the tax-
payer from the costs of bank resolutions. As with the
SSM, criticism focused less on the principle, but rather
on the execution, and especially the German influence
on the SRM and the SRF. It is clear that all speakers
would have preferred a solution closer to the European
Commission’s proposals. Thus, Danielle Auroi (EELV) and
Jacques Krabal (Radical party of the left) questioned
the complexity of the SRM procedures and the multi-
ple actors involved. Jérôme Chartier (UMP) questioned
whether the resolution of a crisis within 48 hours was
realistic given that systemic banks might have to pro-
duce 1,800 pages of resolution plans. Jean-Paul Dupré
(Groupe socialiste, républicain et citoyen), wondered
whether the non-participation of the UK and Sweden
would weaken the positive effects of the SRM and SRF.
The pressure on the government was again low.
A common theme taken up by almost all speakers is
the size of the SRF, with the target of €55 billion being
considered laughably small, unlikely to be able to sup-
port the failure of large banks and thus unable to truly
protect taxpayers from the fallout of bank resolutions.
Danielle Auroi (EELV) also demanded a faster mutualiza-
tion of funds and criticized the national compartments.
These two arguments reflect the importance of materi-
al interests, as France has a number of large banks that
might be too big for the SRF, and the resolution of which
would still have been costly for French taxpayers in a sys-
tem based on separate national compartments. Similarly,
several MPs specifically criticized the size of the French
contributions to the SRF, which they regarded as too high
given the low level of deposits (e.g., Jérôme Chartier,
UMP; Jean-Christophe Fromantin, UDI). An exception
was Éric Alauzet (EELV), who found that the high contri-
butions of the French banks reflected the risks they took
and their size. He argued that banks that are too big to
fail have a responsibility towards the community.
The Bundestag debate on the SRM and the SRF of
14 March 2014 (protocol 18021) also shows that all
speakers supported the basic principle of an SRM and
SRF. Themost critical speaker was Axel Troost (Die Linke),
who liked the general idea but doubted that this specif-
ic system would be able to protect taxpayers. He ques-
tioned the ability of the SRF to handle a systemic cri-
sis or even just the failure of a very large bank. He also
argued that the current contributions to the national
funds (including the German fund) were too small to
add up to the target of the SRF. Another opposition MP,
Gerhard Schick (Bündnis 90/the Greens), criticized the
complex decision-making structures of the SRM and SRF
and the creation of national compartments within the
SRF. He also questioned the use of an intergovernmen-
tal agreement as opposed to EU law.
By contrast, government MPs such as Klaus-Peter
Flosbach (CDU/CSU) and Manfred Zöllmer (SPD) argued
that the current set-up with national compartments and
a longer period during which the fund would be filled
struck a healthy balance, as very high levies on banks
might choke off the supply of credit to the economy. Both
Flosbach and Hans Michelbach (also CDU/CSU) argued
that the absence of national compartments would lead
to the communitarization of debt. This reflected both the
material interests of German banks by preventing ‘their’
contributions to be used to bail out foreign banks and
Germany’s perspective as a creditor state wary of risk-
sharing and financial transfers.
The SRF experiences moderate polarization along
government-opposition lines: while all parties agreed on
the basic idea of an SRF, the opposition (the Greens and
Die Linke) would have preferred a much larger fund that
would become operational far sooner. All German par-
ties defended the savings and cooperative banks against
forced participation in this scheme, though, which also
reflects the importance of sectoral interests in line
with H1.
5.2.3. The Positions on European Deposit Insurance
Scheme
In AN debate 20140152 of 30 January 2014,MPs from vir-
tually all parties demanded the creation of a European
deposit insurance scheme. Valérie Rabault (PS) further
specified that the Cypriot crisis showed that a mutualiza-
tion of national guarantees was crucial for the avoidance
of bank runs.
In the case of the Bundestag, the European
Commission’s musing on the possible introduction of a
European deposit insurance scheme was first discussed
in the debate of 5 November 2015 recorded in protocol
18133. The debate was short (25 minutes long) but heat-
ed. The first speaker, Antje Tillmann (CDU/CSU), praised
the progressmade inmoving towards banking union and
the European initiatives to stabilize the banking system
and reduce the risks for taxpayers. But she also point-
ed towards the non-transposition of key elements by
numerous states, e.g., the fact that only 17 states had
implemented the Directive on bank resolutions despite
a deadline of late 2014, or the fact that only about
half of the member states had transposed the Deposit
Guarantee Directive. In addition, she pointed out that
the first payments into the SRF were only due in 2016,
and that banks had until 2024 to feed funds covering
0.8% of deposits into the system. She also felt that states
still posed a risk to banks and vice versa. She conclud-
ed that the proposal for EDIS came too early and that
national systems had to be fully operational first. This
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criticism was shared by Alexander Radwan (CDU/CSU),
Manfred Zöllmer and Christian Petry (both SPD), who
also opposed the communitarization of deposit insur-
ance and suggested that the Commission should first
control the national transposition of existing rules before
it creates a new European system. They saw a risk that
German savers would have to pay for mistakes in other
countries. Radwan and Petry also argued that the risks
across member states had to become more comparable.
This reflects Germany’s material interests as a transfer-
adverse creditor state.
The fact that savings and cooperative banks should
not be covered by EDIS was a concern shared by all politi-
cians, even those in favour of EDIS. For example, Axel
Troost (Die Linke)—usually not an ally of CDU, agreed
that the local saving and cooperative banks should not be
part of EDIS, because of the risk that their contributions
would be used to save Zockerbanken (gambling banks) or
large risk-taking banks abroad. However, he stated that
he would be open to EDIS covering the same type of
bank, and in that case, national funds could be used to
support banks abroad. He also argued that a European
system would be more effective to combat future crisis
and that the larger German banks—like Deutsche Bank—
might well require such a system themselves at some
point. Gerhard Schick (Bündnis 90/the Greens) agreed
that EDIS was the only means to avoid taxpayers hav-
ing to cover the costs of bank failure if the national
deposit guarantee system was insufficient, but he too
would exclude savings and cooperative banks due to
their distinctive features. Thus, sectoral interests were
again strongly defended by both government and oppo-
sition parties in line with H1.
6. Conclusion
Overall, in line with our expectations, the higher public
salience of banking union was reflected in a more proac-
tive scrutiny in the Bundestag compared to theAN.While
the AN only held four debates, two of which were con-
cerned with implementation, the Bundestag organized
18 debates on banking union, with 19 tabled resolutions
compared to two in the AN.
In addition, the polarization of banking union
was higher in the Bundestag, where a government–
opposition divide existed especially in the case of the
SRF. There was also some polarization on EDIS, but the
importance of savings and cooperative banksmeant that
oppositionMPswere also partially critical of EDIS. French
MPs were generally highly supportive of banking union
and most of their criticism was that integration did not
go far enough. Differences between parties were com-
paratively minimal, and, in line with H3 and H4, the par-
liament was reactive and did not put much pressure
on government.
The support for the position of the German govern-
ment and the pressure to stick to it were both much
higher compared to France. This is the result of the
more proactive approach of the Bundestagwith farmore
tabled resolutions and early debates. On the one hand,
the government could lean on a cohesive majority, but
on the other, the opposition closely scrutinized the gov-
ernment’s performance and was quick to point out, for
example, that the European decision to allow the ESM
to recapitalize banks was a departure from the govern-
ment’s and parliament’s previous line. The numerous
(failed) tabled resolutions also hammered home certain
points such as the opposition to the use of taxpayermon-
ey (e.g., the ESM) for the recapitalization or rescuing
of banks, or the need to exclude the savings and coop-
erative banks from European banking supervision, the
SRM/SRF, and EDIS.
Finally, it is clear that sectoral interests had consider-
able influence in both parliaments: In Germany, the inter-
ests of cooperative and savings banks were defended by
both government and opposition parties. In addition, the
material interests of Germany as a creditor country wary
of financial transfers shaped its opposition to the mutu-
alization of risks across states. Similarly, French support
for a larger SRF and themutualization of risk can be inter-
preted as a concern with the potentially high costs to
the French taxpayer of resolving a large French nation-
al champion. The article thus agrees with the literature
on the importance of structural interests in the creation
of banking union. Ideas played a minor role, for example
with regard to the importance of central bank indepen-
dence in Germany. However, the debates do not reflect
the fact that the German public is in fact more open
towards the principle idea of European integration in this
policy area than the French public.
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1. Introduction: Puzzle
Howmuchof a shift has takenplace inGermany’s policies
on the structure, rules, and institutions of the Eurozone?
What kind of impact have German preferences had on
the 2020 negotiations over the EU budget and the com-
plementary Recovery and Resilience Facility (henceforth,
the Rescue Plan)? How should its collaboration with
France over these issues best be understood? And how
is Germany’s stance likely to evolve into the future?
Germany’s relaxation of its role as anchor of the sin-
gle currency and proponent of fiscal discipline was sig-
nificant in mid-2020, bringing it closer to France and
Southern European positions supporting common debt
and fiscal capacity. One notable result of this relaxation
was support for a joint initiative with France for tem-
porary intergovernmental financial transfers designed to
offset some of the costs of fighting the Covid-19 pan-
demic. The plan envisaged five hundred billion euros of
grants to be distributed across the EU, financed through
the issuance of common debt, a measure that previ-
ous German governments had refused to contemplate
on principle. This borrowing and redistribution would
come on top of another €250 billion raised by the
European Commission and lent to the member states,
as well as loans organized by the European Investment
Bank which were already earmarked for investment in
greener and more cohesive economic activity (European
Investment Bank, 2021). Finally, in this context, the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) also stood ready to
loan money in addition to the EU’s budget and borrow-
ing capacity. All told, the €750 billion increase in the EU’s
budget significantly increased EU capacity from just over
€1 trillion to over €1,8 trillion, not including funds avail-
able through the European Investment Bank.
This development is striking in light of Germany’s
unwillingness to contemplate either borrowing or trans-
fers, or even a contribution-based increase of the EU’s
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budget as recently as early 2020, and well into the first
few months of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the vol-
ume of grants was negotiated down to €390 billion in
July 2020 and transfers came into question, this opposi-
tion came from a small coalition led by the Netherlands
rather than Germany itself. While these developments
cannot be considered German support for a Hamiltonian
moment of European fiscal federalism, they cross the
Rubicon of fiscal transfers between states and com-
mon debt for the first time. This makes it a significant
change in Germany’s Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) policy.
Given Germany’s historical opposition to transfers
and common debt, I ask whether this constitutes a trans-
formation that will outlast the Covid-19 crisis, or a tem-
porary deviation similar to that of 2004–2005. Although
Germany is not the only country that matters in the tra-
jectory of the Eurozone, it is decisive in which directions
EMU can develop in response to challenges. EU agree-
ments on Covid-19 response, and their budgetary impli-
cations pose more than one puzzle. How was a shift in
Germany’s position possible? How do we account for
the timing, specifically the rapid shift in May 2020, given
the continuity of Germany’s stance on EMU rules before-
hand? And how much of a change is this likely to entail?
This article seeks to answer these questions by
focusing on the ideational positions of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic
Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parties, with
attention to selected leadership and public opinion
allies in particular, supplemented by public opinion
data. It focuses on the opportunities and constraints
in Germany for the Finance Minister to bring about
a shift in the country’s macroeconomic policy stance
on EMU, including the issue of EU financial transfers.
The implications for the durability of Germany’s rap-
prochement with France over the basics of EMU mem-
bership and its overall priorities after a longer period
of estrangement between the two countries will then
be considered. The article’s primary conclusion, which
it demonstrates below, is that Germany’s voters and
popular CDU/CSU parties will remain significant forces
for fiscal restraint in the future, both at the national
and European levels. This is seen in the parameters
and conditions attached to the Rescue Plan, and in dis-
course overwhat happenswhen the existing plan expires.
Depending on broader EU economic and political devel-
opments (whether the Eurozone comes under tremen-
dous strain once the Rescue Plan expires), Germany can
be expected to either block its extension (assuming lit-
tle stress) or attach further conditions to its lending pro-
grams (if stress resumes). This article contributes to the
literature on German preferences in EMU and its role
in EMU politics. It begins by assessing the state of the
literature regarding German preferences and negotia-
tion strategies in EMU, which largely matches the record
through March of 2018, and then moves on to assess
how much change has occurred since then and why.
2. Framework and Case Design
Within the literature on EMU development and EU
integration, large innovations naturally attract neofunc-
tional analyses in which form follows need (Niemann &
Ioannou, 2015), guided by EU institutions. It also attracts
intergovernmental analyses that emphasise disparities
in national positions and bargaining power coupled with
lowest common denominator voting systems to explain
the EU’s institutional output (Howarth & Quaglia, 2020).
The intergovernmental literature on EMU incorporates
not only distributional conflicts between haves and have-
nots, but also ideational divides that strengthen the dif-
ferences between them (Schäfer, 2016). In other words,
conflicts are not only about the transfer of resources, but
also whether such transfers are appropriate. This article
builds on the ideational analysis of EMU negotiations by
examining whether and to what degree German policy
ideas have changed as a result of the Covid-19 crisis.
This article hypothesises that national governments
able to reach stable international agreements are those
that hew closely to public preferences (Carrubba, 2001).
This prioritisation of domestic political preferences
forms the foundation of both liberal intergovernmental-
ist literature on institutional supply (Howarth & Quaglia,
2016, 2020) post-functionalist accounts of the impact
of identity, ideas, political saliency and constraining dis-
sensus of EU affairs (De Vries, 2007; Down & Wilson,
2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2009) and the kinds of out-
comes they entail, particularly weak de novo institu-
tions (Hodson & Puetter, 2019) or weak institutional
architectures and endogenous cycles of institutional
improvement (Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier, 2016; Kleine
& Pollack, 2018). Similarly, it shows up in analysis of
the impact of fiscal transfers on support for EU policy,
and for supranational agreements in general (Chalmers&
Dellmuth, 2015; Tallberg, Bäckstrand, & Scholte, 2018).
This leads to the expectation that heads of govern-
ment as political entrepreneurs will promote and pro-
tect positions that reflect political demand at home over
the medium to long term. In the case of German EMU
policy, this is reflected in strong promotion of institu-
tions that reduce risks at the national level, at the same
time that financial assistance mechanisms across coun-
tries remain underdeveloped (Donnelly, 2018a; Schoeller,
2020). At the same time, we look to determine howmuch
short-term policy entrepreneurship takes place in the
absence of strong domestic political demand, driven by
policy expertise and attempts to coordinate solutions that
manage the country’s interdependence with others on a
mutually voluntary basis. This domestic, national orienta-
tion can be falsified by looking at the actions of a German
Finance Minister who is broadly in agreement with a
classic neofunctional network of supranational (EU, IMF,
OECD) and transgovernmental institutions and actors.
To answer the questions posed above, this article
focuses on Germany’s domestic politics and its approach
to Eurozone budget negotiations in the period stretching
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from March 2018 until the fall of 2020. This start of
this time frame is chosen to coincide with the installa-
tion of a German Finance Minister from SPD with sym-
pathies for fiscal union between the Eurozone mem-
ber states, who simultaneously is embedded in a Grand
Coalition with conservative CDU/CSU. It is broken down
into three moments in which economic and political
conditions are markedly different: pre-Covid-19 crisis
(March 2018–March 2020), early Covid-19 crisis (March
2020–May 2020), and advanced Covid-19 crisis (May
2020–). Each period then analyses German positions
on common Eurozone responses to economic and polit-
ical need, through existing institutions and programs
(national structural adjustments buttressed where nec-
essary by ESM emergency loans), or through com-
mon debt and cross-border transfers. Contributions to
German policy are broken down into the positions of pol-
icy entrepreneurs (as elites), political parties, and voters,
taking into account domestic, transnational and intergov-
ernmental inputs.
The study starts by looking at the policy preferences
and initiatives of the SPD Finance Minister of Germany
and his second in command to advocate common debt
and transfers within the Eurozone, together with the
French and EU counterparts who supported such a shift.
It then looks at the policy preferences and actions of the
(CDU/CSU) party fraction which led the government and
opposed any movement in this direction until mid-2020.
Finally it covers the degree of public support for change
or continuity over common debt and transfers. Through
this, we can map German policy change, and ascertain
the ability of the various parties to effect lasting change
in EMU policy, and therefore institutions.
The literature on EMU development, German posi-
tions regarding fiscal transfers and the negotiations
dynamics between France and Germany show consis-
tencies over a longer period of time that underline
Germany’s deeply-seated domestic preferences for con-
servative monetary and fiscal policy (Hodson, 2017;
Howarth & Verdun, 2020). This pattern remains con-
sistent despite two concessions to French preferences
for more interventionist and activist fiscal policy that
can be attributed to the cognitive frameworks of indi-
vidual German Chancellors. Helmut Kohl is known to
have ensured that EMU proceeded despite concerns
about the enforcement of fiscal membership rules due
to Germany’s historical duty to support European inte-
gration. Later, Gerhard Schröder worked together with
France to introduce a relaxation of those rules in 2005.
In addition to these two cases, Angela Merkel is known
to have blocked attempts to push Greece out of the
Eurozone in 2012 and 2015 to preserve the unity of
the currency bloc. However, the original design of EMU,
including the Stability and Growth Pact, and analyses of
EMU negotiations since then rightly underline that polit-
ical parties, public opinion and interest groups remain
consistent in their rejection of common debt and cross-
border transfers.
The frame for analysing Germany’s domestic politi-
cal attitudes toward EU budgets, transfers, emergency
aid and repayment conditions starts with the ques-
tion of whether Germany’s parties and public respond
favourably to them or not. If we witness a broad shift in
thinking, then we should expect the new German posi-
tion to remain stable over time, and for Germany to sup-
port similar Franco-German compromises into the future.
If not, then we should expect the agreements to be of a
one-off nature that applies only to a singular crisis situa-
tion, to expire after the crisis has passed, and for prefer-
ences from the Schäuble era to reassert themselves after
the expiration of the current European Rescue Plan.
This article’s working hypothesis is that a meaningful
shift in Germaneconomic principles has taken place from
ordoliberalism to neokeynesianism at the level of the
German FinanceMinister, his senior staff and his political
party, and made visible by collaboration with French and
European officials in the introduction of the 2020 Rescue
Plan. At the same time, this shift is not fully shared by
CDU/CSU politicians, or in domestic society. They remain
committed to fiscal conservatism and expect Europe to
return to the pre-Covid-19 economic rules after the cri-
sis has abated. The weight of German political and pub-
lic opinion is felt further in the absence of any increased
public support for the SPD as a result of this policy shift.
Overall, this speaks more to a temporary life span of the
2020 agreements, based on the expected tendency of
major political parties to reflect societal demands unless
a more fundamental disruption of the economy leads
public opinion to review its ideational commitments.
This article proceeds as follows. It first reviews briefly
the pre-2018 configuration of people, doctrines and insti-
tutions for the single currency to lay out the political and
institutional landscape inherited by the actors around
the table. It then moves to examine plans and negotia-
tions in the period between March of 2018 and March
of 2020, covering the rise of mutually supportive French
and German finance ministers dealing with the prospect
of a Eurozone budget. This is the potential neofunc-
tional moment which did not come to fruition. In the
penultimate section the article examines the period from
April 2020 onward to underline the impact of Covid-19-
induced changes on German, French, Dutch and Italian
politics, and therefore the prospects for a Eurozone
budget. We then conclude with observations about the
dynamics involved that explain these developments.
3. Pre-2018: People, Interests, Doctrines and
Institutions
Germany’s politicians, voters and key opinion mak-
ers have been fairly consistent about their ordolib-
eral macroeconomic policy preferences since the plan-
ning days of the single currency. The exception was
2004–2005, when the Schröder government moved
with the Chirac administration in France, and then the
entire ECOFIN Council, to set aside the Excessive Deficit
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Procedure and introducemedium-term budgetary objec-
tives. Even then, however, the hold of ordoliberal princi-
ples is visible in Germany’s SPD government instituting
harsh structural adjustment reforms (Hartz IV) that coun-
teracted any notion of broader political ‘wetness’ on
social and fiscal policy. After the Schröder government
left office in November 2005, three coalition govern-
ments followed under Angela Merkel that restored and
pushed for the export of orthodox/ordoliberal macroe-
conomic principles across Eurozone member states,
and EU budget oversight mechanisms to strengthen
those demands (Otero-Iglesias, 2017). This owed a great
deal to the shift of SPD under Finance Minister Peer
Steinbrück (2005–2009) away from Keynesian demand
stimulus and toward bipartisan consensus on budget
retrenchment. This position left the German Green
Party as the only champion of a more social macroe-
conomic policy, and intergovernmental transfers within
Europe. With agreement between the CDU/CSU and
SPD that Germany should reject fiscal union for EMU,
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (2009–2017) could
uphold this position throughout the next grand coali-
tion (2009–2013), and the conservative-liberal coalition
(2013–2018) that followed it. At the European and
national levels across Europe, budgets were to be bal-
anced (Schuldenbremse), and economies (re)structured
to ensure price levels remain stable or move downward
(focus on external competitiveness rather than domes-
tic demand). Similarly, the EU budget was to remain lim-
ited. The strength of this imperative was tested after
the Brexit referendum of 2016 led some other member
states and EU institutions to call for a larger EU budget
(“Schaeuble eyes,” 2016). Throughout this long period of
stewardship, Schäuble’s steadfast position on European
questions was rewarded with unwavering support from
party and voters alike (“Politico poll of polls,” 2020).
Bremer (2020) also notes that the SPD unreservedly
adopted the same positions on fiscal conservatism from
that period on.
Schäuble’s hawkish positions on EU budget size and
on fiscal transfers set the tone for conditional cooper-
ation with French politicians during his tenure. France
had no meaningful impact on this stance. Rather, French
governments varied in their willingness to work together
with their German counterparts on EMU. France’s politi-
cians, voters and key opinion makers have consistently
supported a more interventionist macroeconomic pol-
icy strategy, although each administration chose its own
tactics on how to engage with Germany. The conserva-
tive Sarkozy government (2007–2012) worked together
with Germany to establishmacroeconomic policy surveil-
lance and downplayed the fiscal union demands of its
predecessors, while the socialist Hollande government
(2012–2017) lobbied hard for fiscal union and relaxation
of surveillance in the European Semester without much
effect (Schild, 2013). Even a joint statement between
French FinanceMinister EmmanuelMacron and German
Minister for Economics and Energy Sigmar Gabriel sup-
porting transfers at the zenith of the 2015 conflict
between Germany and Greece within the Eurozone
(Gabriel & Macron, 2015) fell on barren ground as
Schäuble pressed the imperative of national budgetary
and structural adjustments, and the destructive moral
hazard effect of transfers on necessary reform efforts
(Schild, 2020). The liberal Macron government (May
2017–) found its own mix of supporting ordoliberal
macroeconomic surveillance and structural reforms with
more Keynesian proposals to establish a Eurozone bud-
get. This proposal hoped to secure a transactional quid
pro quo between French demands for greater collective
budgeting, and German demands for greater structural
reforms at the national level.
Howarth and Schild (2017) contend the Banking
Union era from 2012 allowed France to advance propos-
als for embedded liberalism, in which market forces are
softened with state intervention mechanisms. The suc-
cesses they point to were the establishment of the
European Financial Stability Facility as a crisis manage-
ment tool (already from 2010) and the establishment,
albeit formally, of amore symmetricmacroeconomic pol-
icy recommendation framework in the Macroeconomic
Imbalances Procedure in 2011. Certainly there is German
and French collaboration on these institutional innova-
tions under France’s Sarkozy government, but if we were
to try to measure embedded liberalism as the presence
of macroeconomic shock absorbers, or of countercycli-
cal macroeconomic intervention (fiscal stimulus during
downturns, whether broad or targeted to promote sun-
rise industries, inclusivity and greening of the economy),
we would not find evidence to support any meaning-
ful influence of French ideas about macroeconomic pol-
icy along the lines of an EU budget or a new rule struc-
ture that gives national governmentsmore fiscal room to
manoeuvre. The European Financial Stability Facility, and
the ESM that followed it, provide loans attached to con-
ditions stipulating budget retrenchment and structural
adjustments. They act as an emergency intervention to
keep the single currency from falling apart, but have
impacts that are incompatible with the mainstreaming
of social protection that we understand under embed-
ded liberalism.
Rather, the ESM is better understood as an institu-
tion that balances Chancellor Merkel’s concern to hold
the Eurozone together and Schäuble’s concern for fiscal
responsibility—a balance that is visible in the Eurozone’s
relationship to Greece in 2015. Pressure on national
governments was increased, but not allowed to eject a
member state. Similarly, theMacroeconomic Imbalances
Procedure adopted in 2011, while opening the door to
hypothetical critique of large current account surpluses
in Germany and the Netherlands, or wildly inflated pri-
vate debt levels, remains asymmetrical in application,
focusing on country-specific recommendations for coun-
tries with public budget deficits and current account
deficits, along with attention paid to the enforcement of
such recommendations through the introduction of the
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 230–240 233
reverse qualified majority vote for the Excessive Deficit
Procedure. These institutional innovations are indeed
best understood as the product of selective Franco-
German cooperation during the Sarkozy administration
that focused on Eurozone system maintenance, rather
than on Franco-German compromises on the budgetary
and fiscal matters that France supported (Brunnermeier,
James, & Landau, 2018; Degner & Leuffen, 2020; Lehner
& Wasserfallen, 2019; Notermans & Piattoni, 2020).
Degner and Leuffen (2020) underline that this was not
dual leadership, but German. The limits were visible in
France’s failure to secure German support on a series
of support mechanisms, including a more robust finan-
cial intervention role for the European Financial Stability
Facility, and subsequently the ESM (Howarth & Schild,
2017, p. 185).
German imperviousness to French and other
European demands were also visible in the outright hos-
tility of Franco-German relations during the Hollande
administration, which advocated directly for fiscal union
and tried to gather together a coalition of countries to
support its demands, but to no avail. 2011–2013 was a
period in which Italy’s technocratic Monti government
and Spain’s conservative Rajoy government were adopt-
ing ordoliberal prescriptions for budget cuts, structural
reforms and toning down long-standing interest in fis-
cal union creation to secure renewed access to finan-
cial markets (Donnelly, 2018a). It was also a period of
polarisation between Germany and the governments of
Cyprus and Greece, in which the latter’s demands for
fiscal transfers poisoned the well for French and Italian
arguments then and thereafter (through mid-2018: see
the centre-left Italian Letta, Renzi and Gentiloni admin-
istrations, as well as the Conte administrations that
followed). This growing gap is mirrored by strong sup-
port for Germany’s stance by successive Dutch coalition
governments led by Liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte
from 2011. As in Germany, budget discipline and rejec-
tion of EU budget enlargement or fiscal union enjoyed
sustained and unquestioned cross-party support, with
the exception of the Dutch Greens. In sum, the situa-
tion Olaf Scholz inherited in March 2018 in no way sup-
ported the development of a Eurozone budget, even if
his reported preferences lay in that direction.
4. March 2018–March 2020: People, Interests,
Doctrines and Institutions
March 2018 is a relevant inflection point to contrast
with the time periods preceding and following because
it is the moment that brings a German Finance Minister
into office with sympathies for fiscal union of some
sort, and with links to counterparts in the French gov-
ernment with the potential to support and shape his
proposals. And yet, a new political desire to introduce
a larger Eurozone budget failed to translate into con-
crete achievements on this front, given the lack of
support from conservatives, and voters and his own
SPD, which remained divided and focused on internal
German politics at the expense of EU affairs. Olaf Scholz,
mayor of Hamburg and member of the party’s techno-
cratic/conservative wing, took up the position of Finance
Minister within Angela Merkel’s grand coalition govern-
ment between the SPD and CDU/CSU.
Scholz’s position within his own party, as well as
the electoral fate of the party, and internal party pol-
itics proved relevant for shaping what kind of propos-
als were worked on and brought forward during this
period. As outlined above, the SPD up until this point had
rejected the idea of a sizeable EU or EMU federal bud-
get, and had hewed to Germany’s mainstream conser-
vative voters in their rejection of such proposals rather
than adopting a profile distinct from that of the CDU/CSU
(Bremer, 2020). But this strategy had not resulted in
electoral success—the party remained persistently weak
in the polls—and over time, led to increasing divisions
within the party and voter migration to other parties as
well. Advocates of greater European cooperation moved
to the Green Party, which advocated a fiscal union of
some kind and grew in importance in the Bundestag,
but was relegated to the political opposition through
this entire period. Conservative opponents of economic
assistance to financially fragile Eurozone member states,
meanwhile, launched judicial challenges to the European
Central Bank assistance for Southern Europe (Saurugger
& Fontan, 2019).
This centrist position led to problems within Scholz’s
own party, and hence hampered any ambitions he may
have had to reshape domestic or European institutions.
This was not just a question of uncertainty, but rather
of internal division. In response to the Party’s contin-
ued electoral decline, the membership’s left wing began
demanding a stronger domestic and European policy
shift which the centrists found untenable, and even trou-
blesome for legal reasons, given the country’s constitu-
tional ban on deficit spending (Karremans, 2020). Until
August 2020, left and right cohorts within the party
collided over the question of whether the 2005 deci-
sion to adopt ordoliberal prescriptions for austerity and
structural adjustment in search of mainstream electoral
support was a good move (in the sense of being a nec-
essary evil to restore and maintain economic competi-
tiveness and stable state finances) or not. To this ques-
tion was added whether Germany should share financial
burdens with other countries in Europe by supporting
EU-level transfers and schemes. Younger party members
and activists supported a shift away from ordoliberal-
ism and the Schuldenbremse domestically, but remained
relatively silent on European economic policy (Grunden,
Janetzki, & Salandi, 2017).
This division was felt in December 2019 when the
extra-parliamentary party, which is responsible for over-
all policy and strategy, moved to the political left. At the
time, the SPD rejected Scholz as (non-parliamentary)
party leader, and refused to name him as the party’s
(parliamentary) candidate for Chancellor in the next
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election. The party selected instead a duo representing
the centre- and left-wing cohorts of the party: Norbert
Walter-Borjans, the centrist, was the former premier of
North-Rhine Westphalia, and Saskia Esken, the left-wing
leader, agitated for a break with the CDU, a shift to
a more pro-social stance, an alliance with the Green
Party, and possibly with anti-capitalist and anti-EU party
Die Linke (The Left Party; “SPD candidate,” 2019). This
strong pull from the party leadership and membership
for a sharp shift to the left raised important questions as
well regarding the SPD’s commitment to the EU overall,
including a larger Eurozone budget.While this shift to the
left might have given Scholz support for a common bud-
get in principle, the manner in which the SPD was tear-
ing itself apart over economic and European policy did
not result in either policy wins or electoral gains. Public
support for the SPD, which had been in steady decline for
years, did not recover as a result of this shift. CDU voters
remained loyal to their party, even as an evolving leader-
ship contest to succeed Chancellor Merkel faltered with
declining support for her designated successor, Annegret
Kramp-Karrenbauer. She led the party from 2018 but
resigned in February 2020.
At the same time as this conflict was playing out,
Franco-German interaction on the prospect of a fiscal
union for the entire EU or a Eurozone budget for those
member states progressed quietly and slowly at the trans-
governmental and intergovernmental levels. At the trans-
governmental level, Scholz’s right hand man, Jörg Kukies,
worked with his counterpart in the French Ministry of
Finance, Odile Renaud-Basso to devise plans for a work-
able improvement of the EU/Eurozone fiscal framework
(Florence School of Banking and Finance, 2020).
Not much is known from transgovernmental doc-
uments about how far the overlap between the two
sides went, but the intergovernmental level between
President Macron and Chancellor Merkel tells us a great
deal. The Meseberg Declaration of June 2018 was the
result of a bilateral discussion between the two lead-
ers, in which the topic of an EU budget was recog-
nised as a topic of negotiation, without explicitly com-
mitting to such an outcome. But the negotiations did
not favour France. This is demonstrated in the whittling
down of Macron’s Eurozone budget and fiscal union pro-
posals into the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence
and Competitiveness on the basis of German objections,
which reinforced the structural adjustment and fiscal
responsibility mantras of the existing European financial
stability architecture, and the central role of the ESM
in holding that system together in emergencies rather
than EU funds (Schoeller, 2020). Later, in mid-2020, infor-
mation from the two Finance Ministry representatives
(below) will demonstrate that the negotiation is one
of how to establish common measures that will sat-
isfy financial markets (Florence School of Banking and
Finance, 2020).
Outside of the central Franco-German relationship,
the increasingly loud demands for fiscal union from Italy
and the contrary demands for national responsibility
from the Netherlands seemed to cancel each other out.
This is visible as the Netherlands led a New Hanseatic
League of small, Northern, fiscally conservative states
afraid of Germany relaxing its insistence on EU frugal-
ity in its talks with France, and as the populist Conte
I government in Italy insisted on transfers, each hew-
ing to their own national publics (Hix, 2018; Matthijs &
Merler, 2019).
Discussions at the 17–21 February 2020 Council
meeting, before the pandemic spread across Europe,
proved inconclusive. French and German negotiations
had progressed under the radar, but their own domes-
tic and international environments remained unchanged.
Within the CDU, which had just lost an interim leader
committed to the EU’s status quo, none of the con-
tenders to succeed Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer yet
envisaged moving toward a Eurozone budget.
5. April 2020 and the Aftermath
The Covid-19 lockdown drove Germany’s government to
introduce successive rounds of targeted domestic eco-
nomic stimulus funded by borrowingwith bipartisan sup-
port (Kluth, 2020), and provided an opportunity for the
Finance Ministry to discuss a common position on EU
budgetary instruments with France through May, and
then take those plans to the European level. Temporarily
breaking the sanctity of the Schuldenbremse domesti-
callymade these other initiatives possible, but the conse-
quences for Europe remained contested within German
parties, particularly within the SPD and the CDU/CSU.
In promoting EU stimulus, the government enjoyed
tenuous but sufficient support. The SPD’sWalter-Borjans
supported EU assistance arrangements to be made
swiftly and practically, while dealing with more funda-
mental problems later. This meant starting with the ESM
as an existing instrument of solidarity among equals, but
without ‘humiliating’ conditions that imposed hardship
typical of ESM loans in the past (Carbajosa, 2020). The
Greens went further, arguing that the ESM’s tainted his-
tory demanded EU initiative based on grants instead (Hill,
2020). The SPD’s Esken chimed in to support the Green
proposal (Esken, 2020; Fritz, 2020). In other words, the
SPD remained divided on the issue of support for grants
to other member states, and a larger EU budget to do
that. Bremer (2020) describes this as the party lacking a
policy paradigm to bring to voters and apply to policy.
Fromwithin the CDUmeanwhile, Armin Laschet, gov-
ernor of the country’s most populous state of North-
Rhine Westphalia and then candidate to replace Merkel
in the party’s upcoming leadership elections, announced
in April the necessity of a larger EU budget financed by
contributions (rather than borrowing), akin to aMarshall
Plan to combat the crisis, coupled with measures to
repay once the crisis was over (“Laschet verlangt,” 2020).
Although Laschet would only be confirmed as Chancellor
candidate in January 2021, this statement is meaningful
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for the resonance it gained with party members and
the broader electorate, which found the position appeal-
ing. Ironically, it placed the CDU in a more pro-Europe,
pro-EU-budget and interventionist position than the SPD
could definitively claim at that moment.
The CDU/CSU finally showed full support for grants
and borrowing in mid-May, after Chancellor Merkel
and President Macron proposed a €500 billion pro-
gram of grants to be borrowed by the EU during the
2020–2027 budget and repaid collectively by the EU in
the 2027–2034 budget. Insisting that Germany only pros-
pers when Europe prospers, Merkel won support from
CDU/CSU parliamentarians at home and in the European
Parliament, and from Wolfgang Schäuble as well to set
aside rejection of deficit spending, and grants at the EU
level (Hill, 2020). Only Friedrich Merz, who unsuccess-
fully competed to succeedMerkel as CDUChancellor can-
didate with support from the right, neoliberal wing of
the party, railed against transfers along with the oppo-
sition liberals (Free Democratic Party) and the xenopho-
bic, anti-EU right-wing party Alternative for Germany
(Rinke, 2020).
Once the announcement had beenmade, Kukies and
Renaud-Basso outlined the details of their project in
an online event on 22 June 2020 with the European
University Institute’s Florence School of Banking and
Finance (2020). They outlined their common strat-
egy of targeted economic stimulus aimed at improv-
ing future economic performance. Collective European
investments would be subject to these conditions, both
through EU grants and loans backed by collective debt
and ESM loans, with the former used more frequently
for the first time. This reflected their shared domes-
tic imperatives to ensure money supported a greener,
more inclusive and more productive economy in the pro-
cess. While Renaud-Basso underlined strategic invest-
ment, Kukies stressed that the plan had been designed
in such a way as to underline the credibility of spend-
ing strategies to financial markets (Florence School of
Banking and Finance, 2020). This meant that in tune
with previous critiques of crisis-driven public spending in
Greece and elsewhere, that a significant portion of the
money would be spent on transforming the economy to
meet future needs and generate future income, rather
than spending it on income support without any further
plans for economic development. The concrete implica-
tions of this can be seen in Commission and Council
agreement that alongside investments in health care sys-
tems which required upgrading in light of the shortcom-
ings revealed during the pandemic, that money would
also be directed toward future growth in digital trans-
formations and environmentally-friendly retrofitting of
economy, society and public administration.
Kukies acknowledged that the plan ducked the ques-
tion of the Hamiltonian moment of European fiscal
capacity, noting that their plan shelved that question to
a later date (Florence School of Banking and Finance,
2020). Instead, the focus would remain on the present,
and designing the Rescue Plan to promote a more highly
developed, productive, and resilient Europe in the near
future. The overall construction was designed to ensure
the EU could help badly hit economies, promote future
recovery, assuage Italian rejection of loans with condi-
tions attached, and push off Dutch (and more critical
German domestic) concerns about an EU federal bud-
get (below).
At the European level, the Franco-German announce-
ment preceded Commission proposals, butwas intended
to be incorporated into them in combination with the
Multiannual Financial Framework. In Council, the Frugal
Four (the Netherlands and Austria, with support from
Denmark and Sweden) supported the continued use of
the ESM for emergencies and opposed grants and col-
lective borrowing. They squared off against Germany,
France and the other member states until the last hours
of the 17–18 July summit, which they forced to extend
to 21 July (Rose & Nienaber, 2020). During this time,
the Four rejected grants outright until Sweden dropped
its opposition on 20 July, followed by Denmark and
Austria, leaving the Netherlands isolated. It achieved
fewer grants andmore loanswith (undefined) conditions,
and underlined the one-time nature of the measure.
In the Netherlands’ domestic justification of its eventual
support for economic assistance, these elements of pro-
ductivity enhancement and conditionality played signif-
icant parts of the government’s reasoning that every-
thing had been done to avert wasting money, laying the
groundwork for a future crisis and preventmaking future
transfers permanent. The plan would be a one-off mea-
sure (Tweede Kamer, 2020).
While the German and French proposals had not
been fully realised, the European agreement provided
a precedent for a shift on domestic and European bud-
getary policy on which future German politicians could
build, both on policy and on the basis of parliamentary
support. Here the statements of various CDU/CSU politi-
cians and opinion leaders shed light on where German
policy is likely to stand, given the party’s consistently
strong standing in voter opinion surveys, ahead of the
Green Party and the SPD in third place (Infratest Dimap,
2021). The party is also diverse in its views, but the
favoured policies remain clearly outlined.
The most positive support for the Rescue Plan came
from the former finance minister. Wolfgang Schäuble
took the position that the Plan was a good step to keep
the Eurozone together, and that a temporary relaxation
of the budget ruleswas appropriate, given the high levels
of debt required to stave off disaster. He also supported
some reform of the rules before reinstating them. This
put him in line with the European Commission, which
announced the use of the escape clause in the Excessive
Deficit Procedure. He did not go as far as to support
the European Fiscal Board’s call for a thorough discus-
sion and overhaul of the pact, particularly their strong
critique of the 60%ofGDP ceiling on public debt (Fleming
& Khan, 2020). Focusing on the effects of the fund,
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 230–240 236
Schäuble maintained that a common strategy would be
crucial to whether the Fund works: How governments
spendwould be bound to determine success or failure of
stimulus. The EU should discuss common strategies for
funnelling investment into future productivity through
digitalisation, artificial intelligence, greening the econ-
omy and the like (Chazan, 2021a).
This was as far as the rest of the Party was pre-
pared to go in rethinking economic policy and law.
Top Merkel aide Helge Braun proposed scrapping the
country’s debt brake (Schuldenbremse) or shifting from
annual to multi-year exemptions in January 2021 (Braun,
2021). He reaped strong opposition within the CDU,
starting with the CDU’s General Secretary, Paul Ziemiak
and the party’s new Chancellor candidate Armin Laschet.
Zemiak demanded the debt brake be reinstalled by
2022 rather than later as Braun had suggested (Chazan,
2021b). Outside the party proper, Lars Feld, conserva-
tive economist and member of the country’s Council
of Economic Experts, attacked a constitutional amend-
ment required to repeal or change the Schuldenbremse
as a slippery slope to hollowing out the deficit brake.
Special exemptions would multiply and be hard to con-
trol (Seibel, 2021). Markus Söder, leader of the CDU’s
Bavarian sister party CSU, also rejected touching the law
(Finke, 2021). This animosity to changing economic pol-
icy principles extended equally to the EU’s plan. CSU
MEP Markus Feder railed against the inclusion of grants
entirely, expecting Italy to disregard conditions on loans
(Finke, 2021).
Meanwhile, the CDU’s candidate for Chancellor in
the 2021 elections (Armin Laschet) demonstrated sup-
port for targeted, temporary assistance but also a need
to return to pre-Covid-19 economic governance norms.
Laschet himself hadmade a point domestically that state
support for hospitals could only be used for corona-
related deficits, and had to be repaid as soon as the
pandemic was over. He also insisted on future budget
cuts and minimizing transfers out of Germany to protect
future generations from the burden of debt (“Laschet
fordert,” 2020). The fact that Laschet was responding
to deficit hawks in the state SPD party underlines the
conservative position of the centre in Germany’s most
populous state (“Laschet: Schulden für Rettungsschirm,”
2020). Given these policy positions, plus the fact that
the SPD show no sign of taking votes from either the
CDU or Greens (Infratest Dimap, 2021), there is reason
to believe these positions will dominate into the future.
Even advice from the European Central Bank to amend
the debt brake and the thinking behind it, most recently
from Isabel Schnabel, has fallen on deaf ears (Arnold,
2021; Donnelly, 2018b).
European policy, both within the EU and the
Eurogroup appear to follow this German concern with
repayment and return to ‘normal’ as well, also with
regard to timing. In early 2021, Scholz declared that
the EU should not rush to a decision while there was
still so much Covid-19-related uncertainty. Meanwhile,
Eurogroup President Donohoe simultaneously called for
a faster rollout of national plans to spend money, and
also to discuss the re-introduction of budget rules, and
the European Commission would consider a finite date
for returning to the Excessive Deficit Procedure, but not
until 2022 (Fleming, 2020, 2021). This hewed closer to
Germany’s position rather than that of France, which
argued that an exit date would damage the recovery.
Finance Minister Le Maire underlined that the Recovery
Fund was already proving too slow and complicated to
use to its full potential due to the requirement that
national governments draft plans on how to use the
funds and receive Commission approval before disburse-
ment (Mallet & Abboud, 2021).
6. Conclusions
This article demonstrates the politics of introducing EU
budgetary instruments and their alternatives to German
voters and party members in three time periods: dur-
ing the tenure of Wolfgang Schäuble, during that of
Olaf Scholz before the Covid-19 lockdown, and that of
Scholz in the context of the economic disruptions of
2020. Covid-19, combined with Merkel’s leadership, has
made it possible for the Germany and France to pro-
pose the Rescue Plan together by changing German polit-
ical discourse from scepticism to acceptance of a larger
EU budget, at least through 2024. Agreement on joint
borrowing to finance this is more tenuous however, as
the inclinations of the CDU/CSU’s red lines on the EU
budget demonstrate, and support for that party con-
firm. The freshly anointed CDU Chancellor candidate
campaigned in 2021 on a program that envisaged a larger
EU budget in the future (presumably from 2027, once
the current Multiannual Framework runs out), but with
greater restrictions on borrowing, and greater insistence
on repayment of loans once the Fund has expired in 2024.
This would mean a reversion to the prior fiscal oversight
architecture, coupled with ESM-centred loan facilities
and oversight mechanisms for emergencies that EMU
inherited before the crisis started. Changes are made in
an incremental fashion (Jones et al., 2016).
While the positions of France andGermany appeared
deadlocked even in the early days of the Great Lockdown
imposed by Covid-19, by June of 2020, the two coun-
tries had united on a temporary, but financially signifi-
cant fund for the EU as a whole that some would like to
see evolve into a more permanent set of fiscal transfers
within the EU. However, there are clear signs that future
German governments seek to return to the pre-Covid-19
architecture that reinforces norms of national fiscal
responsibility and budget retrenchment, with the ESMas
the lender of last resort (Rehm, 2021; Zagermann, 2021)
rather than the EU, given the Commission’s reluctance to
enforce fiscal policy rules (Sacher, 2021). While an exten-
sion or expansion of the Rescue Plan and the principle
of transfers cannot be ruled out, much as the European
Financial Stability Facility became the ESM to combat
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long-term financial market speculation against the bor-
rowing capacity of individualmember states, negotiation
will not be easy, and the prospects for a Hamiltonian
moment based on mutual debt and transfers should be
measured with caution.
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1. Introduction
On5May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court
(FCC) presented a ruling (Weiss and others, 2020) that
put into question the legality of the Bundesbank’s par‐
ticipation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). The ruling created
an intense backlash at the EU‐level for its potential eco‐
nomic, legal and political implications. In the midst of
an unprecedented crisis created by the Covid‐19 pan‐
demic, the FCC’s ruling threatened to undermine, if
not eliminate altogether, the most important macroe‐
conomic response to the crisis implemented by the
ECB at the EU‐level—the Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Programme (PEPP). The FCC’s ruling is the latest episode
of a long‐term jurisdictional struggle between the
German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice
(CJEU) over the operation of the ECB in particular, and
EU integration more generally (Davies, 2012; see also
Table 1).
Indeed, a group of German private plaintiffs has
challenged before the FCC all the ECB’s asset purchase
programmes launched since 2010 (Arnold & Chazan,
2020a; De Cabanes & Fontan, 2019). Yet, judging the
legality of ECB monetary policy falls primarily within
the CJEU’s jurisdiction. Hence, the FCC has passed on
the cases to the CJEU through the preliminary ruling
procedure but reserved the right to review the latter’s
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decisions. For example, when the European Court ruled
against the complaint introduced by Peter Gauweiler—
a former Bundestag member of the Bavarian Christian
Social Union party—against the Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) in 2016, the FCC judges recognized
the primacy of the CJEU jurisdiction but they also
expressed their dissatisfactionwith the content and form
of the CJEU ruling.
On 5May 2020, the FCC judges found that the CJEU’s
Weiss and Others (2018, 2020) ruling was ultra vires as
it failed to provide an adequate assessment of the pro‐
portionality of the ECB’s PSPP. The FCC required the ECB
to justify its programme to the German government and
parliament within three months. More specifically, the
FCC required the ECB to demonstrate that the economic
impact of its bond purchases was proportionate to the
objectives set out in the EU treaties—the Maastricht
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU). Following the FCC
ruling, if the German federal government and Bundestag
(the lower house of the German federal parliament) had
reached the conclusion that the ECB was exceeding its
prerogatives, then the Bundesbank would have been
obliged to withdraw from the PSPP and all German gov‐
ernment bonds purchased by the Bundesbank under the
PSPP would have had to be sold (Fazzini & Urbani, 2020).
The FCC ruling does not disentangle the responsibility of
the two institutions: “The Federal Government and the
Bundestag are required to take steps seeking to ensure
that the European Central Bank conducts a proportional‐
ity assessment” (Weiss and Others, 2020).
The ECB initially announced that it was subject exclu‐
sively to the jurisdiction of the CJEU, which had found
the PSPP legal (Mersch, 2020). Several Governing Council
members even argued that the ECB should not respond
to the FCC ruling as it would create a legal precedent that
could undermine the efficiency of its policies (Arnold,
2020). The CJEU and the European Commission also
underlined that the FCC ruling was not in line with the
constitutional order in the EU (Von der Leyen, 2020).
However, during the two next months, the ECB deployed
considerable efforts to prepare a detailed answer to the
FCC’s ruling. This answer demonstrates that the ECB was
cautious to avoid a potential political and economic crisis
linked with the ruling from German judges.
Against this background, the aim of this article is to
analyse the politics of this new relationship between the
ECB and the FCC, and between the ECB and national
level fire alarms more generally. We thus seek to answer
the following research question: How should we best
understand the relationship between the operationally
independent ECB and the FCC? Legal analysis provides
important insights as to the impact of this issue on the
EU constitutional order but limited guidance to explain
the ECB’s response to the FCC (“Preliminary References
to the Court of Justice,” 2015; “The German Federal
Constitutional Court’s PSPP Judgment,” 2020; “The OMT
Decision,” 2014). From a political science perspective,
the relationship between two independent institutions
operating at the national and supranational level is a
good vantage point to analyse power struggles and legit‐
imacy concerns within Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). In particular, this conflict begs the question
of who controls the ECB’s monetary policy, knowing
that the ECB has been granted an unprecedented level
of independence from other institutions in its polity
(Howarth & Loedel, 2005; Quaglia, 2008).
Applying elements of a principal‐agent analysis, we
answer this research question by arguing that the FCC
ruling was a national level fire alarm—an ex post con‐
trol on ECB monetary policy—which the ECB was unable
to ignore politically. More precisely, we argue that the
inability of police patrols and fire alarms to force the ECB
to justify its nonconventional monetary policy at the EU
level was conducive to the emergence of ex post con‐
trols at the national level. In other words, the perceived
ineffectiveness of the control mechanisms over the ECB’s
monetary policy at the EU level increased efforts to hold
the ECB to account at the national level.
Existing principal‐agent analyses on these questions
focus upon the EU‐level and underline the consider‐
able autonomy assigned to the bank by its member
state principals, the limited ex ante control mechanisms
(Elgie, 2002) and efforts to reinforce ex post control
mechanisms—notably by improving the oversight of
the ECB’s monetary policy by the European Parliament
(Jabko, 2003). The FCC ruling presents us with a new
understanding of the application of a principal‐agent
analysis to the operation of the ECB agent and its rela‐
tionship with its member state principals for two rea‐
sons. First, the controlmechanismsweremanaged at the
national level. Second, the control mechanisms included
private plaintiffs. Conversely, studies of the relationship
between national governments and parliaments and the
ECB focus upon the ‘politicisation’ of monetary policy
usually for domestic political ends (Dyson & Marcussen,
2009; Tesche, 2019). This national‐level politicisation has
not yet been examined in terms of the focus of the
principal‐agent analysis upon ex post controls on ECB
monetary policy. However, the recent ruling of the FCC
demonstrates the need to extend the principal‐agent
analysis to the national level. We also analyse how ex
post mechanisms play out in the case of the ECB’s other
(non‐monetary) policies—notably, banking supervision
and the ECB’s participation in the Troika—in order to
highlight the specificities of these mechanisms when
they apply to monetary policy.
The next section in this article examines the rele‐
vance of principal‐agent analysis to the operations of
the ECB and its relations with other EU institutions and
national‐level bodies. The third section examines the
weak ex post control mechanisms at the EU and national
levels, prior to focusing on the significance of legal chal‐
lenges as fire alarms brought by private plaintiffs at the
national level. The conclusion considers the likelihood of
ongoing legal challenges at the national level.
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2. Who Can Control the Independent ECB?
2.1. The Principal‐Agent Framework and the ECB
This study employs elements of the principal‐agent
framework to analyze the surveillance relationships
between, on the one hand, EU institutions, member
states bodies and individuals and, on the other hand,
the ECB. In applying elements of the principal‐agent
analysis, we recognize the potential validity of the argu‐
ment that, with regard to the ECB’s monetary pol‐
icy, it is more appropriate to understand the ECB as
a ‘trustee’ of national governments rather than as an
‘agent’ because monetary policy was delegated to over‐
come problems arising from time inconsistency (see
Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017; Majone, 2001). In partic‐
ular, the principal‐agent framework cannot determine
whether the ECB’s policies are in line with the principal’s
preferences because the ECB’s objectives were left delib‐
erately vague in the treaty (Elgie, 2002). If this vagueness
is interpreted as a commitment to ensure a high level of
ECB autonomy, the risk of agency shirking or slippage is
highly unlikely because the central bankers define their
objectives themselves. By contrast, if this vagueness is
interpreted as a mechanism to allow the principals’ pref‐
erences to evolve, agency shirking or slippage can occur,
but the time inconsistency problem remains.
Nonetheless, even as a trustee of governments,
the issue of adequate scrutiny of ECB monetary policy
remains and the concepts of ex post police patrols and
fire alarms are analytically useful (Pollack, 1997). In a
principal‐agent approach, principals delegate authority,
administrative responsibility and tasks to agents because
of their organisational capacities and technical compe‐
tence. Tensions exist because agents often have their
own agendas, organisational imperatives, and turf issues
that may conflict with those of their principals. Efforts by
agents to seek autonomy from hierarchical control con‐
tribute to agency loss or slack in the forms of shirking and
slippage. Shirking arises from the agent’s preference to
not fully implement the principals’ preferences. Slippage
arises when the agent develops distinct preferences
from those of the principal as set in the terms of delega‐
tion. Slippage can be agent‐induced or structure‐induced.
The latter occurs when the agent’s use of its discretion
derives neither from its own interests nor those of the
principal but as a consequence of the environment in
which the principal implements its tasks (Chang, 2020;
Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017). Agency slack therefore
rests on a continuum (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, & Tierney,
2006; Heldt, 2017). Agents benefit throughout these
relationships from the advantage of privileged informa‐
tion regarding their own preferences, capabilities, and
efforts at implementing delegated tasks. This asymmet‐
rical information limits principals from fully understand‐
ing and evaluating the activities of their agents (Kiewiet
& McCubbins, 1991; Miller, 2005).
Principals attempt to address this information asym‐
metry and control the risk of agency shirking and slip‐
page through ex post controls, known also as oversight
procedures. These ex post controls are conventionally
divided into ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ (Kiewiet &
McCubbins, 1991). ‘Police patrols’ consist of an active
surveillance of a sample of the agent’s behaviour by
the principal with the aim of detecting any of their
non‐compliance with the principal’s policy preferences.
These include public hearings, studies, field observa‐
tions and examinations of regular agent reports (Pollack,
1997). ‘Fire alarms’ are the principal’s indirect ex post
controls because in its monitoring of the agents’ activ‐
ities, the principal relies on the support of third parties.
‘Fire alarms’ are less costly but at the same time, they are
also less centralised and tend to bemore superficial than
‘police patrols.’ Classic principal‐agent analysis expresses
a clear preference for ‘fire alarm’ monitoring over police
patrols (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).
All of these dynamics are present in the EU andmore
specifically with regard to the operation of the ECB, an
agent that was granted considerable political and oper‐
ational independence from both member state govern‐
ment principals and other EU institutions (Howarth &
Loedel, 2005). Member state governments, operating
as a collective principal (Chang, 2020; Dehousse, 2008)
set the terms of delegation for the ECB agent in the
Maastricht Treaty. The ECB is characterized by a nar‐
row mandate, centred on the overarching objective of
price stability, and a very high level of independence:
It has the autonomy to define its policy objectives and
instruments. The onlymeaningful operational restriction
enshrined within the ECB mandate is the prohibition of
the monetary financing of government debt. This prohi‐
bition derived from the influence of the Bundesbank on
the ECB template (McNamara, 1998).
In the principal‐agent framework, the modification
of the mandate of the agent by the principals is the
strongest form of ex ante control. Indeed, if princi‐
pals notice agent slippage, they can modify the agent’s
objectives as well as its degree of autonomy. Yet, this
ex ante control is hardly applicable in the case of the ECB
because the modification of its mandate requires Treaty
change and, thus unanimous agreement among EUmem‐
ber states (Jabko, 2009). Member states can also exert
another form of ex ante control when they appoint the
ECB’s executive board. Yet, sincemember states have dis‐
tinct, and at times opposed, economic preferences, the
politics of ECB appointment follow an intergovernmen‐
tal logic where the nationality of the candidate matters
more than policy ideas (Fontan, 2016). Consequently, a
change in ECB personnel is more informed by the out‐
come of power struggles between member states than
by the logic of agency control. In sum, the diversity
of preferences within the collective principal strongly
undermines the ex ante controls over the ECB.
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2.2. Weak Police Patrols and Fire Alarms at the EU‐level
Three institutions form the police patrols in relation to
the ECB at the EU‐level. First, the European Parliament
monitors ECB activities. The legal basis allowing the
European Parliament’s surveillance of ECB activities is
very weak: The TFEU only requires the ECB to present
its Annual Report to the Parliament. The Parliament
expanded its monitoring function with the ECB’s active
cooperation from 1999 onwards with the use of a
number of mechanisms including reports, questions
addressed directly to the ECB in letter form, and ques‐
tions to the ECB Governing Council members who attend
meetings of the Parliament’s Economics and Finance
Committee. This voluntary cooperation benefits both
institutions: On the one hand, the ECB strengthens its
democratic responsiveness—or at least the appearance
of this responsiveness; on the other hand, the European
Parliament gains a position of privileged interlocutor
with the ECBdespite its historicalweakness onmacroeco‐
nomic issues (Jabko, 2001). Yet, the lack of coercive legal
tools weakens the oversight power of the Parliament.
In the rare direct confrontations between the ECB and
the Parliament, the latter’s position was systematically
dismissed by central bankers in the name of their inde‐
pendence. For example, the European Parliament (2014)
adopted a resolution criticizing the role of the ECB in the
EU Troika expert groups sent to countries benefiting from
EU loans. The ECB dismissed the Parliament’s criticism
and continued to participate in the Troika.
Second, the EU Court of Auditors performs audits on
some ECB activities. In 2018, the Court audited the ECB in
its role as banking supervisor, but only partially, since the
ECB would not make certain documents available during
the audit. The compromise found between the two insti‐
tutions was to sign a memorandum allowing the release
of bank‐specific data to the Court of Auditors while the
latter underlined that it was ‘not seeking to audit mone‐
tary policy’ (Court of Auditors, 2019).
Third, the CJEU has the power to investigate ECB
measures when third parties legally challenge it within
a period of two months (article 263 TFEU). From a
principal‐agent perspective, third parties are fire alarms.
At the EU‐level, they include the European Commission
and the European Parliament in that these institutions
are not part of themultiple principals and had, atmost, a
secondary role in determining the original ECB mandate.
Both institutions can launch legal proceedings against
the ECB. However, since the start of EMU in 1999, nei‐
ther the European Parliament nor the Commission have
ever legally challenged the choice or design of the ECB’s
monetary instruments. Neither have operated as a fire
alarm on ECB monetary policy. However, the European
Commission has brought cases against the ECB to the
CJEU on other matters including the delimitation of
competences between the Commission and the ECB
(Commission v. ECB, 2003).
Finally, the history of CJEU jurisprudence towards the
ECB shows a marked contrast between the legal cases
on monetary policy and other issues (De Cabanes &
Fontan, 2019). On the one hand, CJEU judges perform a
substantive analysis on cases that are not directly related
to monetary policy and sometimes rule against the ECB
opinion. On the other hand, when CJEU judges have
to evaluate the legality of monetary instruments, their
judicial review is procedural and they are careful not to
second‐guess the ECB opinion (Baroncelli, 2016).
2.3. Weak National Police Patrols
Turning to the national level, the Eurozone member
states rely on their national parliaments and courts to
monitor the ECB’s monetary policy. In addition to send‐
ing its annual reports to national parliaments, ECB mem‐
bers have appeared in front of national parliaments,
albeit only as a voluntary gesture of goodwill. An analy‐
sis of Mario Draghi’s visits to Eurozone national parlia‐
ments shows that these visits weremore akin to ceremo‐
nial strategies for the ECB to improve its accountability
rather than a true form of parliamentary control (Tesche,
2019). By contrast, national parliaments can forcefully
invite ECBmembers to appear before national parliamen‐
tary committees on banking supervision issues (Fromage
& Ibrido, 2018). However, Gandrud andHallerberg (2015)
argue that no EUmember state has achieved a significant
level of parliamentary scrutiny of banking supervision—
by either national bodies or the ECB—which owes in part
to the commercial sensitivity of the policy area.
In sum, while the process of collecting information
may produce disciplinary effects through the systematic
use of surveillance techniques, the compliance of agents
ultimately depends upon the application of meaning‐
ful sanctions. Yet, the structural features of macroeco‐
nomic governance in the Eurozone allowed the ECB to
benefit from an unprecedented degree of institutional
autonomy. The legal dispositions enshrined within the
European treaties provided no procedural mechanisms
to other EU institutions to exert meaningful control over
the ECB’s monetary policy. Moreover, the deep eco‐
nomic and ideological divisions among Eurozone govern‐
ments weakened the possibility of such controls. Hence,
police patrols at both the EU and national level on ECB
monetary policy and other activities have had limited
impact. Given the high level of ECB independence and
the timidity of police controls, the only form of potential
ex post sanction for agency slippage involved the CJEU.
However, over the first two decades of EMU, the ECB had
avoided CJEU legal sanction that required any significant
change in monetary policy. Against this background, pri‐
vate plaintiffs at the national level started to challenge
the CJEU by launching cases in the national legal sys‐
tem that, through the preliminary ruling procedure,were
pushed up to the EU‐level.
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3. The Extension of De Facto National Controls over
ECB Monetary Policy
3.1. Asset Purchase Programmes and Ordo‐Liberalism
The asset purchase programmes implemented by the
ECB potentially undermine two core elements of the
ECB’s mandate outlined in the Maastricht Treaty: the pri‐
mary focus on price stability and the prohibition of the
monetary financing of government debt. Given the rel‐
atively low inflation rate over most of the past decade,
the topic of price stability is less immediately relevant
for those concerned with ECB slippage—although there
have been several challenges to the ECB on this matter
and the ECB has insisted on the neutralization of its asset
purchases (see, for example, Högenauer & Howarth,
2016). Thus, agency loss, here slippage in terms of
asset purchase programmes, focuses on the extent to
which these programmes involve, de facto, the mone‐
tary financing of government debt. The ECB itself has
insisted that sovereign bond purchases are necessary to
ensure the adequate transmission of its monetary pol‐
icy throughout the Eurozone and not to fund govern‐
ments per se (ECB, 2015). In line with this argumenta‐
tion, the ECB Governing Council delimited the purchase
of sovereign debt fromdifferent national governments in
the Eurozone according to its capital key—that is, the per‐
centage of debt purchased from national governments
is determined by the percentage of capital that they
have contributed to the ECB. While, de facto, the ECB
is engaged in the purchase of sovereign debt, it must
demonstrate that these purchases are proportionate to
its policy objective—that is, that their benefits outweigh
their potential costs (Schnabel, 2020).
From a macroeconomic perspective, this evaluation
is rather straightforward. Because sovereign debt forms
the bedrock of modern financial markets, its stabiliza‐
tion is necessary to prevent the aggravation of financial
crises (Gabor & Ban, 2016). From this perspective, the
lines between monetary and fiscal policies are neces‐
sarily blurred. However, beliefs on monetary policy and
central banking arrangements vary. In Germany, these
beliefs are still heavily influenced by ordo‐liberalism, an
economic doctrine that advocates the strict separation
between fiscal andmonetary policies and a prioritisation
of price stability over other monetary policy objectives
as necessary components of a democratic legal order
(Young, 2014). Other creditor countries in the Eurozone,
such as the Netherlands and Finland, share these mon‐
etary preferences, although the salience of monetary
issues is lower than in Germany (Frieden &Walter, 2017;
Nedergaard, 2020).
In fact, since 2010, the strongest expressions of con‐
cern regarding ECB asset purchases came from German
politicians and officials at the national level (see also
Rehm, 2021). For example, Wolfgang Schäuble, the for‐
mer German Finance Minister, blamed ECB unconven‐
tional monetary policy for the rise of the far‐right
party, Alternative Für Deutschland (Wagstyl & Jones,
2016). A small number of national central bank lead‐
ers, notably the Bundesbank President and Governing
Council members have publicly opposed ECB asset pur‐
chases (Howarth, 2012). Members of a range of national
parliaments have also expressed concern and criticism—
notably in Germany and the Netherlands (“Dutch parlia‐
ment,” 2019). Högenauer (2019) shows how ECB mon‐
etary policy became politicized in the Bundestag since
the start of the sovereign debt crisis. While it is highly
unlikely that this criticism forced any real change to
ECB monetary policy—given ECB independence and the
diversity of views in Eurozone countries—it forced the
ECB to respond principally in terms of increasing out‐
reach and communication effort to explain its monetary
policy (Tesche, 2019). Draghi visited the Bundestag twice
during his term as president and a number of other
national parliaments once.
3.2. National Courts as Fire Alarms
The potentially most effective fire alarm to challenge
ECB monetary policy involves judicial and administra‐
tive reviews. Judicial review by the CJEU is allowed by
TFEU articles 263 and 277, while national courts can
also engage in judicial review but—through the prelim‐
inary ruling procedure (article 267 TFEU)—are expected
to push the cases up to the CJEU. There is also administra‐
tive review by the ECB’s Administrative Board of Review
and by national competent authorities on the ECB’s role
in banking supervision. However, with regard to mone‐
tary policy, this review has not been used.
To date, there have been numerous legal cases
brought by private plaintiffs against the ECB that national
courts have referred up to the CJEU. Most of these
cases have focused on the ECB’s role in banking supervi‐
sion (Berger, 2019). However, a number of these cases
focused on the ECB’s monetary policy, notably on the
Greek case (Accorinti and Others v. ECB, 2014). All the
legal cases brought against the ECB’s asset purchase pro‐
grammes were undertaken by German private plaintiffs,
who followed a logic of trial and error (for a full list
of cases brought against the ECB asset purchase pro‐
grammes adopted since 2008 see Table 1). The first
constitutional complaint brought by German plaintiffs
against ECB programmes was directly filed with the FCC,
which found them baseless (2BvR 987/10, 2BvR 1485/10,
2BvR 1099/10). The German plaintiffs filed their second
and third complaint directly with the CJEU (T‐532/11,
C‐102/12P, T‐492/12, C‐64/14P). The latter dismissed
their application and indicated to the plaintiffs that they
should first address their complaint to the national con‐
stitutional court, which would then refer the case to
the CJEU (T‐492/12, alinea 47). Following the CJEU’s indi‐
cation in its ruling, the German plaintiffs complained
directly to the FCC, which then referred to the CJEU for
all the subsequent cases.
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Table 1. Summary of the legal cases brought against ECB asset purchase programmes.
Case Plaintiff(s) Rulings Ruling summary
Securities Markets Hankel, Nölling, FCC Constitutional complaints dismissed
Programme/constitutional Schachtschneider, 2 BvR 987/10 because unfounded. The Securities Markets
complaint (2010) Spethmann, 2 BvR 1485/10 Programme respects Article 123.
Starbatty, Gauweiler 2 BvR 1099/10
Securities Markets Städter Tribunal of the EU Action dismissed as manifestly inadmissible
Programme/action for T‐532/11 as it was filed out of time.
annulment (2011)
Securities Markets CJEU Appeal dismissed as manifestly unfounded.
Programme/appeal (2012) C‐102/12 P
OMT/action for von Storch and Tribunal of the EU Action dismissed as inadmissible, as the
annulment (2012) 5,216 other plaintiffs T‐492/12 applicants were not directly concerned
(Zivile Koalition) by the contested acts.











FCC The FCC rules that the decision to create
complaint (2013) 2 BvR (2728/13— the OMT programme is in contradiction
2731/13) with TFEU (Art. 119, 123 and 127 TFEU
2 BvE 13/13 and Art. 17 to 24 ESCB Statute). Suspension
of proceedings, reference for a preliminary
ruling to the CJEU.
OMT/prejudicial CJEU Articles 119, 123 and 127 of the TFEU and
demand (2014) C‐62/14 Articles 17 to 24 of the Statute of the ESCB
should be interpreted as allowing the ESCB
to adopt the OMT programme.
OMT/2016 FCC The FCC follows the CJEU ruling but points
2 BvR (2728/13— out that the CJEU procedural analysis
2731/13) is problematic.
2 BvE 13/13
PSPP/constitutional Weiss, Lucke, FCC The FCC rules that the PSPP programme
complaint (2015 Starbatty, Gauweiler, 2 BvR 859/15 does not respect the TFEU (Art. 119, 123
and 2016) von Stein, Städter, 2 BvR 1651/15 and 127 TFEU and Art. 17 to 24 ESCB Statute).
Kerber and 1,700 2 BvR 2006/15 Suspension of proceedings, reference for a
more plaintiffs 2 BvR 980/16 preliminary ruling to the CJEU.
PSPP/Prejudicial CJEU The PSPP programme respects the TFEU.
question (2018) C‐493/17
PSPP (2020) FCC The FCC finds the CJEU ruling ultra vires and
2 BvR 859/15, asks to the German parliament to assess
2 BvR 980/16, whether the PSPP is proportional to the ECB
2 BvR 2006/15, objectives. If not, the parliament must order
2 BvR 1651/15 the Bundesbank to withdraw from the PSPP.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on De Cabanes and Fontan (2019).
In all these cases, the German plaintiffs complained
about the legality of asset purchases in the name of
ordo‐liberal principles (De Cabanes & Fontan, 2019).
According to the plaintiffs, purchases of sovereign debt
belonged to the realm of economic policy rather than
monetary policy and disrespected the ‘no bail out’ clause
of the TFEU (Articles 119 and 127). These concerns
related directly to the strict separation between fis‐
cal and monetary policy in the ordo‐liberal doctrine
and fears of moral hazard and the fiscal profligacy of
Southern Eurozonemember states, which had been kept
alive by German political and economic policymaking
elites since the creation of the Eurozone (Howarth &
Rommerskirchen, 2013). These arguments were reiter‐
ated by Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank President, in
his 2013 hearing before the FCC (Ewing, 2013), which
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incorporated them into its prejudicial question to the
CJEU. After the CJEU dismissed these arguments in its
final ruling, the FCC expressed its concerns about the lack
of both CJEU independent expertise on monetary issues
and counter power to the ECB at the EU‐level (Gauweiler
and Others, 2016). The FCC had laid down the gauntlet
on the ECB asset purchase programmes.
The recent Weiss and Others case against the PSPP
can be seen as a reaction by a group of German plain‐
tiffs to the CJEU ruling on the Gauweiler case and their
failure to rein in ECB sovereign debt bond purchases
(Van Der Sluis, 2019). This was a national level fire
alarm in reaction to the perceived inadequacies of both
EU‐level police patrol/fire alarms with regard to the ECB
agent. The FCC set the standard of evidence of propor‐
tionality very high requiring potentially a full study of
the PSPP and proof that its benefits outweighed possi‐
ble negative effects across any other sector or part of
the economy. This is in strong contrast to the jurispru‐
dence of the FCC toward the Bundesbank: The former
never ruled a legal case in relation to the monetary pol‐
icy implemented by the latter (Van Der Sluis, 2019).
The ECB refused to send proof to the FCC that
the PSPP complied with the principle of proportional‐
ity. Instead, ECB Governing Council members reiterated
through press interviews that the ECB was accountable
to the European Parliament and subject to the jurisdic‐
tion of the CJEU alone (see, for example, Lagarde, 2020).
Despite the ECB’s defiant response, there is evidence that
the ECB sought to avoid future conflict with the FCC. The
ECB took unusual steps to demonstrate that its mone‐
tary policy decisions and the unconventional instruments
they used were compliant with the principle of propor‐
tionality pursuant to Article 4 TFEU (Nicolaides, 2020).
First, central bankers referred repeatedly to the
proportionality of their asset purchase programmes
during the Governing Council meeting of 3–4 June
2020, the first to follow the FCC ruling (Nicolaides,
2020). The summary of this meeting differs signifi‐
cantly from the previous twenty‐one summaries of
Governing Council meetings, notably in terms of the use
of the words ‘outweigh/outweighed’ and ‘proportional‐
ity/proportionate/proportional’ (Nicolaides, 2020):
Not only does the account refer to the positives out‐
weighing the negatives of PEPP but…it also hedges
the position of the ECB in relation to critical issues
in the judgment of the FCC, such as the weight that
could be attached to the various effects, possible
unintended effects of monetary policy, the effective‐
ness and efficiency of monetary instruments and the
impact of low interest rates. (Nicolaides, 2020)
Second, the ECB responded to the FCC ruling by passing
previously unpublished documents to the Bundesbank,
which then passed them to the German finance minister,
Olaf Scholz, who in turn passed them to the president
of the Bundestag (Arnold & Chazan, 2020b). While these
documents were not to be made available to the wider
public, theywere to be examinedby theGermanMinistry
of Finance and the Bundestag’s Budgetary Committee
operating in camera. On 2 July 2020, the Bundestag offi‐
cially announced that it supported the ECB, having found
that the central bank’s PSPP was proportional to its price
stability objectives (Arnold & Chazan, 2020c).
The ECB’s additional release of information and the
modification of the ECB’s public justification of its asset
purchase programmes are consistent with its overall
reputation‐building strategy, through which the cen‐
tral bank has tackled public contestation by increasing
its communication on controversial issues (Moschella,
Pinto, &Martocchia Diodati, 2020). The ad hoc and infor‐
mal collaboration of the ECB with the Bundesbank and
German political institutions without any formal change
to the ECB’s accountability either through unilateral ECB
official clarification or treaty change canbe seen as a ‘pro‐
cedural’ type of accountability (Dawson, Maricut‐Akbik,
& Bobić, 2019), which weakens the logic of checks and
balanceswithin the Eurozone. In terms of principal‐agent
analysis, this can be labelled as ‘buffering’ (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1991; Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006). Buffering
involves the provision of information and reporting by
the agent in its attempt to satisfy the principals with‐
out revealing too much information (Hawkins & Jacoby,
2006). The label can also be attached to the ECB’s largely
symbolic engagement efforts with national parliaments
(Tesche, 2019). Indeed, the ECB failed to prove that
the benefits from its asset purchase programmes out‐
weighed any negative effects in any other sector of the
economy because it lacked a model that could aggre‐
gate the effects of these programmes in diverse sectors
and add them up in any meaningful measure. The ECB
was only able to demonstrate that the positive effects
exceeded negative effects for a number of specific sec‐
tors, including banking. While ECB buffering can be seen
as central to the successful resolution of the difficulties
created by the FCC ruling, we lack the space in this con‐
tribution to examine in full the role of the ECB agent in
this context.
In sum, the substance of the arguments mobilized
by German public actors and private plaintiffs and, sub‐
sequently, by the FCC, shows that they have acted as a
national fire alarm in the fear that the ECB was moving
too far away from its original monetary policy mandate,
based on the Bundesbank (McNamara, 1998). The FCC
argument about the lack of counter‐power to the ECB at
the EU‐level also shows that the increased role played
by fire alarms at the national level was linked explicitly
with the lack of substantive pressure over ECB monetary
policy at the EU‐level. While the judicialisation of mon‐
etary policy by German private plaintiffs forced the ECB
to divulge additional documents and provide additional
explanations on its asset purchase programmes, it did
not trigger adverse moves from either the German polit‐
ical authorities or the Bundesbank, which had vocifer‐
ously criticised the PSPP since its inception (Braun, 2016;
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Howarth, 2012). Explaining this paradox—specifically the
failure of German political and elite economic policy‐
makers to sound the fire alarm in 2020—is likely linked
to the severity of the Covid‐19‐induced macroeconomic
crisis in the Eurozone. The aim to avoid a full‐blown
constitutional crisis in Germany, in which German polit‐
ical authorities would order the politically and oper‐
ationally independent Bundesbank to withdraw from
the Eurosystem of central banks is another potential
explanation. Finally, the lack of consistency in the dis‐
course of German elites on ECBmonetary policy could be
explained by scapegoating tactics, whereby elites score
political points at the national level by criticizing ECB
policies with ordo‐liberal arguments but refrain from
assuming the consequences of a German withdrawal
from the Eurozone. However, without further empirical
research, it would be imprudent to attempt to disentan‐
gle these causal explanations: a full explanation of the
German politics on the ECB’s PSPP must be the subject
of another article.
4. Conclusion
We return to the research question posed in the intro‐
duction to this article: How should we best understand
the relationship between the operationally independent
ECB and the FCC? We answer this question by arguing
that the FCC functions as a fire alarm and in effect a fil‐
ter for private plaintiffs with the potential to sanction sig‐
nificantly the ECB through rulings on Bundesbank action.
We argue that the efforts of German private plaintiffs
and the FCC ruling present us with a new understand‐
ing of the application of a principal‐agent analysis to
the operation of the ECB agent and its relationship to
its member state principals because the control mecha‐
nisms were managed at the national level. Private plain‐
tiffs challenged the ECB for operating in a manner they
believed was contrary to its mandate and, specifically,
challenged the participation of the Bundesbank in the
ECB’s PSPP by filing a complaint before the FCC. The FCC
pulled the fire alarm by ruling in favour of the private
plaintiffs and explicitly requiring the Bundesbank to end
its participation in the ECB’s PSPP if the latter failed to jus‐
tify the wider macroeconomic effects of its nonconven‐
tional monetary instrument. Both the private plaintiffs
and the FCC sought to uphold what they in effect argued
and ruled was the correct understanding of the ECB’s
mandate as agreed by member state heads of govern‐
ment and state in the Maastricht Treaty and inspired in
large part by the German central bank and government
(Dyson & Featherstone, 1999). The FCC also intentionally
and explicitly sought to highlight the weakness of both
EU‐level police patrols and fire alarms in relation to the
ECB agent and specifically the weakness of the CJEU as
a mechanism of control. The indignant response of both
the CJEU and the European Commission with regard to
the German Constitutional Court’s ruling focused princi‐
pally upon its proclaimed illegality and the assertion of
the supremacy of EU law and courts on matters concern‐
ing ECB monetary policy. However, the response of the
ECB—in passing information to the German government
and parliament seeking to demonstrate the macroeco‐
nomic proportionality of the PSPP—to avoid a potential
constitutional, political and economic crisis shows that
the FCC ruling could not be easily ignored.
Stepping aside from the empirical analysis that has
driven this article and turning to more normative consid‐
erations, we note that the legal and institutional vacuum
in which the ECB has operated its nonconventional mon‐
etary policy since 2010 can be seen as highly problematic
for the balance of powers between the ECB and the other
institutions of the EU political system. EU‐level ex post
controls have been perceived as inadequate. At the same
time, we recognise that it is also politically problematic
for the FCC to fill the gap by pushing control over the
ECB agent to control over the Bundesbank element of
that agent. In addition to the legal issues that the FCC’s
ruling raises, a number of tricky political questions arise.
For example, to what extent did the response of the ECB
agent reflect the relative economic and political impor‐
tance of Germany in the Eurozone? Would such a legal
challenge in a smaller, less economically and politically
important Eurozone country force the ECB to respond in
the same way? The unclear answers to these questions
raise legitimacy concerns. In the end, the German pri‐
vate plaintiffs did not get their way and the ECB’s PSPP
was not terminated. However, the ECB’s forced response
to the FCC ruling combined with the politically timid
acceptance of this response by the German government
and parliament, sets a clear precedent. The national
(German) legal fire alarm highlighted the problematic
democratic vacuum in which the ECB operates. A future
court case is only a matter of time.
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1. Introduction
Eurozone debt and Covid‐19 economic crises can be con‐
sidered as ‘critical junctures’ (Braun, 2015, pp. 421–422;
Heinrich & Kutter, 2013, pp. 124–126; Ladi & Tsarouhas,
2020, pp. 1042, 1051–1052; Schmidt, 2020, pp. 1179,
1182), understood as a sequence of abnormal and
unexpected events, exogenous to the political system,
requiring reactions and answers that may result in
institutional change, impacting political institutions and
policies (Capoccia, 2015; Stark, 2018). Therefore, they
are also opportune moments for assessing the demo‐
cratic legitimacy of the EU.
Based on a comparative analysis of the EU responses
to both crises, this research assesses the importance of
the constitutional design to allow politically balanced
outcomes and prevent economically biased decisions.
The study departs from the hypothesis that the exist‐
ing institutional design leads to an oversized political
power of a few economically hegemonic states, tending
to achieve inexpedient outcomes and to reproduce struc‐
tural economic imbalances. The research is normative‐
oriented, relying on the importance of the constitutional
architecture of the EU in the context of economic crises
to grant democratic legitimisation.
The first part of the article presents the methodolog‐
ical approach that is used, the second provides a theo‐
retical review of the democratic deficit in the EU, while
the third part presents a short description of responses
to crises; finally, the fourth section delivers the empirical
analysis supporting the hypothesis and anticipating lines
for discussion and conclusions.
2. Methodology and Empirical Analysis
Process tracing (PT) methodology is used for empirical
qualitative analysis of the institutional reforms and pol‐
icy outcomes following the Eurozone and Covid‐19 crises.
PT is a causal inference methodology based on a diag‐
nosis of causal activities and/or events to build ratio‐
nal arguments for hypothesised explanations of a cer‐
tain phenomenon (Bennett, 2010, p. 208). An accurate
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qualitative analysis to observe causal mechanisms is
made (Beach & Pederson, 2016, p. 163; Collier, 2011,
pp. 823–824), through a detailed and sequencedmethod
for rational inference, grounded in tracing previous
events of a result to argue its causes and provide the‐
oretical hypotheses to the outcomes’ causality. It may
be a means to both testing and building theories, or to
merely explaining an outcome (Beach & Pederson, 2016,
p. 2). This research uses theory‐testing approach to PT
to find evidence that the already theorised democratic
deficit is the cause of the hypothesis posed, intending
to demonstrate that despite evidences of policy change
in Covid‐19 crisis, the same democratic perversion hap‐
pened in institutional mechanisms.
Theory‐testing‐driven PT takes theory from literature
to demonstrate that it is present in the form of causal
mechanisms—events/activities observed and subject to
inference—fostering a certain outcome. It is viable when
a grounded theory already exists from which a plausi‐
ble mechanism may be deduced and forward‐tested in a
case study (Beach & Pederson, 2016, pp. 12–15, 29, 164).
The further identified causal mechanisms are defined as
derivations of the democratic deficit underpinning the
rationale of this research. Therefore, X and Y must be
present in the PT inference, where X is hypothesised to
lead to Y (Bennett, 2010, p. 209). In this research, X is
defined as the democratic deficit and Y as the oversized
political power of the economically hegemonic states.
To prove the correlation, events/activities are described,
reasoned and conceptualised as manifestations of X,
that is, of the theory on which the analysis is based
(Collier, 2011, pp. 824, 825). Primary and secondary
sources are used, such as institutional EU documents,
political testimonies, news media, and scientific litera‐
ture, covering the 2009–2015 period, the peak of the
Eurozone debt crisis, and the period between February
and September 2020, related to the analysis during the
pandemic. The PT approach is rooted on a normative ori‐
entation, derived from the democratic deficit theorisa‐
tion of the EU political system, and specifically the EMU
institutional architecture.
3. On the Democratic Deficit of the EU and EMU
The EU and the EMU have long been diagnosed by schol‐
ars as suffering from democratic deficit and legitimacy.
Although these two terminologies may overlap when
assessing democracy in the EU, they have differences
when considering the criteria and scope of assessment of
a political system. While the democratic deficit is based
on the principle of a constitutional design correspond‐
ing to representative democracy for legitimising the exer‐
cise of power, legitimacy, although it may entail premises
of democratic procedures, aims at assessing the degree
and breadth of recognition by the people of the exer‐
cise of authority. For legitimacy to be achieved, people
should not only recognise that a government exercises
the power, but also that it has the right to have that
authority. Even though a democratic based constitution
is an important criterion for that recognition, other fac‐
tors are important, as the governmental outputs, the
habit to it, and historical and identity issues (Shively,
2011, pp. 185–188). So, a political system can be demo‐
cratic deficient but enjoy legitimacy by its people, and
the other way around. Whereas the democratic deficit
debate deals with the need for democracy to procedu‐
rally legitimise the EU’s authority, the legitimacy deficit
studies deal with the substantive approval of EU gover‐
nance (de Jongh & Theuns, 2017).
Such assumption helps to understand why in the first
decades of integration, outputs appeared to be sufficient
to legitimise the EU (Habermas, 2013, p. 2), while last‐
ing peace and economic growth sided by the welfare
state pleased the electorate (Sebastião, 2020, p. 139).
This permissive consensus (Inglehart, 1970) was propi‐
tious for questioning democracy as being inadequate to
conceptualise the EU, as it could be alternatively con‐
ceived as a regulatory state (Majone, 1996), where the
Pareto principle operated. This meets the conceptuali‐
sation of results as pertinent criteria to observe legiti‐
macy, as advocated by Scharpf (1999), backed by the
systemic approach to political systems: Despite the effec‐
tive outputs for citizens, the citizens’ participation in the
governing process, through parties and elections—the
inputs—were also important (de Jongh & Theuns, 2017,
p. 1286; Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2013, pp. 4–5). Outputs
stood out as legitimisers in literature (Caporaso& Tarrow,
2008; see alsoMenon andWeatherill, as cited in Schmidt,
2013, p. 11), but systemic‐based studies even devel‐
oped throughput as a third criteria (Schmidt, 2013, p. 7),
coincident with the institutional procedures of the EU,
that should ensure effectiveness, accountability, trans‐
parency, inclusion and openness to civil society (Schmidt,
2013, pp. 15–19).
Nevertheless, outputs have been controversial
as legitimisers, and the 2008 crisis reinforced this
notion, leading some authors to review those pre‐
sumptions (Scharpf, 2010). For Follesdal and Hix (2006,
pp. 543–545), the central question is how to define
effective outputs. This is a matter of politics and democ‐
racy, requiring competition and opposition, not only to
elect the best policy but even more important for choos‐
ing an alternative government when policy outcomes
have disappointed citizens. When outputs are not sat‐
isfactory, what is questioned is not the legitimacy, but
rather the effectiveness of a government. However, it
is indeed these moments that demonstrate a perma‐
nent dialectics between legitimacy and people’s expec‐
tations regarding the democratic procedures (de Jongh
& Theuns, 2017, pp. 1288–1292). Political competition
and majority‐based institutions are even more crucial
when outcomes have not lived up to citizens’ expec‐
tations and an alternative is needed. In fact, despite
the political empowerment of the European Parliament
(EP), it has not been proportional to the range of com‐
petences transferred from national parliaments to the
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EU. Intergovernmentalism weighs too heavily on the bal‐
ance of powers (Schmidt, 2007, p. 521), and this has
remained unchanged even with Spitzenkandidat (Moury,
2016, pp. 38–48), making the EU a kind of “imperfect
bicameralism” (Moreira, 2017, p. 55).
These claims depart from the premises of repre‐
sentative democracy, underpinning the EU democratic
deficit arguments, assumed as the theoretical rationale
of this research. Free and competitive elections are
the pillar of representative democracy, electing offi‐
cers, that are mediators of social conflicts, represent‐
ing the electorate, and holding legislative and executive
power. Most representative democracies are parliamen‐
tary systems, where government emerges from the party
leader, or coalition, winning a majority of votes in parlia‐
ment through the general election. Parliament and gov‐
ernment exert legislative and executive power respec‐
tively, with a close interdependent relation. Another
model of representative democracy is the presidential
one. A president is elected by universal suffrage, assum‐
ing both the executive and head of state roles, with
great independence from the parliament, that holds leg‐
islative power. There’s still semi‐presidential and semi‐
parliamentary models, which share characteristics of the
former two, withmore or less executive or control power
by the president vis‐à‐vis the government (Delwit, 2015,
pp. 146–155; Fernandes, 2010, pp. 148–158).
Based on representative democracy premises, this
research shares Hix and Hoyland’s (2011, p. 131) judg‐
ment, that a truly democratic EU would require elec‐
tions to be the provenience of the main political offices
(as the President of the Commission) and the control of
the political agenda. Political competition in EP elections
would provide voters with policy platforms or candidates
for office and allow alternative choices when a mandate
defrauded citizens’ expectations. The authors have five
main arguments for democratic deficit in the EU: (1) The
EU decisions are too dependent on executive actors, as
the governmental ones, (2) EP power remains too weak,
once its empowerment was not proportional to the loss
of national parliaments’ power, (3) there is an absence of
truly European elections, given the ‘domestic’ logic of EP
elections, (4) there remains a distance of the EU from its
citizens, considering the complex institutional design and
the secrecy features of some institutions and (5) EU poli‐
cies are not a translation of the majority of European cit‐
izens’ preferences (Hix & Hoyland, 2011, pp. 132–133).
These claims are flagrant in the EMU architectural
design, particularly within the economic governance.
Furthermore, when considering the dialects between
EMU norm and political economy, democracy is subject
to particular perversion.
3.1. EMU and Democracy Constraints in a Multilevel
Polity
Institutionalised in the Treaty of Maastricht, under the
German ordoliberal model (Habermas, 2013, p. 3; Lang,
2004), the EMU operationalises the monetarist ideol‐
ogy (Bellamy & Weale, 2015, p. 259) through two dif‐
ferent forms of governance: a ‘federal’ one, govern‐
ing monetary policy under the European Central Bank
(ECB) political independent authority, and a national
coordination for economic policy. This accommodated
a supranational monetary policy, but the denial of EU
co‐responsibility for Eurozone fiscal balances, designing
the EMU as a non‐optimum currency area. Whereas
monetary policy is supranational, under the ECB political
independence to maintain price stability (Chang, 2009,
p. 68), the economic policy is a national competence, but
subject to very strict coordination, preventive, surveil‐
lance, and punitive mechanisms by the EU, ensured by
a reinforced intergovernmentalism, through the open
method of coordination. The Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) is the central instrument of this economic gover‐
nance, setting limits for national public debts anddeficits,
as well as margins for inflation and interest rates, to
ensure prices stability, credit markets confidence, and
thus the soundness of the single currency, on the benefit
of all the Eurozonemembers (Chang, 2009, pp. 124–125;
Silva, 2017, pp. 69–73). So, while the EMU deprived
national governments of a traditional macroeconomic
instrument, as themonetary policy, important to face cri‐
sis and asymmetric shocks, the EU did not assume a cor‐
respondent competence with supranational instruments
to ensure it, leaving it under exclusive national responsi‐
bility. Furthermore, given the great economic structural
differences between the Member States, a single cur‐
rency and a macroeconomic policy on the type of one
size fits all, was likely to replicate national imbalances
and generate economic irrationalities—as the competi‐
tive and unfair national fiscal policies with dichotomous
effects across Member States (Lang, 2004, pp. 151–157;
Ruchet, 1998, pp. 168–177). As fiscal instruments rested
to be one of the few national automatic stabilizers, each
state would adopt the ones that its structural economic
position in EMU is in advantage for, thus engaging in
national fiscal competition.
Although this multi‐level governance is underpinned
by legal constitutional principles conferring normative
legitimacy to the EMU (Bellamy & Weale, 2015, p. 259),
when considering implications for the normal process
of democratic politics, the imposed restrictions to pub‐
lic finances limit ideological competition over political
economy, the reason Bellamy and Weale (2015, p. 259)
assume EMU represents a kind of neoliberal institutional‐
ization. This is what the German constitutionalist Dieter
Grimm (cited in Habermas, 2015, p. 547) identifies as
the “constitutional status” of some EU policies, which
turn them immune to the normal process of variation
in politics, one of the causes for the distance of the
EU from the citizens. Such a conditioned EMU tight‐
ens the ideological options between the traditional pro‐
liberal and pro‐Keynesian stances of the political econ‐
omy of European democracies, thus depoliticizing eco‐
nomic options (Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018, pp. 11–12).
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This is very clear when considering the clash of for‐
mal national and supranational norms in economic gov‐
ernance: If the national parliaments are the ultimate
sovereigns on budgetary policy, they are simultaneously
limited on political options by the EMU financial criteria.
The democratic legitimacy is also weakened by the fact
that the EP has neither formal competencies in coordi‐
nating and supervising SGPmechanisms nor in themone‐
tary policy. The ECB institutional independence from any
political EU organ, not only undermines accountability of
the monetary policy, as well as remits a highly influen‐
tial policy in national politics to a technocratised scope of
action (Snell, 2016). And the responses to the Euro crisis
have strengthened ECB role without modifying account‐
ability processes (Heidebrecht, 2021).
The Eurozone crisis unveiled those institutional dys‐
functions, making quite evident the structural inade‐
quacy of the EMU to address international economic
downturns, as well as the high systemic risk of the
unregulated European banking. Moreover, it was also
clear that its political economy consolidated two differ‐
ent and antagonist, but interdependent, models of eco‐
nomic development in the EU—exporting competitive
economies/creditor States versus weak and low competi‐
tive economies/debtor States (Parker & Tsarouhas, 2018,
pp. 5–6; Reis, 2016, pp. 46–48). While the former accu‐
mulated liquidity and needed to capitalise it, the lat‐
ter needed credit for public investment and to boost
the economy. Although antagonism could coexist in eco‐
nomic growth scenarios, it proved unsustainable with
the crisis (Sánchez‐Cuenca, 2017, p. 357).
4. Addressing the Eurozone and Covid‐19 Crises
Empirical analysis consists of twoparts: a summary of the
measures to tackle the crises and the other the argument
of the hypothesis. The EUhas addressed the Eurozone cri‐
sis with emergency financial measures and legal reforms
to correct the EMU governance structure. Backed by
loans from the IMF and the EU, the first consisted
of bailout programmes approved for Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, under conditions for cor‐
recting macroeconomic imbalances (Parker & Tsarouhas,
2018, p. 2). Required to be achieved in the short term, it
involved a deflationary policy without compensation for
securing levels of demand—except for the ECB purchase
programme (ECB, 2012), aggravating economic recession
and social exclusion to the extent that IMF later recog‐
nised the exaggeration of the deflationary policy (Elliot,
Inman, & Smith, 2013).
Concerning legal reforms, the six‐pack (2011) and
two‐pack (2013) programmes reinforced the financial cri‐
teria with stricter rules for national budgetary policy and
new governance procedures to operationalise strength‐
ened coordination and surveillance. The Fiscal Compact
(Gouveia, 2018, p. 123) completed this package by requir‐
ing a binding national law to make the strengthened
SGP provisions effective (art. no. 3(2), TSCG). To address
the problem of systemic risk in Eurozone banks, a bank‐
ing union was launched, still unfinished, ensuring single
supervisory and resolutionmechanisms (Pereira& Sousa,
2018, pp. 81–96).
Regarding the Covid‐19 crisis, the first measure was
the adoption of the general escape clause which pro‐
vided for full flexibility available in the SGP in severe
downturns (Council Regulation of 8 November 2011,
2011; European Commission, 2020b; European Council,
2020a; European Parliament Regulation of 16 November
2011, 2011). Additionally, financial funds were made
available: a first loan of €200 billion for businesses
through the European Investment Bank (2020), and a
second temporary loan‐based instrument of up to €240
billion by the Eurogroup, through the ESM (Eurogroup,
2020). In March, the ECB announced a €750 billion
Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (ECB, 2020a),
reinforced in June by €600 billion as a result of falling
inflation (ECB, 2020b).
The ground‐breaking EU response was the approval
by the European Council in July of the European
Commission’s “Next Generation EU” proposal, a €750
billion recovery plan (European Council, 2020b) divided
into grants and loans to be made operational through
various financial instruments (European Commission,
2020a), framed as an addition to the €1,074 trillion
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Although the
European Council’s approval was only possible after
a revision reducing the initial amount proposed for
grants from €500 to €350 billion (Boffey & Rankin, 2020;
Rankin, 2020), this may be an historical agreement to
boost integration, making it a step forward to creating
European public debt and fiscal competences (European
Commission, 2020a; European Council, 2020b).
5. Hypothesising: Political Oversizing of Economically
Hegemonic States
Departing from a PT theory‐testing approach, argumen‐
tation to the hypothesis is structured along a diagno‐
sis of causal inferences based on three derivations of
the democratic deficit: (1) junctural constraints, (2) insti‐
tutional constraints and (3) constitutional constraints
(Figure 1). The first one relates to the influence of
critical economic junctures on the increase of political
over‐power of the richest States, mainly through the
financial markets pressure that activate economic path‐
dependency in the EU; the second one relates to the
secrecy of bargaining and discussions, strengthening the
political power of stronger economies and depoliticisa‐
tion. Finally, the third one builds on the status of a de‐
European Commission.
5.1. Junctural Constraints
This causal event acts as a political power booster of
the most powerful economic states in economic crisis,
towards the urgency of weaker economies to choose
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Figure 1. Causal inference supporting the hypothesis: repercussion of democratic deficit into the political power of hege‐
monic economies happens through junctural constraints (related with the economic and financial crisis features), institu‐
tional constraints and constitutional constraints.
the least bad policy (see Figure 2). This relies upon
the assumption that Eurozone and Covid‐19 crises are
critical junctures. Unleashed by the external shock of
the 2008 global crisis, the Eurozone debt crisis placed
the EMU’s historical path‐dependencies under instability
and threat, posing the need for decisions on emergency
financial measures and new institutional arrangements
in three policy areas (Braun, 2015, pp. 421–422). As a
moment of great uncertainty, avenues for fundamental
revision are opened, which can leverage a rupture or
just a transitional period, that may not culminate in a
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Figure 2. Causal inference of the 1st constraint: Junctural constraints actwith financialmarket pressures or effects of severe
economic downturns, external to the EU, but activating other two causal mechanisms internal to EU, with economic and
monetary path‐dependency and the result of this, the exclusion of a no measure scenario.
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The Covid‐19 pandemic reached the EU also as an exter‐
nal shock, first in the form of a health crisis, that spilled
over to an economic crisis. As long as the economic con‐
sequences turned clear, with a symmetric (and not asym‐
metric, like in 2008) expected impact, Member States
perceived they were facing an existential hazard to the
single market and the EU itself (Lady & Tsarahouas,
2020, pp. 1041–1043). Both crises required extraordi‐
nary responses, but whereas in the former it is gener‐
ally assumed, despite arguments that ECB made an ide‐
ological change (Braun, 2015, pp. 431–436), that there
was not a policy paradigm shift—rather an incremental
change through the persistence of policies and histor‐
ical institutional mechanisms (Heinrich & Kutter, 2013;
Verdun, 2015)—during the Covid‐19 pandemic there
appeared to be a learning process that led to substantial
policy change (Lady & Tsarahouas, 2020, pp. 144–151).
But if this historical institutionalist approach to crit‐
ical junctures explains policy change or permanence, it
is not sufficient to clarify if the implied institutional tra‐
jectories altered (Schmidt, 2020, p. 1181). By relating
junctural constraints with answers to both crises, in a
comparative perspective, it is intended to demonstrate
that the supposed learning process by some political
agents in Covid‐19 does not suggest evolution on institu‐
tional mechanisms, and thus not in the inherent demo‐
cratic deficit.
Despite the evidence of path‐dependency (Capoccia,
2015; Stark, 2018) on economic damage during the
Eurozone debt crisis, the financial urgency had the poten‐
tial for greater losses for weaker economies. The legal
and political answers provided did not change the
EMU ordoliberal political economy paradigm (Hillebrand,
2015), with deficit economies carrying the burden of a
rapid financial adjustment (Hillebrand, 2015, pp. 16–17).
While it’s true that those States reported historical finan‐
cial imbalances, the crisis also showed that the eco‐
nomic EMU path‐dependency was sustained in two
dichotomic models of growth, underpinning a ‘federal’
currency with which they all capitalise their economic
structural position.
The interest of the creditor economies in facili‐
tating credit to the deficit ones expressed that path‐
dependency, since guaranteeing liquidity to the latter
could systematically guarantee liquidity to the banking
creditors of the former (Copelovitch, Frieden, & Walter,
2016, p. 828). An alternative argument is that threat‐
ened Member States could veto solutions. This is true.
But ‘junctural constraints’ as a causal event answer
this. If the Troika memoranda were not accepted and a
Member State would leave Eurozone, national economic
losses would be higher than the austerity imposed, given
the pressure from the credit markets and rating agencies.
If in theory they could use the veto, in practice the EMU
path‐dependency of this crisis, considering themore frag‐
ile position of weaker economies, gave no alternative.
Greece is an example thereof. Despite government
attempts to renegotiate the memorandum to reduce
social consequences and cyclical economic impacts, the
alternative bailout plan presented by the finance min‐
ister, considered credible by some counterparts, was
rejected by the Eurogroup and the European Council
(Varoufakis, 2017, pp. 389–422). Even the national ref‐
erendum that denied the memorandum terms had no
impact on intergovernmental bargaining. In view of the
worsening of the financial situation, to the extent that
the national cash withdrawals and ECB banking liquid‐
ity guarantees would be limited, Greece had no choice
but to accept severe national solutions (Varoufakis,
2017, pp. 423–431). Even considering the historical self‐
responsibility of Greek debt and budget deficit (Gkasis,
2018, pp. 95–102), macroeconomic interdependency is
a fact in the single currency, and bankruptcy or exit from
the Eurozone would not only have dramatic economic
effects for Athens, but also a significant impact on sur‐
plus economies, like Germany (Moury, 2016, p. 74).
The same political hegemonic influence of the
strongest economies applies to Covid‐19. Faced with the
pressure on health services and the economy, govern‐
ments had no choice but to increase public spending,
leading to general national budget deficits (Arnold &
Fleming, 2020; European Commission, 2020c), a back‐
ground for resorting to the escape clause in the SGP.
Although this clause was only introduced in the six‐pack
amendment following the 2008 crisis, in practice the
same solution could have been achieved in the debt cri‐
sis. As the European Council is the decision‐making body
on the correction procedures of deficits, it could have
adopted, protected by the SGP regulations which do not
define correction periods (Council Regulation of 7 July
1997, 1997a, 1997b), longer time frames for budgetary
adjustments, relieving social and economic damage to
debtor states.
Furthermore, the different nature of this crisis has
made richer economies opt for different solutions.While
in the Eurozone the financial systemic risk could be
solvedwithmeasures directed to debtor countries, when
it comes to Covid‐19 the situation is different. It has
affected all Member States alike, although some do have
stronger structures to recover from it (Khan & Arnold,
2020). Secondly, reaching the world market, it has high
potential to affect exporting economies in the EU27
(European Commission, 2020d, 2020e). Thirdly, a repeti‐
tion of the Eurozone austerity could seriously question
the benefits of being in the Euro, making it politically
unsustainable, because the damages of exiting could be
lower than those of a new austerity (“The Eurozone
nine,” 2020; “The new channel of Eurozone instability,”
2020). The perception that the single market was under
a symmetric shock, posing a serious existential threat to
the EU, led politicians to engage in different institutional
answers (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020, pp. 1046, 1047).
It is therefore in Germany’s interest to support
the joint debt. From the moment ‘Coronabonds’ was
on the Eurogroup agenda, while the prominent ‘fru‐
gal four’ (Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden)
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were decisively against it, Germany opted for a dis‐
crete stance as the pandemic was evolving and con‐
sequences were not quite clear. Later in May, Angela
Merkel undertook with France to support the European
Commission’s recovery plan of €500 billion in grants
(Boffey, 2020), and the ‘frugal four’ accepted it in July
(European Council, 2020b).
Path‐dependency was thus a driver for the Covid‐19
outcomes, but path‐dependency was also observed in
the Eurozone crisis and, despite emergency financial
measures taken, the issue of joint debt as medium/long‐
term solution for EMU governance was revealed by EU
institutions (European Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2012;
European Parliament Resolution of 15 February 2012,
2012) but was not followed up. Germany’s support was
the element of change in Covid‐19, dragging the ‘frugal
four.’ Nevertheless, even the approved solution was not
an optimal one, which leads to the second causal event.
5.2. Institutional Constraints
This causal event is based on two institutional decision‐
making characteristics: unanimous voting, capitalising
economic into political ‘representative’ power, and
the secrecy of intergovernmental bargaining, making
national interest a driver of debate to the detriment of
ideology (see Figure 3).
Unanimous votingmakes decision dependent on one
or a few Member States, equivalent to a minority of
the population. While in the Eurozone crisis this was
not a blatant issue, as a group of northern countries
around Germany rejected expansionary policies against
southern Member States with France (Schoeller, 2019,
pp. 131, 132), this situation is clear in the Covid‐19.
The unanimity rule empowered fewMember States (the
‘frugal four’) to influence the reach of outcomes (Zalan,
2020), with consensus reached only with a significant
reduction of the initial proposal and concessions relat‐
ing budgetary contributions. Obviously, in parliamen‐
tary and open debates, negotiation must also occur.
The point here is that unanimity oversized the will of
few political actors, representing a minority of the pop‐
ulation. Even changing their extreme initial position to
support the EU public debt, the four States with low
population density but strong economies were able to
influence the Commission’s proposal for a suboptimal
achievement in a way that could not otherwise be pos‐
sible if there had been a majority voting. An alternative
institutional argument is that the veto can be exercised
by both richer and poorer states to reject a suboptimal
outcome. But economic junctural constraints undermine
its feasibility, as argued in the previous causal event. For
weaker economies, the least bad outcome is preferable
to no solution at all.
The second causal event relating to the secrecy
and informality of the intergovernmental bargaining is
argued to limit or even prevent ideological debate in
favour of nationalist arguments, thereby restricting alter‐
native policies and legitimising the institutionalised eco‐
nomic policy through the official press releases and state‐
ments following the Eurogroup and European Council
meetings. An example is the failed attempt of the
Greek Minister of Finance in 2015 to formally present
and discuss in the Eurogroup an alternative plan to
the Troika memorandum, which was blocked by the
Eurogroup president. Given the absence of formal rules



































































Figure 3. Causal inference for the 2nd constraint: Institutional constraints act with causal effects that may be common to
other policy areas, with unanimity vote and secrecy effects on the political transparency and equity of decision‐making,
which in economic governance translates economic power into political power.
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for Eurogroup meetings (Abels, 2018), he was unable to
oppose the president’s blockades (Varoufakis, 2017, pp.
430–431). Ideological debate on the political economy
of the EMU was abolished, which could have resulted in
some peers perceiving that different economic policies
could achieve equal outcomes. Informality and secrecy,
as in European Council meetings, limit or even prevent
ideological debate, diminishing the ability to persuade
public opinion and peers with alternative policies, turn‐
ing the process more technocratic than political, one of
the causes of democratic deficit (Hix & Hoyland, 2011, p.
132). Political economy, the core of political competition
in Western democracies, is reduced to institutionalised
technocracy in the Eurozone governance.
This causal event is not a denial of the legitimacy of
intergovernmental bodies to defend national interests,
or that national interest is not legitimate in a shared
sovereignty polity like the EU. The crux of the matter is
that when a Member State wants to use ideology to con‐
duct a debate, argue about national interests and envi‐
sion the EU’s future, it is highly constrained by institu‐
tional norms. The EP is of course the EU’s politicised insti‐
tution par excellence, and a counterargument is that ide‐
ological debate is conducted therein. Nevertheless, in
EMU governance, the EP has no formal powers and even
in the approval of the Covid‐19 recovery plan requiring
the EP’s decision, it does not have the media impact like
the European Council. Moreover, it is as legitimate for
governments to use ideological arguments in national
competition as it is at the EU level.
This causal event does not presuppose that ideo‐
logical debate is forbidden or never takes place in the
Eurogroup or the European Council. Itmerely argues that
informality and secrecy limits the occurrence and the
potential of the political reach of ideological arguments.
As Kutter (2020) concludes, despite the discursive politi‐
cisation in media and national fora, with alternative nar‐
ratives about the Eurozone crisis and scenarios for the
future of EMU, they did not reach EU policy‐making and
institutional discourse. Taking into consideration a hypo‐
thetical situation in Covid‐19, if debate were public there
could be arguments explaining that the joint debt does
not mean direct transfers of creditor to debtor countries,
as the traditional MFF; and that EU fiscal competences
could combat tax evasion and regulate themarket for the
sake of the collective interest. If mediatised, such debate
could improve public opinion and counterbalance gov‐
ernmental messages for domestic political competition
purposes (Darroch, 2020).
5.3. Constitutional Constraints
The last causal event relies in one of Hix and Hoyland’s
(2011, p. 131) arguments of the democratic deficit, that
an unelected President of the Commission is deprived of
the power to use the will of citizens to conduct negoti‐
ations. As power depends solely or heavily on intergov‐
ernmental structures, and as the president of the EU’s
executive body does not ensue from a direct represen‐
tative majority and is not subject to an electoral pro‐
cess after the legislature, she/he is unable to politically
use citizens’ demands to oppose the European Council’s
power game and strengthen his/her intermediation role
in the bargaining (see Figure 4). As he/she is not entitled
to be a political intermediary of the EU’s constituencies
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Figure 4. Causal inference of the 3rd constraint: Constitutional constraints derive from the absence of an election‐based
executive power, which in economic governance perpetuates economic power as the driver of change.
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national interests and efforts are mainly channelled to
reaching consensus. This, again, contributes to depoliti‐
cised outcomes of the EU economic governance.
It is true that even empowered by a majority voting,
Commission could not succeed in approving different
outcomes, but representative power could have effects
in the medium term, influencing a change for the next
legislature. We recall that in the Eurozone crisis, joint
debt issuance was called for by the Barroso Commission
(European Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) and the
European Council Presidency (European Council, 2012)
as a structural measure for the Eurozone. While lit‐
erature points to the Commission’s lack of leadership
to formalise a proposal (Schoeller, 2019, pp. 132–135),
the fact is that it faced a status quo headed by the
firm German opposition (“Merkel on eurobonds,” 2012;
Traynor & Wintour, 2012), leading it to weigh the costs
of going against it (Schoeller, 2019, pp. 135–141). Even
the Juncker Commission did not succeed when mak‐
ing a similar proposal (European Commission, 2015),
despite the discussion on a common budget for the
Eurozone. The Von der Leyen Commission succeeded in
2020, with the EU’s constitutional design remaining the
same, only with the shift in German’s position being dif‐
ferent (Boffey, 2020). But while the Covid‐19 responses
appear to be more equitable for the EU Member States
and trigger a policy change in economic governance, this
does not remove constitutional constraints. The shift in
Covid‐19 outcomes were as much allowed by the hege‐
monic economy as was restrained by the remaining ‘fru‐
gal four,’ managing to refute the Commission’s proposal
in a way that a majority rule would have found difficult.
The hypothetical power of a majority‐based Commis‐
sion gains ground when considering the EP adoption, in
April 2020, of a resolution calling for a massive recovery
package based on the reform of the EU’s own resources
through enhanced fiscal capacity (European Parliament,
2020), or that the EP had already accepted in 2012
eurobonds could be a medium‐term solution for stabil‐
ising the Eurozone (European Parliament Resolution of
15 February 2012, 2012), exercising leadership on the
issue, but restricted by the limits of constitutional design
(Schoeller, 2019, pp. 150–157).
Obviously, in the field of a shared sovereignty polity,
the citizens’ chamber is balanced with the states’ repre‐
sentative power; however, recalling the second causal
event, the unanimity rule causes disproportionate power
in favour of a smaller group of economically hegemonic
states, thus undermining the Commission’s ability to
push for politicised‐based results to the detriment of
nationalist‐based ones. Of course, the opposite would
not be a guarantee that the results would always meet
the demands of the citizens, but if this was not the case
the electorate could have a say in the choice of the next
executive, which would appease the issue of democratic
legitimacy (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p. 548).
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Studies of democratic legitimacy about the EU abound.
What this interdisciplinary research aims to demonstrate
is that the damage of the EU’s democratic shortcoming
aggravates, by spilling over into the field of economic
governance, tending to permanently convert economic
power into political ‘representative’ power, in the result
of the structural national positions in institutional path
dependencies of EMU, thus reproducing economic and
political inequalities. If responses to the Covid‐19 crisis
suggest that a policy paradigm shift occurred, this does
not translate to a change in this state of affairs.
The research confirms the spillover and path‐
dependency logic of integration, leveraged by the Franco‐
German axis at critical junctures. However, this study
adds to the debate the conclusion that democracy has
been especially perverted in economic critical junctures,
when decisions are either blocked or unblocked by the
strongest national economies in their interest, and the
EU economic governance is a decisive perpetrator of this.
If EMU’s institutional mechanisms paved the way for
two different models of economic growth with antago‐
nist but interdependent interests, economic critical junc‐
tures tended to perpetuate the political over‐hegemony
of previous surplus economies, when one considers their
democratic representativeness. Even admitting that the
economic policies achieved can also be in the interests
of loss‐making economies, the problem is that the con‐
stitutional design allows the perpetuation of logic of
economic power corresponding to political power, disre‐
garding political representation as such.
Nevertheless, it is admissible that the Covid‐19 cri‐
sis led to different governmental perceptions and a dis‐
ruptive answer by the EU agents. Its outputs opened
avenues for a change in the political economy of the
Eurozone, with prospects of a fiscal union, redistribu‐
tion, and joint debt at the supranational level, as Ladi
and Tsarouhas (2020) conclude. But this was again a
decision triggered and conditioned by the hegemonic
economies, either the decision of advancing for a dif‐
ferent solution or the difficulties posed to restrain the
original proposal. The literature explains this as a conse‐
quence of the structural indeterminism of critical junc‐
tures (Braun, 2015, p. 423), boosting the dominant nar‐
ratives and empowering (even more) the most powerful
actors (Heinrich & Kutter, 2013, pp. 124–125). It is plau‐
sible that the German position was essential to deter‐
mine the responses to Covid‐19 (Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020,
p. 1052), but such an assumption reinforces our argu‐
ment on the permanence of institutional mechanisms,
allowing the economic hegemonic states to be decisive
actors. Despite the different results, the institutional sta‐
tus quo hasn’t changed.
Schmidt (2020, pp. 1180–1182) reminds that if the
historical tracing of responses to critical junctures based
on rational choice and constructivist approaches can
provide explanations for policy change, that is only a
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partial analysis, insufficient to demonstrate if there was
a reframing of institutional mechanisms and constitu‐
tional norms by the actors. If we agree that Covid‐19
has resulted in policy‐learning, we put into question if
political ideology was a factor for policy shift and the
change of Germany’s position, as Ladi and Tsarouhas
argue (2020, p. 1045). We tried to demonstrate that it
was the particularity of the Covid‐19 crisis that posed
hegemonic actors in a non‐alternative solution, or the
possibility of the alternative solution being too danger‐
ous for the survival of the EU, the single market, and
thus for national economic growth strategies. Outputs
were not the consequence of a voluntary ideological
option, resulting from political competition at the EU
level. While we acknowledge that from the Eurozone
crisis a process of policy learning happened, boosted
by the national politicization on the issue, with growing
representativeness of Eurosceptic parties, and that such
politicization is gradually reaching the EU institutions
(Schmidt, 2020, p. 1186), this research argues that the
Covid‐19 decision‐making itself was rather self‐interest
based than politicized based. Politicization means ideo‐
logical contestation and competition based on majority
dialects of power. If it happens in the EP, in the European
Council bargaining, the goal is rather to reach unanimity
to meet the consensus.
In Covid‐19, path‐dependencies and heightened
awareness of self‐interest dependent on common inter‐
est led to a step further in integration, nevertheless the
consequent increased EU economic and financial pow‐
ers can also be a time‐bomb waiting to explode anytime
a crisis generates junctural conditions to. Considering
the new involved scope of EU fiscal competences, in the
short term it may address citizens’ demands and con‐
ceal the democratic issue, but not in the medium/long
term. It is placed for the future the need to decide
on the levels of taxation and their scope. The fiscal
policy is at the heart of the governments of Western
European democracies and is a typical element of par‐
tisan competition and public discontent. If future deci‐
sions are subject to the current constitutional and insti‐
tutional mechanisms, it will replicate national economic
conflicts, and the dialectics of power will remain the
same. Van Loon (2021) case‐study clarifies the influ‐
ence of domestic preferences on EU taxation issues.
Decisions that should be politically based will continue
to be secured by territorial‐based preferences. Thus, if
the results of Covid‐19 mitigate democratic legitimacy
for some time, it may just be postponing and enhancing
it in the next crisis. The prospects for a redistributive EU
should not be at the expense of democracy, putting the
competences that should be in the field of politics under
a kind of technocratic federalism (Habermas, 2013, p. 5).
In futuremoments of economic downturn, should the EU
fail, what would be questioned is not the continuity of
the EU executive, since the electorate cannot play a deci‐
sive role in choosing an alternative, but the EU itself as a
political system. This is at the heart of Eurosceptic claims.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Abels, J. (2018). Power behind the curtain: The
Eurogroup’s role during the crisis and the value
of informality in economic governance. European
Politics and Society, 20(5), 519–534. https://doi.org/
10.1080/23745118.2018.1542774
Arnold, M., & Fleming, S. (2020, October 19). Euro‐
zone budget deficits rise almost tenfold to counter
pandemic. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://
www.ft.com/content/5579361f‐5aac‐4cd3‐9e93‐
190fffdc0baf
Beach, D., & Pederson, R. B. (2016). Process‐tracing
methods. Foundations and guidelines. Ann Arbor, MI:
The University of Michigan Press.
Bellamy, R., & Weale, A. (2015). Political legitimacy and
European monetary union: Contracts, constitutional‐
ism and the normative logic of two‐level games. Jour‐
nal of European Public Policy, 22(2), 257–274.
Bennett, A. (2010). Process tracing and causal infer‐
ence. In H. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), Rethinking
social inquiry (pp. 207–220). Plymouth: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Boffey, D. (2020, May 18). Merkel and Macron propose




Boffey, D., & Rankin, J. (2020, July 21). EU leaders
seal deal on spending and €750bn Covid‐19 recov‐
ery plans. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/20/macron‐
seeks‐endacrimony‐eu‐summit‐enters‐fourth‐day
Braun, B. (2015). Preparedness, crisis management and
policy change: The euro area at the critical juncture
of 2008–2013. The British Journal of Politics and Inter‐
national Relations, 17, 419–441.
Capoccia, G. (2015). Critical junctures and institutional
change. In J.Mahoney& K. Thelen (Eds.),Advances in
comparative historical analysis (pp. 147–179). Cam‐
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Caporaso, J., & Tarrow, S. (2008). Polanyi in Brussels:
European institutions and the embedding of markets
in society (RECON Online Working Paper Series, 1).
Oslo: RECON.
Chang, M. (2009).Monetary integration in the European
Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process‐tracing. Politi‐
cal Science, 44(4), 823–830.
Copelovitch,M., Frieden, J., &Walter, S. (2016). The polit‐
ical economy of the Euro crisis. Comparative Political
Studies, 49(7), 811–840.
Council Regulations (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 252–264 261
positions and the coordination of economic poli‐
cies. (1997a). Official Journal of the European Union,
L 209/1.
Council Regulations (EC) No. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure. (1997b). Official Journal
of the European Union, L 209/6.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 of 8November 2011
on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of
the excessive deficit procedure. (2011). Official Jour‐
nal of the European Union, L 306/33.
Darroch, G. (2020, May 3). Mark Rutte: The ‘world‐
class’ pragmatist trying to take the drama out of




de Jongh, M., & Theuns, T. (2017). Democratic legit‐
imacy, desirability and deficit in EU governance.
Journal of Contemporary European Research, 13(3),
1283–1300.
Delwit, P. (2015). Introduction à la science politique
[Introduction to political science]. Brussels: Éditions
de l’Université de Bruxelles.
European Central Bank. (2012). Compliance of outright
monetary transactions with the prohibition on mone‐
tary financing. Frankfurt: European Central Bank.
European Central Bank. (2020a, June 4). Monetary
policy decisions [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/
html/ecb.mp200604%20~a307d3429c.en.html
European Central Bank. (2020b, March 18). ECB
announces €750 billion pandemic emergency pur‐
chase programme [Press Release]. Retrieved from
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/
html/ecb.pr200318_%201~3949d6f266.en.html
Elliott, L., Inmam, P., & Smith, H. (2013, June 5). IMF
admits: We failed to realise the damage austerity




Eurogroup. (2020). Remarks by Mário Centeno, fol‐
lowing the Eurogroup video conference of 9 April




European Commission. (2011a). European renewal:
State of the Union address (Speech No. 11/607).
Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. (2011b). Green paper on the fea‐
sibility of introducing stability bonds. Brussels: Euro‐
pean Commission.
European Commission. (2012).Ablueprint for a deep and
genuine economic and monetary union launching a
European debate. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. (2015). Completing Europe’s eco‐
nomic and monetary union. Brussels: European
Commission.
European Commission. (2020a). Communication:
Europe’s moment, repair and prepare for the next
generation. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. (2020b). Communication to the
Council, on the activation of the general escape
clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (COM
[2020]123 final). Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. (2020c). Communication to the
EP, the Council, and the ECB, on the 2021 draft bud‐
getary plans: Overall assessment. Brussels: European
Commission.
European Commission. (2020d). The impact of the
Covid‐19 pandemic on global and EU trade (17th
April 2020). Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. (2020e). The impact of the
Covid‐19 pandemic on global and EU trade (27thMay
2020). Brussels: European Commission.
European Council. (2012). Towards a genuine economic
and monetary union (Report EUCO120/12). Brussels:
European Council.
European Council. (2020a, March 23). Statement of EU
ministers of finance on the Stability and Growth




European Council. (2020b). Special meeting of the Euro‐
pean Council. Conclusions (Report EUCO10/20). Brus‐
sels: European Council.
European Investment Bank. (2020). Coronavirus out‐
break: EIB Group’s response. European Investment
Bank. Retrieved from https://www.eib.org/en/
about/initiatives/covid‐19‐response/index.htm
European Parliament Resolution (EP) No. 2011/2959 of
15 February 2012 on the feasibility of introducing sta‐
bility bonds. (2012). Official Journal of the European
Union, CE 249/2.
European Parliament Regulation (EP) No. 1175/2011 of
16November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coor‐
dination of economic policies. (2011).Official Journal
of the European Union, L 306/12.
European Parliament. (2020). Resolution of 17 April 2020
on EU coordinated action to combat the Covid‐19
pandemic and its consequences (2020/2616). Brus‐
sels: European Parliament.
Fernandes, A. J. (2010). Introdução à ciência política
[Introduction to political science]. Porto: Porto
Editora.
Follesdal, A., & Hix, S. (2006). Why there’s a demo‐
cratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and
Moravcsik. Journal of CommonMarket Studies, 44(3),
533–562.
Gkasis, P. (2018). Greece and European monetary union:
The road to the demise of Greek economy. In O.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 252–264 262
Parker & D. Tsarouhas (Eds.), Crisis in the Eurozone
periphery. The political economies of Greece, Spain,
Ireland and Portugal (pp. 93–110). London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Gouveia, A. F. (2018). Completing the economic and
monetary union: What economic and fiscal gover‐
nance? In J. M Caetano & M. R. de Sousa (Eds.),
Challenges and opportunities for the Eurozone gov‐
ernance (pp. 121–144). New York, NY: Nova Science
Publishers.
Habermas, J. (2013). Democracy, solidarity and the Euro‐
pean crisis. Paper presented at the KU Leuven Euro‐
forum, Leuven, Belgium.
Habermas, J. (2015). Democracy in Europe: Why the
development of the EU into a transnational democ‐
racy is necessary and how it is possible. European
Law Journal, 21(4), 546–557.
Heidebrecht, S. (2021). Financial crisis, emergency
reforms, and the challenge for democratic gov‐
ernance at the centre of Eurozone. Unpublished
manuscript.
Heinrich, M., & Kutter, A. (2013). A critical juncture in EU
integration? The eurozone crisis and its management
2010–2012. In F. E. Panizza & G. Philip (Eds.), The pol‐
itics of financial crisis. Comparative perspectives (pp.
120–139). London: Routledge.
Hillebrand, R. (2015). Germany and its Eurozone crisis
policy. German Politics and Society, 33(1), 6–24.
Hix, S., & Hoyland, B. (2011). The political system of the
European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Inglehart, R. (1970). Public opinion and regional integra‐
tion. International Organization, 24(4), 764–795.
Khan, M., & Arnold, M. (2020, November 5). Brus‐
sels scales back expectations for EU’s economic
recovery. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://
www.ft.com/content/908fa7dc‐9825‐45b9‐bba9‐
94f07418fb13
Kutter, A. (2020). Construction of the Eurozone crisis: Re‐
and depoliticising European economic integration.
Journal of European Integration, 42(5), 659–676.
Ladi, S., & Tsarouhas, D. (2020). EU economic gover‐
nance and Covid‐19: Policy learning and windows of
opportunity. Journal of European Integration, 42(8),
1041–1056.
Lang, G. (2004). Les politiques budgétaires et le pacte de
stabilité [Budgetary politics and the Stability Pact].
In M. Dévoluy (Ed.), Les politiques économiques
européennes [The European economic politics]
(125–168). Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Majone, G. (1996). La communauté Européenne: Un état
régulateur [The European community: A regulatory
state]. Paris: Montchrestien.
Merkel on eurobonds: ‘Not in my lifetime.’ (2012,
June 27). Euro Active. Retrieved from https://www.
euractiv.com/section/euro‐finance/news/merkel‐
on‐eurobonds‐not‐in‐my‐lifetime
Moreira, V. (2017). “A vontade dos cidadãos da União”:
A democracia supranacional da União Europeia
[“The will of the Union’s citizens”: The suprana‐
tional democracy of the EuropeanUnion]. Estudos do
Século XX, 17, 45–80.
Moury, C. (2016). A democracia na Europa [Democracy
in Europe]. Lisboa: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos
Santos.
Parker, O., & Tsarouhas, D. (2018). Causes and conse‐
quences of crisis in the Eurozone periphery. In O.
Parker & D. Tsarouhas (Eds.), Crisis in the Eurozone
periphery. The political economies of Greece, Spain,
Ireland and Portugal (pp. 1–27). London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Pereira, L. B., & Sousa, M. R. (2018). Towards a full
banking union in Europe: Waiting for the next crisis?
In J. M. Caetano & M. R. Sousa (Eds.), Challenges
and opportunities for the Eurozone governance (pp.
81–97). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Rankin, J. (2020, July 21). EU summit deal: What
has been agreed and why was it so difficult? The
Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2020/jul/21/eu‐summit‐dealwhat‐
Reis, J. (2016). Quando a sombra domina a luz: A econo‐
mia política do empobrecimento (Portugal pós‐1993)
[When shadowovershadows light: The economic pol‐
itics of impoverishment (Portugal post‐1993)]. In E. P.
Ferreira (Ed.), União Europeia. Reforma ou declínio
[European Union. Reform or decline] (pp. 46–48). Lis‐
boa: Nova Vega.
Ruchet, J. (1998). La fiscalité des états de l’Union: Diver‐
sité ou divergences? [The fiscality of the Union states:
Diversity or divergences]. In D. Schlacther (Ed.),Ques‐
tions d’Europe. Le débat économique et politique
[Questions on Europe. The economic and political
debate] (pp. 168–177). Paris: Ellipses.
Sánchez‐Cuenca, I. (2017). From a deficit of democ‐
racy to a technocratic order: The postcrisis debate
on Europe. Annual Review of Political Science, 20,
351–369.
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe, effective and
democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scharpf, F. (2010). The asymmetry of European integra‐
tion, or why the EU cannot be a social market econ‐
omy? Socio‐Economic Review, 8(2), 211–250.
Schmidt, V. (2007). L’Union Européenne crée‐t‐elle
ou détruit‐elle la démocratie? [Does the European
Union create or destroy democracy?]. Politique
Étrangère, 3, 517–528.
Schmidt, V. (2013). Democracy and legitimacy in the
EuropeanUnion revisited: Input, output and through‐
put. Political Studies, 61, 2–22.
Schmidt, V. A. (2020). Theorizing institutional change
and governance in European responses to the Covid‐
19 pandemic. Journal of European Integration, 42(8),
1177–1193.
Schoeller, M. (2019). Leadership in the Eurozone. The
role of Germany and EU institutions. Switzerland:
Palgrave.
Snell, J. (2016). The trilemma of European economic and
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 252–264 263
monetary integration, and its consequences. Euro‐
pean Law Journal, 22(2), 157–179.
Sebastião, D. (2020). Parties in the EU political system.
Growing determining actors? In R. Moldovan (Ed.),
The European Union. Policies, perspectives and pol‐
itics (pp. 131–152). New York, NY: Nova Science
Publishers.
Shively, W. P. (2011). Power and choice. An introduc‐
tion to political science. New York, NY: McGraw‐Hill
Companies.
Silva, A. M. (2017). A aventura da moeda única. Enredos
e dilemas, processos e desafios: Ensaio de história e
de política [Adventures of the single currency. Plots
and dilemmas, processes and challenges: An essay of
history and politics]. Coimbra: Imprensa da Universi‐
dade de Coimbra.
Stark, A. (2018). New institutionalism, critical junctures
and post‐crisis policy reform. Australian Journal of
Political Science, 53(1), 24–39.
The Eurozone nine. (2020, March 26). Euro Intelligence.
Retrieved from https://www.eurointelligence.com
The new channel of Eurozone instability, part 1 (2020,
March 21). Euro Intelligence. Retrieved from https://
www.eurointelligence.com
Traynor, I., & Wintour, P. (2012, May 24). Euro‐
zone crisis: Germany and France clash over
eurobonds at summit. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/
may/23/eurozone‐crisis‐france‐germany‐divide
Van Loon, A. (2021). European financial governance: FTT
reform, controversies and governments’ responsive‐
ness. Politics and Governance, 9(2), 208–218.
Varoufakis, Y. (2017). Comportem‐se como adultos
[Behave like adults]. Oeiras: Marcador.
Verdun, A. (2015). A historical institutionalist explanation
of the EU’s responses to the Euro area financial crisis.
Journal of European Public Policy, 22(2), 219–237.
Zalan, E. (2020, July 20). EU summit enters four day with
recovery deadlocked. EU Observer. Retrieved from
https://euobserver.com/economic/148985
About the Author
Dina Sebastião is an Assistant Professor at the University of Coimbra, Faculty of Arts and Humanities,
and a research member at CEIS20. She holds a PhD in European Studies and has been researching EU
policies and politics, mainly through the study of parties, the Europeanization, with a special focus
on Portugal and Spain. Within these subjects, she has been participating in international conferences
and published chapters and articles in several peer‐reviewed journals. She was awarded the Jacques
Delors 2017 Prize/Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for best academic study in EU issues.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 252–264 264
Politics and Governance is an innovative new offering to 
the world of online publishing in the Political Sciences. 
An internationally peer-reviewed open access journal, 
Politics and Governance publishes significant, cutting- 
edge and multidisciplinary research drawn from all areas 
of Political Science.
www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183-2463)
